European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues

Annual EENeT Conference 2014 in Ávila/ES and EENeT Subgroup Meeting 2015 at CEPOL in Budapest / HU

Focussing Radicalisation
June 2014 – Mai 2016

About the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues

The EENeT is an independent, non-partisan consortium of terrorism experts from European law enforcement agencies / relevant authorities and the field of science
It is dedicated to a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency analysis and research which is seen as a prerequisite to provide comprehensive insights into the complexity of the phenomenon "terrorism".

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For all matters related to the paper series, please write to the
EENeT Administrative Office, currently located at the
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Preface

Dear Readers!

Thanks to the generous financial support of the EU and the hard work done by the EENeT Administrative Office and Steering Committee, we had the opportunity to host the annual EENeT Conference 2014 in The National Police Academy in Ávila.

As the following pages record, the Conference, was full of stimulating presentations which were followed by a frank exchange of information and useful discussions. The thematic configuration of the meeting, with the four chosen blocks: Radicalisation - Deradicalisation, Methodological Approaches, Phenomenological Changes in Terrorism and Extremism and Counter-Terrorism provided us a great opportunity to address the phenomenon of terrorism as it is, influenced by a wide range number of factors.

The papers that you are about to read, will show the diversity of the EENeT, and give us a stronger and wider understanding of the different topics on the table. We really enjoyed taking part in the EENeT Conference 2014 and wish that you enjoy as well the reading of the outputs of such an stimulating event.

<div align="right">
Mr. Fernando Martínez Marty
National Police of Spain
</div>

Assessing the terrorist threat: The organizational structures' role in committing acts of terrorism.

Brecht Volders
Ph.D. candidate, Research Group on International Politics, Antwerp University, Belgium

Terrorism scholars as well as policy-makers often believe successful acts of terrorism are dependent on material resources - such as scientific data, financial resources and access to arms. Yet, this limited focus fails to grasp the subtle complexities in organizing a terrorist act. In concreto, the organizational structure assigns, controls and coordinates the various roles, power and responsibilities within a terrorist organization. It substantially influences the effective and efficient use of the organization's material resources. Assuming the rationality of a terrorist organization, this theoretical paper primarily adopts agency theory. We will explore the essential components of any organizational structure - 'membership', 'operational space and time', 'formalization' and 'centralization' - and their respective impact on the terrorist organization's capacity to successfully complete more complex terrorist attacks while maintaining secure.

Introduction[1]

'On April 9, 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, a front group for AQI, declared that his group was changing its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), indicating his desire to play a greater role in the Syrian civil war. The emir also claimed that AQI had already been fighting in Syria in the form of the Nusra Front, which he said was subordinate to him. Yet Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the Nusra Front's leader, refused to acknowledge Baghdadi as his leader; instead he pledged a direct oath of allegiance to Zawahiri. In response to the spat, Zawahiri sent a private message ruling that both men had erred: Baghdadi by not consulting Jawlani, and Jawlani by refusing to join ISIS and giving his direct allegiance to Zawahiri without permission from al Qaeda central.' (McCants 2013, p.1)

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[1] This paper is work in progress. It also has been presented at the ECPR Graduate Student Conference 2014. Please do not cite without consent of the author.

This bureaucratic power struggle is a prime example of terrorist organizations' susceptibility to organizational challenges. Like any competent manager, Ayman al-Zawahiri needs to keep tabs on the members' activities and devote resources on keeping them in line with the organization's aims. (Shapiro, 2013a) Without such organization, "no group of individuals acting under a common rhetorical banner can achieve an effective scale of violence. Well-managed organizations have conducted bombing campaigns in the Basque country, Northern Ireland and Pakistan, and it was a competently organized Al Qaeda that attached the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001." (Shapiro, 2013b, p. 1-2). Yet, terrorism scholars as well as policy-makers often believe that access to tangible resources - such as scientific data, financial resources and access to arms and material - is sufficient for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. This perspective fails to grasp the subtle challenges in organizing terrorism. As the competition between the Nusra Front and ISIS illustrates, also terrorist organizations need to be effectively coordinated and managed. These intangible specifics of any organization continuously affect the acquisition and efficient use of any material resources. (Ouagrham-Gormley 2012, Stepanova 2008)

In what follows, this exploratory paper will particularly focus on the impact of the terrorist group's organizational structure to their capacity to organize and conduct more complex acts of terrorism. More complex attacks refers to attacks with a large scale of operations. Other intangible tools, such as the social environment or the organizational culture, should not be underestimated. Yet, the organizational structure assigns, controls and coordinates the various roles, power and responsibilities in an organization. Mintzberg (1993) defines the organizational structure as, "the sum total of the ways in which its labor is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks." This has a direct impact on the functioning of the terrorist organization, and their effectiveness and efficiency. We will focus on the impact of four contingent structural components: 'membership', 'operational space & time", 'formalization', and 'centralization'. These are not fully exogenous. Yet, we will take these as given in a fixed timeframe for reasons of clarity. Moreover, we assume a terrorist organization to have a collective rationality. The act of terrorism itself is always perceived as benefitting some of the collective preferences and values of the organization. (Crenshaw 1998)

The 'structural capacity' of a terrorist organization

Terrorist organizations are covert organizations. "They rely on stealth and secrecy to complete their missions". (Shapiro 2013b) Contrary to regular organizations, clandestine organizations' actions to improve its operational effects are antithetical to its actions to improve its security. In order to achieve the highest operational impact, terrorist organizations must apply various communication and coordination mechanisms to control its members. Yet, any such communication and coordination mechanism entails significant vulnerabilities with regards to the simultaneous need to maintain security. (McCormick & Owen 2000) Wireless as well as material communication modes can be intercepted and interfered from a distance. Personal electronic devices (e.g. cell phones) can be intercepted or used for finger prints. Mobile computing can lead to loss of critical data and operational compromise. Internet access facilitates bidirectional access. Standardized routines, rules and procedures may define patterns that law enforcement agencies and intelligence services can exploit, etc. (Don, Frelinger, Gerweh, Landree & Jackson 2007). A prime example is the CIA's success in killing Osama Bin Laden after they managed to trace Bin Laden through its courier (Bergen 2012).

The organizational structure has an essential impact on this inverse relation between capacity and security. The "ways in which its labor is divided into tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks" strongly influences this balancing act between achieving the highest operational impact while simultaneous maintaining security. Building on organization theory (e.g. Mintzberg 1993, Morgan 2006, Dalton & Todar 1980) and terrorism literature (e.g. Jackson 2006, Cragin & Daly 2004, McCormick & Owen 2000), we have identified four contingent structural components. Each of these components sets the stage in which the terrorist organization carries out its tasks and activities in an fixed timeframe. "They construct the anatomy of the terrorist organization and provide a foundation within which the organization functions." (Dalton et al 1980, p. 49)

- First, the organizational structure is constructed by the organization's membership. Membership refers to the size of the organization (both to the number of cells and number of members within each cell) as well as to particular tangible and intangible skills of the members. Principal-agent theory suggests an increasing number of members will lead to an increasing level of delegation, and vice versa. In order to function efficiently, principals delegate conditional authority with respect to certain tasks to an agent rather than micro-managing everything on their own. Yet,

these independent actions by an agent might not always be in perfect alignment with the expectations of the principal. We expect this to have implications on both the efficiency of the organization as the security of the organization. In addition, the particular skill-set of any member is likely to impact the type of attack that can be carried out. For instance, nuclear terrorism would require the cooperation of members with particular engineering skills and knowledge on nuclear physics. Hence, we believe both the number of members and the level of members' skills will directly influence the successful functioning of any organization.

- Second, the structure of a terrorist organization is also composed by the operational space and time an organization has at its availability. Any (complex) attack requires a specific level of planning and training to execute the attack. (Cragin & Daly 2004) Consequently, each terrorist cell and its individual members needs to be able to turn to a secure location for a vast amount of time, which can range from local hideouts over urban neighborhoods to state sanctuaries. Building on principal-agent theory, we expect that the level of secure operational space and time directly impacts the likelihood of terrorists conducting successful acts of terrorism and simultaneously maintaining the group secure. It allows for better strategic coordination while reducing operational and tactical vulnerabilities.

- Third, the level of *formalization* has an essential role in the ways its labor is divided into distinct tasks and coordination is achieved among these tasks. Formalization refers to, "the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and communications are written, and the degree to which roles are explicitly defined." (James & Jones 1976, p.80) As delegation between principals and agents would occur, this mechanism aims to help principals to control their agents. Clear communication and coordination strengthens the planning and execution of a complex attack. Yet, it also leaves traceable evidence for law enforcement agencies. As previously indicated, direct communication modes can be intercepted. Formalization is thus expected to have an direct impact on a terrorist organization's balancing act with respect to their capacity to carry out more complex attack versus their need to remain secure for law enforcement agencies.

- Finally, the organizational structure is most directly constructed by the level of *centralization*. This refers to, "formal as well as informal measures with respect to the locus of authority to make decisions affecting the organization, and re-enforcement of these decisions." (James & Jones 1976,

p. 80) It is through this mechanism that leaders plan, coordinate and execute the attacks of the terrorist organization. (Cragin & Daly 2004) Classifications fall within a continuum from 'hierarchical' to 'network'. Again, as delegation occurs, this component is believed to be essential in influencing the level of control principals have over their agents. An hierarchical structure implies more tight control over subordinates. Yet, it also entails some security vulnerabilities. It is less robust against penetration to the higher levels of an organization. This is a direct security threat for the leadership of any terrorist organization.

Hence, these four contingent structural components are expected to influence the extent to which terrorist organization can successfully cope with the inverse relation between capacity and security. Together, these components determine the organizational structure of an organization. Yet, actual terrorist organizations are frequently hybrids of different structural types. There is a significant level of heterogeneity, which impedes the selection of a few particular organizational types. (Jackson 2006) To overcome these problems with setting up an typology, we need to focus on the impact of the individual contingent structural components. Note, however, that the distinction between these four contingent structural components is arbitrary. All components are closely related and, sometimes, even overlapping.

Success versus security

Conventional wisdom dictates that the primary criterion to define successful acts of terrorism is the number of casualties. 9/11 is perceived as a success for terrorist organization considering nearly 3000 people died. Yet, any terrorist attack should always be framed in a terrorist organization's deliberate strategy to advance its end. America's furious reaction after 9/11 might be considered counterproductive to Al Qaeda achieving their broader ends. Whether a terrorist group aims for regime change, territorial change or policy change, terrorism is always, "the considered application of means to advance one's end." (Harmon 2008, p. 39) Thus, it is clear that any terrorist organization's strategy is a multi-layered concept. In order to categorize any act of terrorism as successful, it requires competence across all levels of the, "taxonomy of strategy." (Lonsdale 2007, p.6) The highest level of this taxonomy is the strategic level. It consists of a plan to acquire broad policy goals (e.g. territorial or regime change). In concreto, terrorist organizations deliberately chose terrorist acts as a means of pursuing their ends. (Jones & Libicki 2008, Crenshaw 2011) This is achieved at the lowest level of strategy, the tactical level. This level refers to the specific acts of terrorism (e.g. suicide bombings or kidnappings). The tactical

engagements will be linked together to the overall strategy by means of the operational level. As Lonsdale (2007) pointed out, "the operational level can be thought of in both conceptual and material terms. Conceptually, this level links tactical engagements together in the overall terrorist strategy. Materially, we can think in terms of a geographic area within which forces are moved." Any terrorist attack must be a success on the tactical, operational as well as strategic level. For example, although the 2003 attack on Western compounds in Riyadh were a tactical success, it seemed like Al Qaeda was no longer able to exercise control over its members given the attacks mainly killed Muslims. The successful tactical engagements were not in line with the overall strategy of attacking Western targets.

The four identified contingent structural components will have an effect on the likelihood of terrorist organizations achieving an attack which is successful across all levels of the strategy taxonomy. Yet, they will also affect the likelihood that these terrorist organizations run some security risks. There is a clear tradeoff between both considerations. The next sections will outline the main considerations that terrorist organizations face when carrying out acts of terrorism.

Membership

Membership refers to the size of the organization (both the number of cells and number of members within each cell) as well as to particular tangible and intangible skills of the members. It serves as the driving force behind any act of terrorism. No terrorist organization can physically function without its members. They determine the pool from which terrorist organization can draw when deciding to carry out a tactical attack. Consequently, the quantity and quality of this pool will impact the likelihood of successful terrorist attacks. It will influence the complexity of the operations which they can undertake and the overall probability of achieving the desired attack. Relatively simple operations such as suicide bombings, assassinations or assaults do not require the participation of many well-skilled terrorists. However, an attack on the scale of 9/11 required various members to carry out reconnaissance assignments, coordinate logistics such as safe houses and transport, communicate with authorities, set up an assault team with fly skills, etc. (Jackson & Frelinger 2009) It is no surprise that Al Qaeda - which according to Hoffman (2011) has a more active presence in more places than it did in 11 September 2001 - is still able to carry out coordinated simultaneous terrorist attacks on a regular basis. Its global Jihad often benefits from, "resources mobilized for other purposes." (Deloughery 2013)

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Yet a higher number of members also impedes clandestine groups from keeping their operatives off law enforcement agencies' radar. (Jackson & Frelinger 2009) As the mere number of members grows, the capacity of the leader to effectively manage its members tends to decrease at an increasing rate (McCormick & Owen 2000). A small group with few members in a relatively small area has limited management requirements. Yet, when a group grows larger, it is in need for a better command and control system. (Cragin & Daly 2004) It has to keep control over its members in order to avoid both unsuccessful attacks – on either the tactical, operational or strategic level – and leaks, detections or defections. To illustrate, the FARC assassinated nine hikers in Colombia's Purace National Park in February 2000 without the prior knowledge or consent of the group's leaders. This led to turmoil within the FARC, and a backlash from the group's traditional supporters that were furious by the attack. (Cragin & Daly 2004) Besides the serious damage to their strategic interests, the turmoil within the organization and decreased popular support strengthen the likelihood of leaks, detections or defections. Uncontrolled use of violence implies serious security considerations. The benefits associated with the growth of membership are thus increasingly offset by these difficulties. Well-skilled members and leaders - which opt for the right weapons, number of operatives to be used, the correct allocation of financial and other resources, etc. – can, "postpone the point of diminishing marginal returns." (Jackson & Frelinger 2009, p. 29)

Operational space & time

Operational space & time refers to, "ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both." It allows terrorist organizations to plan and inspire acts of terrorism around the world. (U.S. department of State country reports on terrorism 2013) This leads to a positive impact on all the levels of the strategy taxonomy. Members of the Rote Armee Fraktion are known to have been overseas with respect to crucial training courses by Palestinian terrorist organization. They helped them to further develop their urban guerilla warfare skills in Jordan and Syria in 1970. (Billig 1985, Aust 1985) Likewise, the FARC operated within in a demilitarized zone in Southwestern Colombia from 1998 to 2002. This enabled them to coordinate their activities without concern over arrest or disruption, thereby enhancing their urban warfare capabilities and bolstering their weapons supplies (Cragin & Daly 2004). Moreover, operational space & time allows the terrorist organization to link any tactical engagement more effectively with their broad policy goals. It enables them to communicate and reflect upon the impact of any terrorist

attack on the long-term goals of the organization. The senior leadership of Al Qaeda had the opportunity to discuss various options before deciding to carry out the specific attacks of 9/11.

Yet, the moments that terrorists actually organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit and operate are the moments at which they are most vulnerable. Increasing operational space and time requirements for terrorist organizations lead to a growing opportunity for law enforcement agencies to permeate the relative security being exploited by terrorist organizations. For attacks with a large scale of operations, the leadership faces an increased threat of leaks, defection and or detections during the attacks preparations. A frequently cited example is Operation 'Bojinka' in 1995 - which aimed to blow up a dozen commercial airliners by means of nitroglycerin-based bombs. The plot progressed a great deal but was uncovered when the perpetrators made a mistake while mixing a batch of explosives in their apartment. The following fire drew the attention of the Philippines authorities (Homeland Security Institute 2007). Other vulnerabilities to law enforcement agencies are, e.g., the interception of communication (especially in case of a large geographical spread between various cells), suspicious neighbors informing the police, etc. Law enforcement agencies can benefit of terrorist organizations that fail to effectively and efficiently use the operational space and time at its availability. The longer terrorist organizations would need a place of relative security, the higher the chance that the terrorist management experiences some complexities and/or incidents will occur.

Formalization

Formalization refers to "the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and communications are written, and the degree to which roles are explicitly defined." (James & Jones 1976, p. 80) A strong level of formalization ensures clear and compelling communication lines, well-defined roles and task allocations and a well-developed monitoring and control mechanism of terrorist leaders over the individual members. Shapiro (2013b) argues convincingly that terrorist groups use these bureaucratic-type rules to deal with, "preference divergence and the resulting internal conflict within an organization." This will lead to more successful attacks – on the complete taxonomy of strategy. He provides the example of Al Qaeda in Iraq's "Fighter Registry Reports". The organization's personnel was divided in three categories: incoming fighters, permanent emirate fighters, and exiting brothers. It detailed the work that they were expected to do. Moreover, there were even "membership commitment forms" found. These were meant to memorialize the members to their tasks.

Yet, although helpful in effectively coordinating and guiding an organization, it creates obvious security problems. Strong, written connections are a vulnerable target for penetration by law enforcement agencies. It is no coincidence that intelligence services noted the pattern of Al Qaeda activity indicating an attack had reached a crescendo shortly before the 9/11 attacks. (9/11 commission report 2004) Standardized routines, rules and procedures can construct vast patterns that law enforcement agencies and intelligence services might exploit. Material communication modes can be intercepted. (Don, Frelinger, et al. 2007) A prime example is the CIA's success in killing Osama Bin Laden after they managed to trace Bin Laden through its courier. His attempts to steer his organization proved to have sincere negative consequences – both for him as the Al Qaeda organization. (Bergen 2012) Weak connections, on the other hand, are very robust to penetrate. Terrorist organizations acknowledge this. For instance, Louis Beam's "leaderless resistance" model wrote formalized rules and procedures that were actually designed to weaken the connection between the individual and the group.

Centralization

Centralization refers to, "the formal as well as informal measures with respect to the locus of authority to make decisions affecting the organization, and re-enforcement of these decisions." (James & Jones 1976, p.80) The classification on the continuum from 'hierarchical' to 'network' has an important impact on the control over their subordinates on each level of strategy. Hierarchical organization implies a more clear command and control system, more accountability between various units and the central control, and a stronger likelihood of specialization between the different units (Heger, Jung & Wong 2013) Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, early Marxist factions as well as the Red Brigades all initially chose for a centralized, hierarchical organization. (Shapiro 2014) Yet, on the other hand, a lack of centralized control and coordination can stimulate innovation. More independent actors can frequently experiment with new approaches more easily. The centralized PIRA council, for instance, had different parts of PIRA to attempt new operations, ranging from attacking and sinking British coal ships at sea to attempting to bomb security force targets from the air. (Jackson et al 2005) This can stimulate bottom-up creativity, team-work and engagement. (Hymans 2012)

Yet, again, there is a clear inverse relationship: an hierarchical organization is more easy to penetrate. Leaks, detection or defections' impact is much stronger due to the close connection between different units and members in the organization. The loose structure of PIRA, for instance, enabled them to recover

from the capture of a high commander of the Belfast Brigade - Gerry Adams – in a week or so. (Mobley 2008) Yet, when the PIRA tightened their organizational structure, they became more vulnerable to law enforcement agencies. There is the example of PIRA volunteer Raymond Gilmour. This was a low-level driver for his cell. Yet, he became the ideal British informant due to his regular contacts with a wide range of PIRA members throughout Derry. (Mobley 2008). Nevertheless, there are also security considerations with more network-type of organizations. The risk of this type of organization lies in the fact that your lack of control creates the conditions for the agents to do things contrary to the will of the principal. This impedes the successful carrying out of a terrorist act, or can even imply security risks due to the increased risk on defection or leaks.

As previously mentioned these four contingent structural components are closely interrelated and can be overlapping. For instance, operational space & time might be relying on the passive and active support of members of the organization. It is the unique combination of these structural components which will impact the capacity of terrorist organizations to carry out successful acts of terror. Yet, in general, there is an inverse relationship between their capacity for succesful attacks and their need to remain secure.

A case study

The relevance of a concept is determined by its usefulness. (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011) This paper aims to sketch a first explorative case study to reflect on the impact of the organizational structure of a terrorist group. Aum Shinrikyo made headlines around the world in 1995 when members carried out a chemical attack on the Tokyo subway. A nerve agent – sarin – was released onto 5 train cars, killing twelve and causing an estimated six thousand people to seek medical attention (Fletcher 2012). The preparations – including weaponizing and testing the chemical agents – were a large scale of operations. Note that this is only one particular case. The specific nature of this case - e.g. the mere fact that Aum Shinrikyo was considered to be a religious sect – implies that no generalizations can be drawn from this. This is merely meant as a first explorative exercise.

First, Aum Shinrikyo succeeded in attracting over 9000 Japanese members, including a group of young scientists and engineers. They abandoned traditional career tracks to serve the charismatic leader, Asahara Shoko. (Metraux 1995) The mere number and particular scientific skills of these members enabled the organization to successfully work on biological and chemical weapons. Besides the Sarin attack – where multiple members

coordinated a simultaneous, multi-point attack – Aum launched 17 known chemical and biological weapons attacks between 1990 and 1995. (Ballard et al 2001) The quality of the pool of members influenced the success of their attack. Yet, there were important limitations. Technical expertise remained limited to the inner circle of Aum Shinrikyo due to security considerations. They were confronted with various technical problems that hindered the efficient execution of the attack. These could potentially be overcome more easily by outsider help. Furthermore, due to security considerations, the organization had to execute, torture, or isolate members who appeared to have moral qualms about the organization's activities and its overall strategy. (Ouagrham-Gormley 2012, Danzig et al 2011) This clearly demonstrates that the benefits often associated with a growing organization are increasingly offset by managerial difficulties in securing the organization.

Second, Aum had the opportunity to work on its biological weapons program for approximately six years. There were no real intrusive investigations by the police. As the high number of preceding CBW attacks demonstrate, they had the operational space and time available to plan and train for the Sarin attacks (Ouagrham-Gormley 2012). The building known as Satyan 7, for example, housed a moderately large-scale chemical weapons production facility. Despite the relative crude design of this facility's design, it was nonetheless very capable of producing the sarin used in, e.g., the Matsumoto attack. (Olson 1999) Note that the relative weak Japanese law enforcement agencies is probably a very important factor. It most likely substantially contributed to the fact that this organization achieved to carry out the Sarin attack. Yet, as the other sections also demonstrate, Aum Shinrikyo remained wary for security considerations. Numerous incidents during the preparation of Aum's biological and chemical attacks led to complaints by local residents. One of these complaints to the police in 1993 led them to move from their headquarters in Tokyo to a location near Mount Fuji. A couple of months later, they had to move again due to neighbors' complaints. Hence, they had to transfer equipment and documents, and even destroy some of its agents. (Ouagrham-Gormley 2012, Danzig et al 2011) This type of actions demonstrates that terrorist organizations acknowledge the success versus security tradeoff. Despite the obvious efficiency loss, and the passive law enforcement agencies, Aum Shinrikyo opted nevertheless to move their activities.

Third, Aum Shinrikyo's strong level of formalization mimicked a governmental structure with more than 15 ministries with particular tasks. There was, e.g., a ministry of defense, a ministry of science and technology, a ministry of construction, a ministry of finance, and a ministry of intelligence. (Senate

Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation 1995). Moreover, there was a strict ranking between subordinates. Followers were categorized into seven ranks of enlightment. Communication was strictly regulated and access to work areas was highly formalized. Asahara's orders were clear, and they were acted upon as decrees. (Danzig et al 2011) His requirements on the tactical level were clear and well-matched to Aum's strategic goals, leading to a succesful act of terrorism. Yet, this clearly included some security risks. For instance, an Aum badge - an explicit symbol of the Aum Shinrikyo organization – was found beside the corpse of one of its most eminent critics. Yet, this did not lead to more investigative attention to the group. (Danzig et al 2011) More active law enforcement agencies could have made use of these type of liabilities.

Finally, this lacking law enforcement pressure also neutralized security-risks related to the centralization of Aum Shinrikyo. They were hierarchically centralized and autocratic. Shoko Asahara and his inner circle made every decision, specifically with respect to their biological and chemical program. This well-defined vertical chain of command and control allowed tactical, operational as well as strategic control over their agents. It led to a successful 1995 Sarin attack. Yet, more active law enforcement agencies could have penetrated this type of organization more easily. Furthermore, this authoritarian management style did not allow the use of technical expertise existing outside the inner circle, and lacked a system of checks and balances. Decision-making was often based less on science than on the irrational believes of its leaders. Had the chemical mixture and delivery system been slightly different, the resulting tragedy would be unprecedented. (Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 1995) The group persevered in bioweapons, despite repeated failures in culturing, production and dissemination of pathogens. (Ouagrham-Gormley 2012) This clearly impeded any innovational flexibility. In addition - besides the obvious strategic disadvantages - these failures did entail various security risks. Leaks, detections or defections are more likely to occur when faced with failures.

Conclusion

This theoretical paper elaborated on the impact of a terrorist group's organizational structure. How does it influence their capacity to successfully complete more complex terrorist attacks? We explored the usefulness of this exercise by means of a first application to the Aum Shinrikyo's Sarin attacks in 1995. Assuming the rationality of a terrorist organization, this paper primarily applied principal-agent theory to identify various organizational challenges. Yet, further refinement by extra scholarly effort is necessary. It is necessary to

systematically investigate these ideas, and adopt organizational perspectives beyond the rational framework as well. Jacob Shapiro is one of the most outstanding scholars today working on this topic.

Despite these reservations, we have strong indications to believe that the organizational structure of a terrorist organization has an substantial impact on a terrorist organization's capacity to successfully complete more complex terrorist attacks. In concreto, it strongly influences the success versus security tradeoff that terrorist organizations face when carrying out complex acts of terrorism. Counterterrorism efforts must focus on tipping the balance in favor of compromising the group, and disturbing their efficiency equilibria. As Levi argues, "it has often been said that defense against terrorism must succeed every time, but that terrorists must succeed only once. This is true from plot to plot, but within each plot, the logic is reversed. Terrorists must succeed at every stage, but the defense needs to succeed only once." (Levi 2007)

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**Indicators of transitioning of non-violent actors into terrorism:
A systematic review of research that can guide screening, assessment and
the identification of high-risk individuals (GENESIS).**

Dr. Kiran Sarma
School of Psychology, NUI Galway, Ireland

Objectives. The specific review question that guided the research is: What are the detectable risk factors for violence that may be implicated in the transitioning of non-violent actors into terrorism? The synthesis will inform efforts to develop risk assessment and screening tools that can support decision making in counter-radicalisation and security vetting areas. The study forms part of a broader programme of research (GENESIS, funded by the Irish Research Council) that seeks to explore the feasibility and utility of developing evidence-based screening and assessment tools that can facilitate the identification of high-risk individuals.

Method: The systematic review covered the terrorism-specific literature. The search included a sweep of the main electronic databases (e.g. science direct, informaworld etc.) and on-line search engines (e.g. Google Scholar). Leading authors in the field were also contacted to identify any unpublished papers or presentations relevant to the review question. To be included in the review the research had to be applicable – that is, isolate detectable risk-factors for transitioning into violence.

Results: We isolated a range of historical, dispositional (e.g. demographic, cognitive, emotional), behavioural and contextual/situational factors that may be implicated in transitioning into violence, illustrating a high degree of variance in the factors across and within networks and organisations.

Conclusions: The radicalisation-specific literature is under-developed. Much of the literature has emerged on individual risk factors for radicalisation has done so in isolation from the broader psychological and group-dynamic literature on violence. We argue that the current state of the evidence cannot be used to develop actuarial risk assessments that lead to the categorising of individuals (e.g. high/medium/low), but that there is sufficient evidence to develop risk assessment systems (Decision Making Systems) that can help front-liners systematically examine known risk factors and therefore guide decision making.

Implications: The results have implications for those working to identify at-risk individuals – including front-line practitioners working on so-called 'counter-radicalisation initiatives', those involved in the vetting of new or existing staff in security-sensitive environments, and for scientists who may, in the future, seek to devise new assessment and screening tools.

For more information about the study and GENESIS programme, see:

http://whitakerinstitute.ie/project/identifying-collectives-transitioning-new-terrorist-entities-genesis/

...

The radicalisation process of the NSU[2]

Ina Schmidt
BA, Faculty of Social Studies Department of political Science, Masaryk University (Brno), Czech Republic

Abstract
In 2011 the last member of an extreme-right terror-cell in Germany reported herself and her already dead colleagues to the police and by this revealed the racial background of 10 murders over a long period of time, which till this date were not even suspected to be conducted with a racist background. The inquiry of the case is still not finished and all in all the case attracted a lot of medial, public and political attention.

Being such a recent case the following paper assumes its high significance for the studies about radical movements in the contemporary time and their establishment in modern societies. The aim of the paper is to provide an analysis of the factors that contributed to the radicalisation of the NSU, the way this process developed and the important influences. This sets the focus to the first years of the NSU, the time of their consolidation until they finally disappear into illegality and underground. The article is built upon a theoretical framework consisting of already existing theories about individual radicalisation processes and analyzes the factors that contributed to the radicalisation of the NSU based on public sources concerning the history and early events around the NSU.

Conceptualization and differentiation

According to a basic conceptualization by Bötticher and Mares, radicalism is a comprehensive term which includes also extremism and in its core terrorism (Bötticher & Mares 2012). According to their model radicalisation shall be understood in the framework of this paper as the development from a radical into a terrorist. Radicalisation was also defined amongst others in the European Survey of Youth Mobilization (British Council & St. Andrews University 2011 p.7) as the acceptance of violence or other undemocratic means to reach ones' goals and more general as a social process which is experienced by the radicals that transform into terrorists.

Although radicalism and extremism are often used synonymous in the public discourse there is a significant difference. Extremism is against the constitutional democratic state and aims for the rise of a dictatorship, state while radicalism, though criticizing the established forces, finds itself at the end

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[2] NSU = Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground)

of the democratic continuum, still supporting the democracy as such (Mares 2014). Terrorism is amongst others characterized as the "demonstrative use of violence against persons, threat of more violence, intimidation, communicating the acts of violence to a larger audience, the political motivation of the act and others" (Schmid 2011).

Possible factors contributing to radicalisation

The theoretical framework for the work consists mainly of one more general and one more specified approach towards radicalisation, which were selected due to their close connection with the research question and the intention to use their findings and implications for the research.

The first approach concerns the nature of radicalisation in general and is the approach on which the EU research project "Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law" (TTSRL) is based. According to this notion there isn't any single explanation for radicalisation but it is always the result of a complex interaction between different factors, which can be divided into an external, a social and an individual level. Though these factors do shape individual behaviour they don't have direct effects on it, but at the social and individual level develop some dynamics that directly involve the individual and provide the ground for external factors. Further there are catalysts that abruptly accelerate the radicalisation process like trigger events and recruitment (TTSRL 2008 p.9).

External causes that might apply to the case of radical-right terrorism in Germany are economic deprivation and poverty (TTSRL 2008 p.20) and globalization and modernization that facilitate frequent intercultural action and by this can according to some scholar increase the probability of intercultural conflicts (TTSRL 2008 p. 21). Causal factors at the social level might be the identification with particular social groups or dynamics that arise in the network and its structure (TTSRL 2008 p.25-26). Trigger events are very specific for the respective scene and its priorities and premises and have to be identified in every case individually.

Further the analysis is built upon the approaches by Daniel Köhler, who researched the impact of the group on the consolidation of radical movements. He developed a theoretical model of the mechanisms of interaction between the radical milieu and their positive and negative target societies with the aim to understand single processes of radicalisation, militant group behavior and the respective strategies that are developed (Köhler 2014/2 p.451).

Köhler identifies three most important points of interaction between radical milieu and target society. The first one is the infrastructure, which refers to

events, the economic infrastructure which ensures the financial support for the radical movements, the corporate design which provides visual elements and the individual platform, meaning the expected outer appearance of members (Köhler 2014/2 p. 455). As a second important aspect follows the ideology of the radical group, which is in competition with the ideology and values of the non-radical society. The extent of radicalisation is according to this model characterized by the ideological gap, which is one of the central impulses behind group-specific and individual processes of radicalisation (Köhler 2014/2 p. 457). The third influential feature is the internal hierarchy in the radical group.

The major finding from a second study by Köhler concerning individual motivation for entry and exit in the radical scene is, that non-politicized ideals, combined with the desire for expression, are attached by radical right groups to a concrete political program and assignment to foster a specific internalization of a political ideology and expected behavior (Köhler 2014/1 p. 307). The author identified three phases, entry, belonging and exit, which are characterized by an increasing degree of politicization, expressed in assignments, roles and activities for the political struggle. The attitude towards violence is changing over the phases, the individuals become prone to the strategic use of violence. The entry, the important phases for this paper, is characterized by the wish for expression of certain values, ideas and ideals, as well as the wish for a (collective) identity, individuality and dislocation. Also chance and random meetings often play a significant role and in the process of the radicalisation the motives do shift more and more to an idealistic political essence (Köhler 2014/1 p. 338-339). Formative influences (family and the social environment) were identified in all of the researched cases (Köhler 2014/1 p. 321), as well as a desire for expression (Köhler 2014/1 p. 326).

While the first approach by the TSSRL, like many other studies, researches and theories, focuses more on religious, Islamic radicalism and had to be applied selective to the following research, the findings by Köhler explicitly concern the radical-right scene in Germany, though he states that his findings can be also applied to radicalism in other contexts.

The paper adds to the study by Köhler insofar, as in the case of the NSU-members the element of exit is missing. The assumption is, that the factors that cause the entry into the radical right scene are instantly the same while factors that lead to the exit appear in the later phase of belonging to the scene. Concerning the TTSRL-Study the assumption that factors contributing to radicalism are instantly the same in the cases of radical right or religious extremism shall be verified at least according to the selected example of radical right violence.

Radicalisation process of the NSU

The information for the following part was collected mostly by researching public newspaper sources for the early history of the members of the NSU and by relating on the official documents and records about the investigation of the NSU-case by the court.

With regard to the more general approach of the TTSRL-Project the *economic deprivation and poverty* can be confirmed for Beate Zschäpe, while the families of Mundlos and Böhnhard belonged rather to the higher, good earning parts of the society, the parents of Böhnhard working as teacher respectively engineer, the father of Mundlos being even a professor. Only Zschäpe grow up in insecure circumstances (Hünniger 2014). Here might be remarked that the economic situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall in Eastern Germany was characterized by insecurity, which the people did not experience in this way before and that the people all of a sudden found themselves in direct comparison with the West of Germany.

The notion that *globalization fosters intercultural conflicts* cannot be confirmed by the case study, as in this part of Germany are hardly living any foreign nationals till today (Thüringer Landesamt für Statistik 2011). Here might be the contrary thesis mentioned, stating that also a lack of contact with foreign nationals can foster radical attitudes, the so-called *contact-hypothesis*, which is nevertheless disputed among scholars and was already researches with contradicting results (Köhler 2014/1 p.341-342).

The *identification with a certain social group* and the d*ynamics of the radical right* are often expressed in the musical subculture and through concerts, which were regularly attended by Zschäpe, Böhnhard and Mundlos (Cieschinger, Almut et all 2013). Also the "Winzerclan", a youth club with a strong right-wing orientation which was joined by the three NSU-Members in their early years (Döbert 2011) might be seen as an expression of internal dynamics of the extreme scene.

According to the model of radicalisation by Daniel Köhler the *formative influences* by parents and/or the social environment are fairly important in the first phase of the radicalisation process. Though the families at least of Mundlos and Böhnhard did not share the radical attitudes of their children (Zeit 12.10.2014, Hünniger 2014), Mundlos Böhnhard and Zschäpe definitely grew in a part of Germany and during a time when radical right ideas were fairly widespread.

The *wish for individuality and collective identity* is harder to confirm with the available information, but at least the search for a collective identity can be seen in the fact that the trio regularly visited the Winzerclub, later on joined the radical right-oriented group "Thüringer Heimatschutz" and later on even

funded the radical-right companionship "Kameradschaft Jena" (Cieschinger, Almut et all 2013).

Concerning the *fortuity of their first contact* with the radical right scene it is possible to argue that they had, through the locality in which they grew up, a certain predisposition to choose the respective way. On the other hand the club in which they first met was not explicitly right-oriented, but on the contrary excluded members whose attitude changed too much and had clear rules against radical right (Zeit 12.10.2014), so in the meeting exactly in this location lies some also character of randomness. Due to the policy of the Winzerclub Zschäpe, Böhnhard and Mundlos were excluded as their attitudes were getting too radical (Döbert 2011). This exclusion from legal opportunities forced them to search for other opportunities which are by definition likely to be more radical, as they need to tolerate the radicalised attitude, so a self-enforcing process develops.

The *desire for expression*, as well part of the first phase according to Köhler, is clearly confirmed by the fact that the Verfassungsschutz found extreme-right propaganda material in the garage rented by Zschäpe and used by all three (Cieschinger, Almut et all 2013), while the claim that the *degree of politicization* is still low in this phase must be denied, as the actions of the three NSU-members already in the first phase seem to be highly politically motivated.

Also a *dislocation* is taking place, as the NSU left their city of origin and fled to another city in order to escape the police and the issued arrest-warranties (Cieschinger, Almut et all 2013). Through this change of the locality the old connections to the society outside the radical spectrum got cut; in the new location the individuals are less likely to establish new contacts to the non-radical spectrum, which further contributes to their radicalisation. Also the cut of the contact to the parents contributes to these developments and was further important as the families mainly of Mundlos and Böhnhard did not share the radical attitude and were not likely to tolerate the developments from a certain point on (Hünniger 2014). Connected with their flight to a different city Zschäpe. Böhnhard and Mundlos also created a parallel life, which was especially important in order to be able to operate in democratic structures without raising suspicion.

Also the *importance of the infrastructure* is found in the case study, so all three visited for example concerts and Mundlos wore the typical clothing and symbols even before he met Zschäpe and Böhnhard (Döbert 2011). Later on they NSU actively used this infrastructure for themselves, to collect money, get a false ID and flat and be able to further follow their intentions (Cieschinger, Almut et al. 2013). At this point it is unlikely that the radical group will continue

to exist if there will not be established structures that can help them financial as well as bureaucratic.

The assumption by Köhler that with increasing radicalisation the *ideological gap* between radical milieu and target society is growing can be confirmed for example by the statement that they chose their victims according to the criteria of being Non-Arian, male and in a potent age (Röpke 2012), which made them in the eyes of the NSU "enemies of the German people" (Thüringer Landtag 2014 p. 19). Further the NSU set for itself the goal to cause a transformation of the system of the Federal Republic Germany in favour of a National-Socialist system (Thüringer Landtag 2014). This way of thinking, connected with the simple fact that they murdered for their conviction mirrors an already high ideological gap between target society and radical group.

Conclusion

Based on already established researches the paper took a look on the factors that contributed to the radicalisation of the members of the radical-right terror group NSU that was active in Germany from 2000 till 2006. The paper identified the exclusion from legal opportunities that forces the individuals to search for alternatives which are likely to be more radical, the change of the location and the loss of the old social environment, the support from the radical-right scene and the creation of a parallel life in order to not awake any suspicion as most significant for the concerned case study and further described a broad range of other influential events and circumstances.

The analysis showed that the case confirms the assumptions of other authors in many cases and that Beate Zschäpe confirms even more assumptions than the other two members. Further the external factors lined out in the TTSRL-project have to be denied, as well as the assumption by Köhler that the politization is low in the beginning of the radicalisation. If these findings correspond to the differences between NSU and the cases on which the respective researches were built upon (TTSRL-project: Islamic extremism instead of right-wing extremism; Köhler: no exit by the members) has to be further researched and verified by other case studies

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Contemporary right-wing extremist violence in Europe: An overview

Prof. Miroslav Mareš
Director of the study program Security and Strategic Studies at the Faculty
of Social Studies, Masaryk University (Brno), Czech Republic

Right-wing extremist violence in Europe is considered a serious security threat. The aim of this paper is to describe and to analyze the spectrum of this violence, mostly from the point of view of its actors, strategies and tactics. Europe is defined in its geographical borders for the purposes of this article, it is not limited only to EU-countries.

Ideologically, many concrete variants of right-wing extremism can be identified in Europe, however, three ideological streams are most important – the ultraconservative authoritarian right (sometimes linked to Christian dogmatism), neo-Fascists and neo-Nazis and a part of the new right. Borders between these three categories are not strictly defined, many overlaps and unclear cases can be found (for example clergy neo-Fascism is connected also with ultraconservatism).

The violent spectrum was in post-War period connected mostly with the neo-Fascist and neo-Nazis spectrum, however, the current situation is typical of the use of violence by some new right representatives (for example, Anders Breivik or vigilante groupings around English Defence League) or ultraconservative militants and fighters (for example, Russian Orthodox Army in Donbass)(Bötticher, Mares 2012: 298-314, Mares, Visingr 2015).

Actors of right-wing extremist violence can be "normal citizens" with right-wing extremist attitudes, people from subcultures and social movements, members of terrorist groups (or terrorist "lone wolves") or paramilitary and military right-wing extremist units. It is questionable if right.-wing regime violence exists in contemporary Europe (it depends on characterization of concrete political regimes – see below).

A List of the main direct forms of right-wing extremist violence in contemporary Europe with examples is included in the following table:

Ad hoc street violence and incidents	Hate crimes without preparation (right wing extremist attacks against political, ethnic, national, racial, sexual or other enemies in streets, schools, clubs, pubs etc.) Ad hoc clashes between right-wing and left wing youngsters, ethnic gangs, prisons gangs or imprisoned individuals with extremist background etc. Inaccurate or false individual self-defence etc.
Violent demonstrations and counter-demonstrations and riots	Anti-Muslim Demonstrations in Germany 2014/2015 (only a part was violent!); Anti-Roma Riots in East Central Europe; Marches of the extreme right (only a part is violent, as the March of Independence in Poland); Attacks against LGBT parades in Central and Eastern Europe
Vigilantism	East Central European paramilitaries connected with political parties (successors of the Hungarian Guard, Guard of Independence in Poland, Protection Patrols of the Workers´ Party); Anti-Muslim and anti-Immigrant Patrols (Italy, UK etc.); National Liberated Zones (Germany, East Central Europe), European Defence League and its national branches etc Violent hidden units of political parties (maybe Golden Dawn militants in Greece).
Militant subcultures and social movements	Skinheads (their REX part) Hooligans (their REX part), Autonomous Nationalists, Nazi Punks Casa Pound, Identitarian Movement (only a part is violent), Military Fans (only a part is REX and violent), Outlaw MC Gangs (only a part is REX and violent);

Militant networks with violent and terrorist propaganda	Combat 18/Blood & Honour + Terrormachine + Aryan Strikeforce, European National/Free Resistance (part), Anti-Antifa, White Aryan Resistance, Wotan Jugend Misantropic Division, Knights Templar Europe and many national groupings;
Terrorism	Groups , for example, National Socialist Underground in Germany, Death Squad or The Arrows of the Hungarian National Liberation Army in Hungary or the National Socialist Party in Russia; Individuals ("Lone Wolves"), for example Anders Breivik, David Copeland, Franz Fuchs etc., maybe Brunon Kwiecień in Poland, sometimes it is not clear if the perpetrator acted alone or with links to a group (for example Pavlo Lapshyn and possible links to the Wotan Jugend) or it is not clear if he/she had clear right-wing extremist belief and terrorist character (for example, Peter Mangs in Sweden)
Wars and military conflicts with right-wing extremist participation	Right-wing extremist units (including foreign fighters) in Ukrainian conflicts (Ukrainian - for example battalion „Azov", Battalion „Donbass", Battalion Aidar", military arm of the Right Sector - and separatists, for example Russian National Unity, Russian Orthodox Army, commando Russitsch, commando Varyag, some right-wing foreign fighters in battalions Prizrak or Vostok, however, here are also leftist foreign fighters!) Right-wing extremist units preparing for future Balkan wars (Albanian National Army, some Serbian Cetniks groupings etc.);

Regime right-wing extremist violence (depends on characteristization of the regime in Russia and in separatist "peoples´ republics" or on interconnection of some Ukrainian right-wing extremist organizations with the regime etc.)?	- Pro-Regime right-wing extremist forces in Russia, separatist republics and maybe Ukraine; - Eurasianists and pro-Putin Militants in Russia (etc.), Speculations about support of Russsian secret services for right-wing extremism (including violent groups) in Europe

Sources of the table:

Backes 2012; Bötticher, Mares 2012, Bötticher Mares 2013, Mares – Visingr 2015, Mayer – Odehnal 2010, Ministerstvo vnitra CR 2015, Smolik 2010, Rekawek 2015

If right-wing extremist violence is used with strategic aims, we can distinguish between several strategies:

- Threatening and/or revenge (for example Anti-Antifa strategies, campaign Good Night Left Side and interconnected campaigns, maybe violent campaign of the Golden Dawn in Greece against political opponents etc.);
- Leaderless resistance as the first phase of protracted war (for example current Combat 18 strategies, some parts of the European National/Free Resistance);
- Initiation of mass civil war by small cell terrorism with the goal to initiate paramilitary war and then "final" European conflicts against "enemies of European civilization" (for example strategy in Breivik´s manifesto);
- Strategy of Tension /"False Flag" operations – they are based on a violent act which seems to be committed by enemies of the extreme right, in fact right-wing extremists are responsible for them. The goal is to win public support and to initiate public anger against these enemies (for example Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty BBET - in Belgium);
- Use of vigilantism as a strategy with the goal to win public support thanks to "law and order" capabilities;

- Military strategies within the context of great strategies of concrete countries or separatist/irredentist regions to win control over a territory (for example right-wing extremist units in Ukraine).Most important targets of right-wing extremist violence in various European regions are included in the following table (Backes 2012, Bötticher, Mares 2015, Knack.be 2014, Mares 2005: 131-137, Mayer Odehnal 2010, Rekawek 2015).

Western, Southern and Northern Europe	Muslims + Immigrants; left-wing and multicultural activists, police.
South-Eastern Europe	Traditional „national enemies", Roma, LGBT community
East-Central Europe	Roma, left-wing and multicultural activists; LGBT community, Muslims, immigrants; police.
Eastern Europe	Immigrants from Caucasus and Central Asia; left-wing and multicultural activists; LGBT community; traditional „national enemies"

It is important to mention that violence between various ideological streams of right-wing extremists is possible (for example clashes between neo-Nazi and nationalist activists in the Czech Republic) and that right-wing extremists from various nations can fight against each other (Serbian and Albanian, Ukrainian and Russian nationalists etc.)(Stojarová 2012, Vejvodová 2014).

Right-wing violent extremists cooperate sometimes with other variants of extremism. Right-wing extremism can be interconnected with separatist/irredentist extremism (as in Southern Tirolia) or with anti-separatist extremism, as in Ulster (McAuley 2012). For example in separatist units right-wing and left-wing foreign fighters in Donbass are fighting together and in East Central European countries (including former territory of the German Democratic Republic) a broad ideological front of supporters of Novorossia is active (Mares, Visingr 2015). Traditionalist neo-Nazis groupings have – thank to the anti-Semitic belief - links to Baathist Arabian extremists and to the regime in Iran, rarely also to some forms of Islamism (as to Radio Islam). On the other hand, cooperation of „modern" anti-Muslim New right with some Jewish militants against Islamic opponents represents a specific case, a.o. within the English Defence League (Meleagrou, Brun 2013: 15).

Violence is promoted also in right-wing extremist propaganda (on the internet, white power music, novels, movies, fashion brands and motives, computer games etc.). Besides current violent forms, groupings, strategies, "heroes" etc. (see above) also serious historical forms of violence are propagated (or denied), as Axis WW II Crimes and crimes against humanity, Jewish holocaust, Roma

holocaust, genocide in Srebrenica etc. (Výborný 2012). Sometimes themes from non-extremist spectrum are glorified by extremists (as the murder in the Slovak town Hurbanovo, where several Roma people were killed by one shooter, however, without extremist background)(Janíček 2015: 50).

Some European right-wing extremists are violently active outside Europe. Currently allegedly several foreign fighters serve for Kurdish and maybe for Assad´s units against the Islamic state. Political support is declared for Assad Regime in Syria, mostly by the European Solidarity Front for Syria, for Palestinians and Karen People in Burma (Bötticher, Mares 2013). In the last decade some Europeans were engaged in South African white racist groupings or in anti-leftist fight in Latin America, as Hungarian and Croatian right-wing extremists in plot in the Bolivia in 2009 (Sputnik 2015).

On the other hand, on European territory right-wing extremists from abroad are active, as Turkish Grey Wolves (they are violent against political opponents) or Caucasian militant nationalists (clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalists due to conflict in Nagorno Karabakh can be assessed as a threat, maybe also the activities of Georgian nationalists against opponents)(Mareš 2013: 60).

The spectrum of various ideological streams, forms, strategies, tactics or targets of violent right-wing extremism in Europe is very broad and heterogeneous. As the most serious variants of REX-violence in contemporary Europe we can define (with respect to the number of victims and to capability to de-stabilize security order):

- Right wing extremist violence connected with anti-Muslim activities;
- Right-wing extremist violence against Roma and
- Right-wing extremist violence connected with Ukrainian crisis.

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Multiple right-wing violent actors in the state of Saxony (Germany)

Matthias Mletzko
Research Project by Backes/Haase/Logvinov/Mletzko/Stoye, Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung e.V. an der TU Dresden, 2014
(Hannah Arendt Institute for the Research on Totalitarianism, Germany)

The idea to investigate multiple violent actors (MIT) with political motivation came about during a research project comparing right-wing violence in two German states – Saxony and North-Rhine-Westphalia (Backes/Mletzko/Stoye 2010). One of the findings was that this type of multiple offender played a significant role in areas of aggravated violent activity. Astonishingly enough no analytical work could be found on this question – although it is common criminological knowledge in the general field of criminal behaviour, that the small group of multiple offenders deserves special attention because their contribution to the total of criminal acts is disproportionately high. A first research proposal 2010 fell asleep in interior ministry desks for almost two years – until the NSU-case of right-wing terrorism caused rude awakenings and drew public attention nationwide and beyond in November 2011.

The project started in summer 2012 and ended August 2014 with funds of the interior ministry of Saxony. The data base: 70 intensive violent actors (IT) could be selected out of a total of 1683 right-wing violent offenders who acted in a timeframe from 2001 to 2011. Selection criterion was a minimum of four violent acts in the German police registration system for politically motivated crime (PMK) - readiness for repeated use of violence seems to me a pretty good indicator for radicalisation. Those 70 were involved in 151 violent actions. The study tried to generate knowledge to the following leading questions:

- What are social-biographical specifics of the actors?
- Which types of actors - event seeking or ideology-based - can be identified?
- What are the patterns of violent action – direction, planning, mode of action, intensity?
- What are specifics of the groups of multiple violent actors?
- What are specifics of ideological inputs? (party-affiliations, hate music)
- Which factors of radicalisation can be identified?

For reasons of time and pragmatism (analytical emphasis of the speaker) my focus will be on patterns of action and groups.

Before getting into details I would like to put the subject of investigation into nationwide context to get the proportions right. This picture shows the Saxony state quota of right-wing violence nationwide is remaining on a stable level – whereas the national curve oscillates to a certain degree, but never approached the unique eruptive wave of xenophobic violence at the beginning of the nineties. Compared to other states, Saxony traditionally bears a disproportionately high relative quota next to other eastern states like Saxony-Anhalt or Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.

Right-wing violent actions nationwide and state Saxony 2001-2012

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
⊞ Sachsen rechts	95	112	77	66	93	78	90	127	85	98	88	54
☐ Sachsen rechtsextremistisch	85	89	69	63	89	77	90	126	84	98	84	54
▦ Bund rechts	980	940	845	832	1.034	1.115	1.054	1.113	959	806	828	842
⊠ Bund rechtsextremistisch	709	772	759	776	958	1.047	980	1.042	891	762	755	802

Source: Jahreslageberichte BKA, LKA Sachsen

Some other specifics of right-wing violence in Saxony: The direction differs from the nationwide pattern where xenophobic violence leads, followed by confrontations against leftists. In Saxony we have the opposite picture – confrontational violence leads, followed by xenophobic actions. Furthermore there is a higher percentage of manifestation-related violence, due to a series of demonstrations with nationwide mobilization.

A few remarks on the base and collection of data: Main sources were police data and court files – interviews with actors did not work unfortunately. Although we have a harmonized police data system for criminal acts with political motivation (PMK) since 2001 the compilation of long term police data to obtain

our population of actors was everything else than easy due to several administrative and procedural obstacles – security bureaucracy in Germany is a never ending story, to put it mildly. The collection of Court files ran smoothly – this was the bulk of the empirical base. Other than that militant scene media were analysed to determine ideological inputs. Interviews with actors were intended but could not be realized.

Now to our hard-core group of 70 intensive violent actors (IT) in Saxony: We had a total of 1.683 violent actors in that state (2001-2011). About 1/3 of those (n= 461) were multiple actors (2-3 violent acts) – "MT". This MT group carries almost half (n=471) of the total of right-wing violence (n=994).

Abb. 1: Mehrfach- und Intensivtäter 2001 – 2011

Our IT-group (minimum 4 violent acts) breaks off the MT-group as shown here (n=70) and participated in 151 violent actions - 15% of the total of right-wing violence in Saxony. Obviously we are not talking about a majority group, but about a group of actors with significant qualitative features – as indicated by the fact that almost the half tends to life-threatening violent behaviour.

Which leads to patterns of violence: First of all we were looking into intensity of action – there are no items in German police statistics on violence which would indicate the degree of brutality, with the exception of attempted and completed homicides and assaults with arson and explosives. An unknown number of life threatening assaults simply gets lost in the legal category of dangerous physical injury (repeatedly criticized but never changed). Based on forensic medicine

evaluations of life threatening inputs on the body we built a registration format of typical physical assaults as shown here:

Tab. 1: Lebensbedrohliche Tatbegehungsweisen

TI	Erf.–Code	n = ?	Handlungsweise
			Stumpfe und stumpfkantige Gewalt:
I	9	47	Tritte auf am Boden Liegende
I	8	29	Tritte gegen Kopfregion
I	6	15	Schläge/Würfe mit schwereren Gegenständen aus Glas (volle Flasche, Bierkrug) gegen Kopfregion
I	1	11	Schläge mit schwereren stockartigen Gegenständen (Metallstange, Baseballschläger, Totschläger, Hockeyschläger) Zaunlatte, Stuhlbein, Besenstile, Holzstangen) gegen Kopfregion
I	3	3	Schläge mit stockartigen Gegenständen (Metallstange, Baseballschläger, Totschläger, Hockeyschläger, Zaunlatte, Stuhlbein, Besenstile, Holzstangen) gegen übrige Körperregion; bei besonders wuchtiger Ausführung und schwerem Gegenstand u. U. = I
I	11	2	Stoß des Kopfes gegen festes Widerlager, bei besonders wuchtiger Ausführung = I
I	2	1	Schläge mit sonstigen stockartigen Gegenständen (Zaunlatte, Stuhlbein, Besenstile, Holzstangen) gegen Kopfregion, bei besonders wuchtiger Ausführung = I
I	32	1	Kopfschlag mit präparierten Handschuhen (Quarzsandfüllung), mehrere Faustschläge auf Kopf mit erheblichen Verletzungen (Gesichtsschädel), bei besonders wuchtiger Ausführung = I
I	33	1	Kopfschlag Zaunlatte mit Nägeln
			Spezielle Gewalt und sonstige Situationen:
I	34	1	Detonation Imbisswagen nach ausgeströmtem Propangas
I	35	1	konkrete Personengefährdung bei Brandanschlag

Erläuterung: TI = Tatintensität, n = Fallzahl nach Tatbeiträgen (meistens mehrere pro Gewaltdelikt), I = lebensbedrohlich.

Based on this instrument of registration it could be shown, that 64 out of 151 actions (42 %) were conducted with life threatening intensity. In some cases (12 of 64) life threatening modes of action were applied excessively, combined and/or over a longer period of time. Which means: This type of actor tends to act not only more frequently but also more brutally.

Next to this profile of high intensity there were other specifics concerning direction and planning of actions of IT´s:

- Actions occurred almost exclusively in groups – leaving only a tenth of actions with lone actors.

- Directional emphasis: Confrontation with leftists makes up two thirds of the actions. If we add the victim-group "other opponents" (differing lifestyles), it sums up to about four fifths. Only one eighth of the actions had xenophobic direction. As mentioned above this picture contrasts sharply with the nationwide trend of violence.

- Grade of planning: Two thirds of the actions were conducted deliberately and with planning – like patrolling "enemy" areas/meeting points/events in a victim-seeking manner, raids or arson attacks and violence at manifestations. Only one sixth could be labelled as spontaneous action. This is another clear contrast to the nationwide picture drawn by security agencies which says that the vast majority of right-wing violence is of spontaneous nature (implicitly meaning: committed by dull headed Joe-Sixpack-Types...). This perspective was criticized as being distorted (NSU-investigation commissions) but no empirical evidence was delivered so far to support other evaluations.

- Inputs of hate media, mainly rightist rock music and cyber hate materials: A tenth of the cases showed stimulating effects close to or even during the violent actions – actors would sing classics with themes of killing and extinction or pictures of the action were taken and circulated. This is a low ratio – but related evidence is not collected systematically. There is knowledge on the range of distribution and the importance of hate media but not on the question on how hate media relate to action.

The analysis of patterns of action could be deepened by looking closer at the groups chosen by the IT-actors. A total of 17 groups could be identified. The missing of some groups (NSU, NS Chemnitz, Döbeln, Geithain, Terrorcrew Muldental) was caused by bureaucratic obstacles. Those groups broke down to two clusters:

- 1) Groups with weak structures and short duration (n=11) – typically gathered around episodes of violent actions.

- 2) Groups with tighter structures and longer duration (n=6). Those were "Saxionian Hammerskins" (SHS), former members of "Skinheads of southern Saxonia" (Ex-SSS) - "Sächsische Schweiz" being a region with extraordinary high voting results and militant activities; Dresden-based "Hooligans Elbflorenz" (HE), Mittweida-based "Storm 34" and follow-up group "S 34 new" (label by author), "H.-Net" (label by author), a Dresden based no name network. Except "S 34 new" all groups were subject to prosecution as criminal organization (§ 129 StGBStrafgesetzbuch).

The groups were compared along a guideline ("AGIKOSUW") proposed by colleague Pfahl-Traughber for the analysis of terrorist groups but also useful for violent groups below or close to the level of terrorist action. The criteria are actors, intensity and patterns of violence, ideology, communication, organization, strategy, surroundings, effects. Some of the main characteristics/differences:

- Actors: No such thing as a "typical profile" – social (f.i. "broken home"), psychological – could be found. The most frequent type of delinquency career is the mix of offenses with political and criminal background and can be found in both clusters. The "criminal only"-type drifts to the first cluster, the type "political only" to the second. A handful of IT-actors (min. 3) showed special talents and skills as leaders ("Bewegungsunternehmer") and acted as organizers/networkers with long term continuity.

- Intensity/patterns of violence: Almost all groups focused on confrontation with leftists and related lifestyles. Only one group had a racist thrust, conducted with utmost brutality (Clique around IT D. in Kamenz) – with the leading actor coming close to a racist killer-type. Life-threatening actions occurred within the majority of groups (15). Eight of those preferred this pattern of action more than others (with a ration up to 50% or more of their actions). Most of the groups remained below the level of firearms. Two groups, SHS and SSS were in possession of some and had some training, but never used them in action – leaving the key question why they didn't despite favourable surrounding conditions whereas another group with very similar surroundings – NSU - did. The use of brute force caused dissonant feelings among some of the actors, leading to cop-outs and exits by a few. Few others contained violence for tactical reasons.

- Ideology: Influence of rightist rock music and affiliations with the NPD (dominant German rightist party with ties into the militant scenes) were dominant factors for the transfer of ideological messages. Three groups – SSS, S 34 and one loosely structured group – ran their own bands. Three IT-actors played an important role in managing and distributing musical hate media. NPD-affiliations became obvious with a significant number of memberships and developed higher density in groups like Ex-SSS or S 34, while causing frictions in formations like the Dresden no-name-network "H.-Net". More detailed observations on ideological inputs via print, internet and music can be found in separate chapters of the study.

- Organization, strategy: Both hierarchical and cell-structured groups were present in the cluster "tighter structures" – SHS, SSS and S 34 belonging to the first and Ex-SSS and "H.-Net" to the second type. Except S 34 (3-4 years)

the structured formations showed long term duration, contrasting with the "loosely structured" cluster with episodic durations. All of the structured groups were able to intimidate their adversaries – to a significant degree in some regions like "Sächsische Schweiz" or Mittweida. Although documented deliberations on the usefulness of violence campaigns could not be found, the cell-type formations (ex-SSS, "H.-Net") cumulated other characteristics of terrorism-prone potentials: those developed capabilities for organization, logistics, tactics and covert action and were able to maintain relations to other delinquent milieus, both political and criminal.

This leads me to some closing remarks: Despite multiple problems and obstacles experienced in the course of this project I think the thrust of the investigation is worth to be followed further on by police research units. It could help to identify high risk individuals, groups and constellations. One example: On Sunday 26th of October in the city of Cologne police and security agencies were caught pretty much with their pants down in confrontation with a riot of a crowd of roundabout 4 800, a mélange of hooligans, outlaw motorcycle gang-members and right-wing militants, mobilized nationwide around the issue "Hooligans against Salafists" – a confrontationist scenario with promises of more to come. One of the above mentioned Saxon groups of the cluster with structures – "Hooligans Elbflorenz" exactly fits into that picture: A formation with high grade training and extra-legal performance of group violence, influenced by one of the ideologized IT-types mentioned above together with other hard-core political-militant actors.

For more information, see – in German language:

Backes, U., Haase, A.-M., Logvinov, M., Mletzko, M. Stoye, J. (2014):
Rechtsmotivierte Mehrfach- und Intensivtäter in Sachsen.
(Research Project of the Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung e.V. an der TU Dresden)

V&R unipress, Göttingen 2014, ISBN 978-3-8471-0374-5
or as download http://www.hait.tu-dresden.de/dok/bst/Heft_69_Backes.pdf

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The activities of the right-wing extremists in the Czech prisons

Ondřej Kolář
The Prison Service of the Czech Republic

This article is focused on activities of right wing extremists in Czech prisons. It´s rising from materials of Prison service of the Czech Republic and from notes of author, who is authorized to coordinate the fight against extremism in Prison service of the Czech Republic with other state authorities. The main task of his work is the service of the prison Světlá nad Sázavou, which is typically the only women's prison in the Czech Republic. He works as a head of prevention and complaints unit. The main content of work is dealing with the complaints among convicts, but also among the civilians to conditions of imprisonment. Another part of work includes the crime investigation of the convicts, such as a drug abuse, possession of illegal objects, violence among prisoners, which is associated with the increase of prisoners over the past two and a half years.[3]

For our organization, it may be noted that the Prison Service of the Czech Republic (next only PS CR) is one of the security forces in the Czech Republic and is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic. Its activities are controlled not only by the present authority, but mainly by the General Directorate of the Prison. It is headed by the CEO (Chief Executive Officer). Currently, PS CR consists of 35 facilities[4].

Employees of the prisons, as a part of their professional activities, are dedicated to prisoners, especially in the performance of the treatment program. Czech Prison staff also regularly attends lecturing courses, where they are familiarized (acknowledged, informed about) with the specific issues that may affect their work. Such issues may be, for example, narcotics, keeping of a mobile phone in prison, securing of crime scenes, specific communication with convicts and the accused ones, and not least the issue of extremism, which is currently a very live topic. The reasons for these activities are the events that happened in Europe, which were related to the radicalisation of people in prison. Therefore one of the professional prison staff activities is to map the extremists' lives in prisons, no matter whether they belong to the left or right-wing spectrum.

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[3] Before amnesty of prezident the Czech republic from 1.1.2013 was number of inmates 22 638 and after amnesty decreased to 16 195 inmates. Recently is a number of inmates on 19 785 to 13.5.2015 (www.vscr.cz).

[4] Prison service of the Czech republic - 25 prisons, 10 custodies and two facilities for detention – notice of author

However, the problem lies in insufficient quantities of the teachers who are specialized in the subject of extremism and who could bring this topic to the employees much closer. At present, the PS CR has only one person who deals with this subject and who conducts the overall monitoring of prisoners in relation to their activities and cooperates with specialized police departments, particularly the department for uncovering organized crime.

Activities of the right-wing extremists in the Czech prisons could be divided into several groups, and these groups are intertwined (connected) with each other and may even be a certain radicalising element for other prisoners.

What is extremely important for every person who is located in the detention facility? It is their support. This support, for accused or convicts, is mostly provided by family members, acquaintances but also their friends. In relation to the activities of right-wing extremists in prisons, the monitoring of correspondence to prisoners is one of the major activities that can contribute to the elimination of the possibility to radicalise other prisoners in the prison. With concern to the correspondence for inmates, there exists a very significant project, called "powinnost" which refers to so called - Prisoners of war (P.O.W.)[5]. This support can take many forms: from sending regular letters, sending packages with printouts, various promotional materials etc. This type of support doesn't focus only on people in custody or serving a prison sentence, but also on their family members who have no sufficient funds to be able to provide material support to their own relatives in prisons. The support of imprisoned neo-Nazis is also realized via activities of Resistance Women Unity (RWU).

RWU aim was and is to support the neo-Nazi movement and at the same time to fulfill the traditional role of women, i.e. to educate children to the ideas of National Socialism. RWU activities aim to promote single mothers within the movement, organize the activities for children and also play a significant role in taking care of POW[6]. The form of support and also the possibility of further radicalisation of people in prison is the possibility of sending CDs with White Power music (next only WP). The Law on Imprisonment states that the prisoners by themselves cannot have any such materials that promote movement suppressing human rights and therefore the PS CR is entitled to confiscate such materials from convicts. These materials can serve as a resource

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[5] Prisoners of war – P.O.W. – extremists understand their conviction as politically motivated act, their crimes understand as patriotic acts, against political system – notice of author.
[6] BASTL, Martin, MAREŠ, Miroslav, SMOLÍK, Josef, VEJVODOVÁ, Petra, *Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR,* Vid. 1., Praha: GRADA, 2011, s. 149, ISBN 978-80-247-3797-3, p. 149

to find out and to learn new trends among extremists, whether it is WP music, or other forms of support. In present time among the convicts, there is sometimes expanded amateur edited ZIN[7] – „Spider´s Web ". It includes not only the materials of racist themes, but also the various articles taken from foreign servers, which after translation and linguistic adjustments can serve as a motivating element for radicalisation of inmates in prisons.

What became also very important recently are activities of right-wing extremists on social networks, especially Facebook. It should be noted that persons in custody or imprisonment are not allowed to keep a mobile phone with them and the detection of such a conduct will result into disciplinary action, or it may be a reason for initiation prosecution of inmates. The penetration of illegal objects, especially mobile phones and drugs into prisons, is one of the most fundamental problems of the current prison system. This infiltration of mobile phones in prisons is to be seen in relation to the presentations on social networks. This concerns in particular the presentation of their own characters, their crimes, also it serves as an effective means of support of the prisoners, but it also serves to discredit the workers, who are often critically expressing to the addresses of ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic, other religious stress etc. It is especially the discrediting of PS CR with extension to the entire democratic system, what is a very often accentuated issue among these people on social networks. In the future it is possible to believe that the presentation on social networks will play a very important role in the prison environment, during the possible recruitment and recruiting of new members into the ranks of right-wing extremists.

The recruitment and the possibility of recruiting of other prisoners is one of the other activities in which the right-wing extremists in prison are involved. The prison environment provides a sufficient amount of impulses, which have influence on individuals and can be very motivating tools of radicalisation. The reasons, why an individual in prison leans on the side of the radicals, are numerous; nevertheless two of them take the largest part in this process. They are above all the protection factor and a factor of security. The first of these two mentioned factors is related to the convicts' concern of their own life in prison - no knowledge of the prison environment can make another group of convicts to take an advantage of new prisoners. Therefore, these new prisoners may develop efforts to ensure their own protection, especially from convicted using their optical power, well-known in the prison environment and belonging to a

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[7] ZIN – from English word – fantasy – it is about their imaginations, opinions and possibilities how to solve situation in society – notice of author.

group of right-wing extremists, or other group of prisoners. The second, an equally important factor, is the material support, when a member or a supporter of the group in prison becomes an indigent prisoner who is trying to take advantage of such an offer for his own benefit. Although it may be just a personal profit of the individual without a real passion for that matter, these activities should not be overlooked or underestimated by prison staff. Within the kind of recruitment or recruiting other inmates, there also serves a selection of topics, which brings an attention above all to crimes of ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic, especially the Romanies, and to the circumstances associated with their integration into society or the issue of a positive discrimination.

Very crucial in prisons are further activities of right-wing extremists, which are mainly related to their behavior on the ward where they are placed, their behavior towards employees of prisons and also to the tattoo that is prohibited in all prisons in the Czech Republic. Referring to the symbols, which we can find in tattoo of the right-wing extremists, the symbols can be divided according to the following criteria:

- the symbolism with an obvious racial motive
- the symbolism with a latent racial motive
- the symbolism of the simple racial motive, adoring Nazi leaders, violent acts from World War II etc.[8]

It is necessary also to emphasize that contemporary Nazis use a large number of symbols. Many of them are taken over, unchanged from the original Nazism. Many neo-Nazi symbols are neoplasms, but sometimes they contain the original Nazi motives.[9]

The current right-wing extremists in prison are trying to hide these images conspiratorially into another symbol so that it will be impossible to identify them. An important role is played by the symbolism of numbers and letters, as cryptograms of membership of a particular extremist group developing its activities outside the prison. Sometimes, inmates can leave these symbols tattooed on very unusual body parts (e.g. an underside of the lips, armpits etc.) where tattoos are not visually identifiable. Although you can't see them, the tattoos point to the inner strength of the individual, who has decided to have the specific tattoo done.

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[8] CHMELÍK, Jan, *Symbolika extremistických hnutí,* Praha: ARMEX, 2002, ISBN 80-86244-14-8, p. 56

The extremism is a social phenomenon, which needs not to be underestimated by Prison service of the Czech Republic. The possibility of radicalisation inmates then can go to increase of criminality after their release from prison. On the other side if these activities will be mapped, the employees can influence inmates very well and decrease the number extremist crimes after their release from prisons. It has a connection with education of prisons staff. Not only about symbolism of extremism, but about the process radicalisation of inmates too, which can play very important role for their own self-radicalisation.

[9] MAREŠ, Miroslav, *Symboly používané extremisty na území ČR v současnosti,* Praha: MVČR, 2006, p. 8-9

Impact of contemporary Ukrainian conflict on radicalisation of violent extremist scene in EU countries

Prof. Miroslav Mareš
Director of the study program Security and Strategic Studies at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University (Brno), Czech Republic

Contemporary Ukrainian crisis has an international impact on governmental as well as non-governmental actors, including the impact on security of the EU and its member countries. A specific dimension of this threat is the impact on radicalisation of the violent scene in EU countries. The goal of this paper is to analyze this issue. Forms and causes of this radicalisation will be identified, relations between various variants of extremism and Ukrainian crisis will be outlined and the general impact of Ukrainian crisis - in relation to extremism in the EU - on European security will be assessed.

The so called Ukrainian crisis started in November 2013. A part of Ukrainian citizens protested against president Yanukovych, who rejected the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The first phase of the crisis can be labelled as „Maidan" crisis - it is characterized by mass demonstrations and violent clashes with Ukrainian governmental forces (mostly paramilitary units Berkut) in Kyev and other Ukrainian cities. This phase ended with Yanukovych´s escape to Russia. During this phase the extremist spectrum in the EU was polarized in relation to the events in Ukraine. Thanks to a strong role of the new Ukrainian right-wing extremist organisation Right Sector (PS) in militant protests it was propagated in a part of neo-Nazi and neo-Fascist European spectrum Ukrainian extreme right and several dozens of right-wing extremists from the EU participated in Maidan riots. The second phase of Ukrainian crisis is connected with the Russian annexation of Crimea (its main duration is limited to February and March 2015). This act   mobilized Russian supporters to propagandist activities within the extreme right as well as within the extreme left in EU countries. The most serious third phase started in March 2015 after declaration of independence by regions in Eastern Ukraine and their struggle for unification with Russia (Hypki, Szulc 2014: 4-26). War on these territories had and has a significant impact on the extremist scene in the EU, including the period after the cease-fire agreement.

The most important forms of activities which interconnect violent extremism in the EU with Ukrainian crisis are described in the table below (with selected examples).

Form of activity	Example
Involvement in military activities in the area of the conflict	Foreign volunteers from the EU in Battalion Vostok or in Batallion Azov (Mareš, Visingr 2015)
Violence in the EU related to Ukrainian conflict	A clash between Ukrainian nationalists and Spanish leftist students at the conference on Ukraine, Madrid, October 2014 (RT 2014)
Support for violent activities in the area of the conflict (funding, weapons, equipment etc.)	Financial and logistic support for Regiment Azov in Slovakia (Azov 2014)
Propagandist support for violent activities by extremists in the area of the conflict	Concert of Italian left-wing extremist music band Banda Bassotti in Donbass (TeleSur 2014)
Propagandist support for violent activities by extremists in the EU	Left-wing extremist participation in the campaign Solidarity with the Antifascist Resistance in Ukraine in the UK (The Marxist Student Federation 2014)

The causes of radicalisation of extremist activists regarding Ukrainian conflict are based on ideological beliefs (for example neo-Nazis affiliation to legacy of Ukrainian SS divisions or dogmatic communist support for Stalinist symbols used by a part of separatists) and geopolitical interests (for example support for Eurasian ideas or for separatist demands), in cases of some foreign fighters in Ukrainian conflict from EU countries the money paid by pro-separatists Russian oligarchs or desire for adventure play an important role (Mareš, Visingr 2015: 95-96). The influence of secret services (mostly Russian) on radicalisation of violent extremists in the EU is an important phenomenon.

From the ideological point of view the violent extremist scene in the EU can be the divided into the following main categories in relation to Ukrainian crisis:

- Pro-Ukrainian right-wing violent extremism;
- Pro-separatist right-wing violent extremism;
- Pro-separatist left-wing violent extremism;
- Pro-separatist separatist violent extremism.

Disputable is the existence of Islamist extremist structures related to both sides of the conflict. Pro-Ukrainian left-wing extremist or separatist extremism are marginal or even non-existing phenomena (in fact, some anarchists criticize both sides of the conflicts)(Mareš 2014).

Pro-Ukrainian right-wing violent extremism is represented by various right-wing extremists with ties to the tradition of Hitler volunteers during World War II as well as by anti-Russian nationalists from several countries (typically from Poland). Also branches of Ukrainian right-wing extremist organizations (Social-National Assembly – SNA, Right Sector - PS, Missantropic Division) operated in Ukrainian diaspora in EU countries. Paradoxically, in 2014 also a part of Russian anti-Putin neo-Nazis in diaspora in the EU declared support for Ukrainian right-wing extremists (mostly the group Wotan Jugend), however, after a wave of Ukrainian anti-Russian activities they criticize the whole conflict as a "Jewish conspiracy" and they have a critical view on Ukrainian struggle (ČT 24: 2015). An important result of the support for Ukrainian struggle are volunteers from EU-countries fighting in Ukrainian right-wing military units (mainly Battalion/Regiment Azov). Their number can be estimated around 50 persons (Rekawek 2015: 7-8). Right-wing extremists from Ukrainian diaspora were involved in several clashes with opponents, a. o. in Prague in September 2014 (Hassan 2014). In several EU countries – logistical and propagandist support was organized mostly by domestic right-wing extremists in cooperation with Ukrainians (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2014b: 4).

In relation to Ukrainian crisis the right-wing extremist spectrum is divided (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2014a: 3-4). Right-wing extremist supporters of separatist regions are connected mostly with Eurasian movement and in some Slavic countries with pan-Slavic movement. More active are these people at the intellectual and propagandist level, partially in trolling. Right-wing extremist volunteers from several countries serve in separatist units, mostly in Battalion Vostok and in Battalion Prizrak, a. o. from France, Poland and Hungary (in the Szent Istvan Legion). The total number of such fighters from EU countries can be estimated around 50 (Rekawek 2015: 3-4). Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between left-wing and right-wing orientation among „social and anti-western protesters" without deeper ideological background (Mareš Visingr

2014: 97-98). Russian right-wing nationalists from diaspora in the EU are active in propaganda and in trolling.

Pro-separatist left-wing violent extremism in the EU consists mostly of dogmatist communist groupings and of a part of the new left under Russian influence. Propagandist activities and hacking (sometimes under symbols of the Anonymous movement) are typical of this part of the political spectrum, sometimes also demonstrations with ad hoc violence. Volunteers from several countries are fighting in separatist units, mostly in Battalion Vostok and in Battalion Prizrak, a. o. from Spain, Italy, Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic etc. Ethos of „anti-fascist international brigades" from the Spanish civil war is propagated here. The total number of left-wing extremist pro-separatist fighters can be estimated around 100 persons (including social protesters without stronger ideological background)(Rekawek 2014: 3-4). Virtual propagandist networking with other militant groupings is created mostly by the organization Borotba.

Separatist violent extremism from EU countries connected with Ukrainian crisis can be divided into two main parts. The first part are Russian irredentists from Baltic countries – they promote annexation of their territories to Russia according to Novorossia model (Johannsmeier 2014) and some of them are even fighting in Donbass (Rekawek 2014: 3-4). The second part are traditional separatist movements in EU countries which are connected ideologically with the Russian regime (a. o. militant groups from Basque country). Some separatist groupings used Ukrainian crisis for propaganda of their own activities – as separatists in Venice ("Repubblica Veneta") gained media attention after an action with their home-built tank in April 2014 (The Local 2014).

The impact of Ukrainian crisis on radicalisation of violent extremism in the EU can be summarized in the following findings:

- With regards to Ukrainian crisis there exists internal cleavage within the extremist spectrum in EU-countries (pro-separatist vs. pro-Ukrainian), including the division of right-wing extremist spectrum into pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian parts and left-wing extremist spectrum into pro-separatist part and a part which is "against both parties" of the conflict.
- An important phenomenon of foreign volunteers can be identified, however, their number from EU-countries is relatively limited (extremists from several nations are on both sides of the frontline - French, Italian, Polish fighters etc.);

- A strong propagandist battle in the EU is led in relation to violent activities ín Ukraine, partially under the influence of Russian and other secret/intelligence services;
- The impact of Ukrainian crisis on extremism in the EU is not such a serious threat in comparison with the impact of Middle Eastern conflicts ton extremism in the EU, mostly Jihadism (Russia plays the propagandist role of a „savior" of Europe in relation to jihadist extremism)
- Regional differences within the EU in relation to the importance of the impact of Ukrainian crisis on violent extremism – a stronger influence can be observed in East-Central European countries, Baltic countries and Southern Europe than in other regions of the EU.

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Muslims in Hungary and the problem of radicalisation and foreign fighters in the Middle-East

Dr. Szilveszter Póczik
Senior Researcher at the National Institute of Criminology, Hungary

Hungary with its Muslim population of 25 ‰ belongs to that region of Europe where the Islam doesn't exercise meaningful influence however the country is located only a couple 100 miles away from regions of the Balkans where Islam is a one or the most influential confessions. In the total population on the Balkans of about 75 million persons, 15 millions are Muslims who follow the Ottoman tradition of a more or less tolerant and "liberal" Islam of European style. The majority of the Muslims on the Balkans are descendants of Christian orthodox and catholic believers who had converted voluntarily or under pressure to the (Sunni) Islam.

Muslim population in Europe

Source: Kettani, 2010, graph. by Kr. Justh

In Albania some two thirds of the total population of 3.5 million persons are Muslims but due to the tendentious antireligious politics of the communist dictatorship under Enver Hoxha (O'Donnell, 1999) a great part of them doesn't exercise the religion though in the last decades the intensification of religious life can be observed and radical Muslims won some place, too. In the neighboring countries, particularly in Serbia / Kosovo 1.587.000, in Macedonia 506.000, totally some 2 million Alban Muslims are living in a geographically region influenced by hard nationalist, separatist and Islam radical tendencies complemented with a military experience obtained during Kosovo's liberation war 1998 – 1999 (Lellio, 2006), anticipating a great Alban national state in the very near future. The Alban national liberation movement extended its activity to Macedonia and Serbia beyond Kosovo too. In Kumanovo the Alban National Liberation Army had attacked the security forces of the Republic Macedonia in February 2001. Though the so called Ohrid Treaty had stopped the escalation of the armed conflict and offered an autonomous status for the Albans living in the North-Western region the struggles started again in the last months. „Emissaries of Muslim Brothers and such foundations as al Waqf al Islami and Irshad have settled down in Chair, a Skopje district. The Macedonian police and special services are not able to control this part of the city. Over 50% of Macedonian jihadists that have joined the Islamic State come from the Muslim community of Chair. Today they are returning to Macedonia. The neighbors of the country host terrorist organizations. The Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac operates in Serbia. It is an Albanian separatist militant insurgent group fighting for independence of three municipalities: Presevo, Bujanovic and Medveda, the home to most of the Albanians in south Serbia, adjacent to Kosovo" (Kolarov, 2015).

Albanians in neighboring countries

- Republic of Albania
- Area in neighboring countries where Albanians are the majority
- Area in neighboring countries with a significant Albanian minority

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanians

This military experience and engagement is the reason why ISIS prefers to recruit Alban fighters. According the information given by Resul Rexhepit, one of the leaders of the Muslims in Kosovo to the daily paper Bota Sot on 9th March 2015, ISIS offers 20-30 thousand euro to Alban youths for join and fight in Syria. After estimations, currently 300 Albans are fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria and 16 died.

Against 135 persons penal procedures are in progress who partly recruited for ISIS or were members of terrorist cells fighting for ISIS. In Kosovo it is not prohibited to join foreign armies but an amendment of the Penal Code is under preparation to criminalize the participation in foreign armies and recruitment of mercenaries punishing them with 5-15 years prison.

Composition ethnique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine

2005

Bosniaques
(dits "Musulmans")

Serbes

Croates

Source: http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosznia-Hercegovina

In Bosnia and Herzegovina 44 % of the total population of 3.7 million persons are Muslims who had no own ethnic identity until the Yugoslav Civil War. They saw themselves as Islamized Serbs or Croats. The Bosnian identity was much more a local territorial identity colored with the religious identity of Islam and the nonreligious cultural tradition influenced by Islam. These together formed the base for a new state and nation. During the war numerous Islamist foreign fighters (mujahids) as well as technical support and arms arrived from all over the Muslim world but particularly from Iran and the al-Kayeda to Bosnia to support independence and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state.

Though according the Peace Treaty of Dayton foreign fighters had to leave Bosnia a number of foreign jihadist settled down in Bosnia and founded own families but remained in close contact with terrorist organizations in their original homelands, too. The war radicalised the ethnic Bosnians too. Due to ethnic cleansings and forced migrations, earlier multiethnic regions and settlements with a cosmopolitan mentality became Islamized.

Demographics of Bulgaria (wikipedia)

In Bulgaria, the 1 million Muslims who represent 12 % of the total population are, in opposite to other big Muslim communities of the Balkans, no descendents of onetime Christians but ethnic Turks. Under the communist dictator Todor Zhivkov they were targets of assimilation attempts and more than 300.000 of them left the country for Turkey. This mass emigration reversed after the political change in 1990. Many Turks returned to Bulgaria keeping in close political and economical contact with Turkey, too. As a minority they form through their legal political party Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi with some 14% of the votes on national level an important factor in Bulgaria's political life. "The Saudi foundation Al Waqf-Al Islami mentioned above that is linked to Al Qaeda too has built several mosques in Bulgaria but the investigation conducted in August 2004 has not found any evidence of terrorist activity but has uncovered a shadowy network that finances mosques and schools that promote the radical teachings of Wahhabi Islam" (Buhrer Tavanier, 2005).

Hungary as a cultural and political part of the Occident has ever been situated in the border region of three civilizations namely that of the West itself with its Rome styled social structure and religious tradition, the Eastern Orthodox Christianity dominated by Byzantium and later by Russia as well as the Islam expanding forward from the southern part of the Balkans after Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed on 29th May 1453 after a two-month siege (Runciman 1990:84). The occupation of the Carpathian Basin and the State Foundation by the federation of united Hungarian tribes at the turn of the 9-10th century was itself an indirect consequence of the conquest by Islam on the great steppe located to the North from the Caucasus. As testified by written sources and the usage of Dirham (Arab coins) there was a great number of Islam believers called Besermyans, Ishmaelites, Khwarezmians or Saracens in early Hungary who played an important role as well in the economy as in other social functions, too as treasurers, coiners, traders and soldiers mentioned in meaningful documents, f.e. the Regestrum Varadiense (1208 - 1235). The largest Muslim communities lived in the southern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom, in Syrmia and the region where the Drava joins the Danube as well as around the towns Pest, Hajdúböszörmény and Nyitra (today Nitra, Slovakia). The first Islamic author to speak of the Muslim community in Hungary was Yaqut al-

Hamawi (1179-1229 C.E.). He reported in his Mu'ajam al-Buldan about 30 Muslim villages in Hungary. Under the pressure by the Popes of Rome and the Catholic Church in the 11th century the kings St. Ladislaus, Coloman and Andreas II passed laws against non-Christians. These laws subdued Islam by coercing Muslims to eat pork, go to Christian Church and to intermarry with Christians and prohibited them to celebrate Friday and to bear public offices (f.e. Treaty of Bereg of 1233, Synod of Buda of 1279 etc.). These regulations persecuting the Islam led to mass emigration of the Islam community which found a new home on the territory of the Golden Horde (Kipchak Khanate) of the Tartars north the Black See. They remembers until today their Hungarian origin (kipçak macarlar).

Hungary's second encounter and confrontation with Islam took place in the 15th century with the military foreplays of the great Ottoman wars (1526–1699) on the Balkans. By the 16th century, the Ottomans and Habsburgs had become the two powers being in rivalry for the domination of (Eastern) Central Europe. The Ottomans occupied the Balkan, the greatest part of Middle-Hungary and seized Vienna two times.

On the Balkans they also managed to convert huge populations to Islam, particularly Albans and Slaws in Bosnia and Herzegovina, partly by settling numerous Muslim Turks and Arabs amongst them, partly by offering advantages as beneficiary taxation, access to public office positions and all professions, having gun rights etc. "The Ottoman conquest on the Balkan peninsula during the 14-15th centuries led to a massive expansion of Islam achieved by the influx of Turkic-speaking populations on the one hand, and by the gradual conversion of parts of the local Slavic population on the other. Today, some 8.4 million Muslims live in different countries throughout the Balkan region" (Merdjanova, 2007:35). In Hungary perhaps because of the deeply rooted demotic Christian religiosity the conversion to Islam was not very attractive. On the other hand, after 1699 the Islam cultural heritage in Hungary's regions occupied earlier by the Ottomans was systematically destroyed (Ferenci, 2010:123-130). Under the scope of this the reconquest also Islamized populations got Christianized again.

In spite of the confessional tolerance, the relatively prosperous economy under the Ottoman rule the Hungarian peasant population was suffering from the repeating military campaigns, high taxes, slavery, particularly the devşirme, i.e. the so called "blood tax" or "child collection". In the middle of the 14th century, Sultan Murad I built an army of slaves (kapikulu). The captive slaves were converted to Islam and trained for the Sultan's personal service. Though it was slavery since the Sultan had absolute power over them but the Sultan's slaves had a high status. They had the chance to become the highest officers of state and military elite. In spite of the restriction on the enslavement of Muslims, Jews and Christians, young Christian boys from the Balkans were taken from their families, converted to Islam, and enlisted into the most famous branch of the Kapıkulu, the Janissaries, a special soldier class of around 100,000 warriors of the Ottoman army that became a decisive faction amongst the military commanders of the Ottoman forces and high administrators of the Empire. Ones of them recruited in this way were Pargalı Damat Ibrahim Pasha and Sokollu Mehmed Pasha both Grand Viziers under Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. The interpreters and diplomats recruited this way referred to as dragomans were highly estimated in the Sultan's court (Ács, 1997). Though in Hungary "child collection" was not a common practice, particularly free raiding troops of Tartars kidnapped children systematically to sell them on the slave markets (Inalcik, 1979:25-43). A late exotic result of such recruiting is the community of Majarabs (Hungaro-Arabs, or Tribe of Hungarians/Madjars) living along the Nile River in Egypt and Sudan. They are of Hungarian ancestry dating back to the late 16th century (1517) when Hungarian soldiers of the Ottoman Empire were fighting in southern Egypt and a portion of them led by General Ibrahim Sendjer el-Madjar remained there and intermarried with the local Nubian women. They were discovered in 1935 by the Africa-researcher Hungarian Earl László Almásy and his co-worker, the German engineer Hansjoachim von der Esch (Esch, 1941). Their identity specifically sets them apart from the surrounding Egyptians until today (Margittai, 2007:I-III), a.o. they don't pray in the mosque and wear a hat instead of fez or turban. Madjarabs live along the Nile, in Sudan around Wadi Halfa, in Egypt around Aswan in the villages of Magyarab-irki, Magyararti, Magyariyya, Magyar-nirki, Hillit el-Magyarab and about 400 Magyarabs live in Cairo.

Ottoman Balkans Population Map

Source: (Karpat, 1986)

After a period of 352 years, by 1878 the Balkans was liberated from the Ottoman overlordship. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy achieved the right of occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also obtained the right to station garrisons in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which remained under Ottoman administration. A state of relative stability was reached soon enough. The Austro-Hungarian authorities were able to embark on a number of social and administrative reforms. To dissipate rising South Slav nationalism, the Habsburg rule represented by the Hungarian Governor Benjámin Kállay between 1882 and 1903 did much to codify laws, to introduce new political practices and to contribute to modernization a lot that strengthened the

sympathy of the locals for Hungary. In 1881 Austria-Hungary obtained the German and the Russian approval of the annexation of these provinces, finally, Austria-Hungary annexed them on 6th October 1908.

Austria-Hungary in its new extension had some 600,000 Muslim (Hanafi) citizens but according the census of 1910 Hungary had 553 (179 Turks and 319 Bosniaks) citizens, only. The Austrian and Ottoman empires were no longer bordered each other that allowed both to coordinate their interests and to become finally allied during the First World War. In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Islam became step by step an "accepted" and later a "recognized" confession. In 1879, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina received the right of free confessional practice in a decree which was extended to Hungary, too, in 1895 (Law No. XLIII. § I). This law declared Islam in 1916 (Law No. XVII) a "recognized" religion. On the proposal of the City Hall Budapest a Mosque Building Committee came to life.

In the course of the 19th century there was a growing interest in Islam and the connections to the Islam world became more and more intensive. The first Hungarian translation of the Quran was published in 1831 in Kassa (today Kosice, Slovakia). It was Ödön Széchenyi who organized the first fire brigade in Istanbul. The public opinion at the turn of the 19th and 20th century was determined by three, partly contradictory factors. On the one hand by the growing sympathy for the "sick man of Europe" as Tsar Nicholas I of Russia described the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2001) because it had supported the Hungarian anti-Habsburg liberation aspirations and offered asylum to the Hungarian insurgents after their defeats in 1711 and 1849 (Serin, 2008; Herman, 2002). On the other hand by a literary work, the romantic-historic novel "Stars of Eger" written by Géza Gárdonyi playing in the centuries of the Ottoman wars. (English: Eclipse of the crescent moon: a tale of the siege of Eger, 1552 / by Géza Gárdonyi; transl. and with an introd. by George F. Cushing, 7. ed. – Budapest, Corvina, 2005; Turkish translation by Erdal Salikoglu, 2013, titled Egri Yildizlari). In his novel the renowned author described the Ottoman conquerors as bloodthirsty and greedy enemies of Christianity and humanity. The novel became very soon popular and required schools reading. It determines the pupil's imagination of Islam partly until today. The third factor was the scientific interest in the Islam. The most noteworthy Hungarian scholar among other orientalists dealing with Islam was the world-famous Ignác Isaak Yehuda Goldziher. In 1873 he began a journey through Syria, Palestine and Egypt, and took the opportunity of attending lectures of Muslim sheiks in the mosque of al-Azhar in Cairo. In 1890 he published his "Muhammedanische Studien" in which he showed how Hadith reflected the legal and doctrinal controversies of

the two centuries after Muhammad's death more than the words of Mohamed himself. Goldziher was a strong believer in the view that Islamic law owes its origins to Roman Law. He represented Hungary at numerous international congresses and received the Large Gold Medal at the Stockholm Oriental Congress in 1889. His eminence in the sphere of scholarship was due primarily to his careful investigation of pre-Islamic and Islamic law, tradition, religion and poetry (Chisholm, 1911).

In WW I the Bosnian soldiers consisted of four infantry regiments and a field rifles battalion were part of the Austro-Hungarian infantry and fought bravely (Schachinger, 1994). A unit of 100 Bosnian and Alban Muslim soldiers led by the highly decorated Hilmi Hussein Durić or Hüseyin Hilmi Dürik (Alibašić, 2004), former chief imam of the Austro-Hungarian army, and Viktor Maderspach participated in the Uprising in West-Hungary in the autumn of 1921 defending Hungary's territories around Sopron against the Entente and the Treaty of Trianon (Sarkady, 2009).

Hilmi Hussein Durić

Durić became Hungarian citizen with other Bosnians in 1927 and started in cooperation with Ismail Mehmedagić to organize the Islam cultural and confessional life in the Hungarian capitol. He elaborated numerous plans for boosting Islam in Hungary, f.e. that of founding a Collegium Islamaticum. Among others he initiated to build up an Islam Centrum named Gül-Baba Hungarian Mohamedanian Confession Community. In 1931 the Independent Hungarian Autonomous Islam Religion Community then in 1932 the Gül-Baba Cultural Committee came to life having Christian members, too in order to collect donations for the Islam community of Bosnians in Hungary and to support it however the contemporary newspapers refused the idea as one kind of foreign influence. In the same year, the first European Islam Conference was held in Budapest (Ferenci, 2012). On behalf of the Hungarian governments Durić as envoy visited Egypt, Syria, Palestine and India. He died in 1940. (Popovic, 1995) In spite of these efforts the number of Islam believers remained vanishing low. In 1920 their number was 468, ten years later 291. They were almost without exception foreigners settled in Budapest (Fazekas, 1996)

In the period of the early communist dictatorship between 1947 and 1956 all religions were persecuted for ideological reasons based on Marxist-Leninist dogmas but in the subsequent era, Islam achieved a new interest. Partly because a new generation of orientalists grown up was working hard in the field of Islam studies, partly because besides the few Muslims coming from the Palestine Liberation Organization and other revolutionary movements of the Third World for medical care and asylum many hundred young people came – particularly after in the period of the declared "new economic mechanism" after 1968 till the political change of 1989 – as university students from Islam or partly Islam countries of Asia, North and Black Africa (f.e. Nigeria, Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia etc.) as well as the Middle East which were in a more or less close ideological, economic and/or military alliance with the Soviet Block. These students being controlled politically by the Muslim Students Association made friends and love relationships with Hungarian students and exercised their religion and solemnized their feasts in the student hostels. This attracted their Hungarian friends, too. Some of the latter converted to Islam and formed together with their Muslim fellow students formal Islam believer communities: the first in 1985 at the University for Agricultural Sciences in the town Gödöllö. This required to be recognized as successor of the Independent Hungarian Autonomous Islam Religion Community of 1931 and was approved by the State Office for Church Affairs as Hungary was seeking friendship with semi-communist Islam countries but useful economic cooperation with capitalist Islam states, too (Köbel 2011). Supported by the Muslim World League and Saudi Arabia represented by the Saudi Major-General Kamal Ibn Siraj al-Din al-Marghalani, the Hungarian Islam Community having 20 members came to life such way on 15th August 1988 (registered by the Court of Budapest on 3rd July 1990) as a church of converted Muslims led by the agricultural engineer Balázs Mihálffy, alias Sheikh Abdurrahman (Ferenci, 2010:141). This community runs the first Islam Center settled in Miskolc in 1993. Also other smaller Islamic religious communities came to life in other university towns. A couple of years later, in October 2000, the Church of Muslims in Hungary (http://iszlam.com/english) and in 2003 the Islam Church (today the greatest Islam community with foreign businessmen and student members) were registered. Nowadays 5 meaningful meeting houses, 7 greater Islam Foundations and a number of associations led by foreign citizens (mostly businessmen) are active in Hungary but no one tends to radicalisation. On the contrary, they consider each other rather rivals however not for confessional but for personal reasons. That is why they cooperate much more with other faith collectives than with each other (Linder 2004). Amongst the 25-30 thousand Muslims in Hungary (0.3% of the total population) about 4-5 thousand

might be ethnic Hungarians. In Budapest, seven worship or meeting rooms are available, the greatest is Dar as Salam (House of Peace). Since 1980 two Quran translations have been published. In 2004 the Christian-Jewish association started the Jewish-Christian-Muslim Free University to introduce the three great monotheistic world religions in comparison. The new Church Affairs Act of 2011 (Law No. CCVI of 2011 on freedom of conscience and religion and the legal status of religious confessions and communities) made the founding and working of churches more difficult by bounding their recognition to a minimum (10,000) of members. That is why the two biggest Muslim faith communities, the Hungarian Islam Community and the Church of Hungarian Muslims founded the Hungarian Islam Council in 2012 that represents the Muslims in Hungary now. Similarly restrictive regulations are in effect in the Czech and the Slovak Republic where religious communities of at least 10 thousand and 20 thousand believers respectively are allowed to found a church. That is why in Slovakia f.e. there is no registered Muslim religious organization except the Slovakian Islam Foundation (Islamska nadácia na Slovensku) which is a representing organ of Muslims but no church (Pap & Kitanics, 2014:300-301).

In the last years Turkey started a campaign of re-Islamization and financed Islam centers generously in the former communist and consequently atheistic South-Eastern Europe, particularly on the Balkans relying partly on local or immigrated Turkish groups, partly on genuine local Muslim believers (Korkut, 2010). The gigantic mosque planned for Tirana under the scope of this religious diplomacy will offer places for 4,500 people but also several other mosques were built up or renovated on the entire Balkans. After two failed attempts of architecting mosques (http://koos.hu/2010/05/13/mosque-az-elso-mecset-magyarorszagon-a-latvanytervek/) in Hungary, now two meaningful mosques are planned, each one for Budapest after the model of the Süleymaniye Mosque built by Mimar Sinan Pasha in Istanbul, the other one for the town Debrecen which shall be constructed in cooperation of the Yunus Emre Cultural Center founded by Turks settled in Hungary, the Hungarian Islam Community and the Hungarian State as well as the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) (see visualization:
http://vigyazo.blog.hu/2015/05/15/ezt_a_hatalmas_mecsetet_epithetik_budapestre).
This is a new step in the friendly connections between Turkey and Hungary developing since the middle of the 90s. Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller and Necmettin Erbakan were strong supporters of Hungary's NATO-join and Hungary acquitted this with supporting Turkey's EU-aspirations. Nevertheless, Hungary's Muslims are not fully satisfied. Zoltan Bolek chairman of the Hungarian Islam Community warned the Ministry of Human Resources in a letter envisaging to turn to the Muslim World League with a complaint because

of the anti-Islam behavior by the Hungarian Government and to initiate a boycott by the Islam countries against Hungary.

The explanations above at all don't give answer to the question of the lack of Islam radicalism in Hungary. While Western European countries have to seek the explanation for the radicalisation of their Muslim communities, in Hungary and other countries of Eastern Middle Europe as Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland a hypothesis is needed for the opposite development. Its reasons are to be found partly in the general political, social and economic conditions and trends of these countries, partly in the sociological structure of their Muslim populations and the interaction of both.

First of all, the Muslim population in Hungary and other countries mentioned above are very small and at the same time very differentiated. In contrary to Poland and Romania, Hungary has not even a small indigenous Muslim minority, in Hungary all Muslims are immigrants, descendants of the same and converts of Hungarian ethnic. The greatest mass of them are the former guest students. In the course of their recruiting they were subject of a careful selection procedure both by their homeland authorities and the security services of the target country supervised by the Soviet intelligence itself. The main selection principles were political reliability and intellectual preparedness for the university studies that were determined in the most cases by the delegating country but not by the applicant. The prospective students were predominantly man – as an exception Ethiopia delegated female students, too – coming from families loyal or closely linked with the central and local ruling administrative and military elite that followed the Marxist-Leninist dogma including its anti-religious attitude. In practice, they all were almost without exception children of the enlightened and secularized upper or upper middle classes increasingly distancing themselves from Islam (and any other religion) out of conviction or political reasons, considering religion a danger for their political power. The approved study programs in the so called "brotherly" countries were limited to technical sciences, engineering, economy and medicine and studies in – potentially ideology based – human or social sciences were not allowed. It meant that the student's predispositions brought from home hindered any inclination to radicalism. Facing the – in spite of the Soviet rule very – European (Western) liberties in everyday life, the liberal attitudes in social and family relationships, sexual life, choosing life partners and consorts, consuming alcohol, dressing, lack of centuries-old taboos etc. many of them felt attracted by irreligious life. The communist state did its best, too, to keep them apart from any religion and any excess. Incompetent students were short path sent home. The in average 5-6, in case of doctors 6-9, years spent in Hungary with

studies while being deeply integrated in the intensive social environment of intellectual youth became decisive for their way and view of life. Many of them got married partly out of love partly targeting the chance to remain and start a carrier in Hungary or later elsewhere in Europe, under more beneficial circumstances than in their homelands to which their links became looser and looser anyway. Muslim students didn't form a real community, neither at the moment of their arrival nor later, neither based on the common homelands nor based on Islam. Enthusiastic believers formed a minority among them but no case is known in which a spontaneous radicalisation process would have taken place like that of Sayyid Qutb during his stay in the USA. Arabs and Black-Africans were popular partners among Hungarian female students (however less popular among the parents of the latter). For those who got married and got children usually very soon, their Hungarian family, i.e. their wives' paternal house and the administration and business world (nursery, kindergarten, elementary school, working places for trainees, employment etc.) became the site of a secondary socialization decisive for their individual future that loosened or cut their the habitual and emotional links to their Islam homelands. These former students from Islam countries became honorable family fathers and in accordance with their qualifications high ranked professionals and/or businessmen fitting fully the customs of their host country. Their wives and children met only a couple of times their Muslim parents in law and grandparents respectively, didn't learn their language and grown up as Hungarians having all skills necessary to take a good life start but being devoid of the consciousness of having Muslim roots or solidarity to their fathers' homelands. The situation was very similar in case of the high numbered divorces, too. In such cases the Muslim fathers returned home, the Hungarian wives and the children remained in Hungary or the Hungarian wives if they beforehand had followed their husbands to Islam homelands returned to Hungary with their children. Since the divorces took place a couple of months or years after the marriage regularly the children remained with their mothers. Conversion of wives to Islam was at that time neither customary nor necessary, not even in the homeland of the husbands as the countries in question were at that time quite secular and seemingly tolerant in faith affairs. Of course, there were exceptions and different cases too, f.e. Hungarian wives who converted and children who got a doubled education but finally also they became Hungarians with their father's religion, language and culture, but no Muslims more or less familiar with Hungary, its culture and tongue. Summarized, originally irreligious attitude, confessionally indifferent, mathematically oriented technical profession, long lasting high and stable social status and acceptance, a long lasting secondary socialization, deeply internalized

secondary (European) value set in everyday and professional life as well as a flexible personality save Muslims in Hungary from radicalisation. (It is to be mentioned that in the youth period of former Muslim students Islam radicalism was unknown as it was the period of modernization experiments in the developing countries). The former Muslim students belong today to the senior generation being around 60 or older. Their children are in an age of around 30-35 years and are similarly highly positioned so their radicalisation is improbable.

In the second period of the Yugoslav Civil War, i.e. in the so called Bosnian War (6 April 1992 – 14 December 1995), 48,000 Bosniaks, in majority Muslims, were fleeing and seeking asylum in Hungary from brutal ethnic cleansing by the aggressive Serb nationalists. They were accommodated together with further 20,000 other asylum seekers from the Balkans in the 32 provisional refugee camps established in Hungary's southern border region (Póczik, 1999:297). Nevertheless, the greatest part of the South-Slav refugees including the Muslim Bosniaks disappeared by the end of the 1990s, the major part of them returned home and a minor part migrated away to Western Europe.

Hungary acceded to the Geneva Convention of 1951 and it's Protocol of 1967 already in 1989 (March 1) maintaining the restriction of excluding asylum seekers from outside Europe from the local refugee procedure and supply offered in Hungary. This restriction was dissolved because of constitutional and human right concerns in the Law No. CXXXIX. of 1997 on Refugee Rights. This act opened Hungary's borders for the refugees from the Middle and Far East as well as South Asia and Africa, too. Due to it the structure of immigration including refugees is modified meaningfully. More and more refugees arrive from the conflict zones of the geographical regions mentioned above: mainly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria. Nowadays about 2500-3500 African – mainly North-, Middle- and West-African - immigrants are living in Hungary, they are 2 % of all immigrants (Glied, 2011:192). They – and a fistful of Turks, Iranians and others - arrived partly having economic targets, seeking investments possibilities or employment in the business, catering industry, entertainment or other trade partly seeking asylum. On the other hand Hungary's integration into the EU in 2014 attracted a smaller new wave of young Africans. Their number is slowly growing, with about 25% per year. The majority of them are Muslims. They and their families bring a stricter and more vital Muslim tradition from home determining the everyday life including obligatory worship, eating rules and dress code for man and woman as well as gender hierarchy than the Muslim students from the communist era did. Due to the liberalization of social roles and rules more and more ethnic Hungarian

women having Muslim husbands decide to convert to Islam and to subjugate themselves to Sharia and the Islamic rules of life, even within Hungary. It means, they have either a doubled identity or reject their ethnic identity to the benefit of the Muslim identity.

The last great immigration wave of Muslims to Hungary started in 2012 from Kosovo and triggered a meaningful panic in the Hungarian state administration.

	2011	2012	2013	2014
Registered refugee applicants in Hungary, total	1 693	2 157	18 900	42 777

Citizenship	2011	2012	2013	2014
Afghanistan	649	880	2 328	8 796
Kosovo	211	226	6 212	21 453
Syria	91	145	977	6 857

Source: Hungarian Office for Immigration and Citizenship (BÁH)
http://www.bmbah.hu/

Thought the number of refuge applicants totally showed a twentyfold growth and that of refuge applicants from Kosovo a hundredfold growth by 2014 in Hungary compared with 2012 the target country for them is not Hungary but much more Austria, Germany or another welfare state in Western Europe. According the Dublin rules they have to submit their refuge request in the first EU country they entered to get at least the theoretical possibility to migrate forth later. That is why Muslims from the Kosovo to which Hungary is not the country of aim will never belong to the Hungarian Muslim population.

In Hungary there weren't and aren't concentrated Islam neighborhoods and intensive community life beyond the religious events. Islam in Hungary doesn't work like a civilization as it should do in normal circumstances in a Muslim country (Póczik, 2011:21) but like a mini-religion on the cultural periphery separated from all other relevant social actors and interactions: is spiritual but not habitual. Also that is why the Hungarian Muslims don't show any sign of radicalisation. It is to be remarked that the Islam communities of religion are

under a continuous and rigorous intelligence observation and control partly to protect them from racist activities, partly to filter out the impact of radicals and their ideologies. Due to that there are no radical preachers, no Islamist radical propaganda and no violent excesses or outrages. Since the National Counterterrorism Center (TEK) has been founded in 2010 (Governmental Regulation No.232/2010.VIII.19.) the intelligence activities and operative counterterrorism measures are concentrated in one hand. TEK could in cooperation with the Islam communities prevent radical Islamist leaders to arrive and pursue radical Salafist propaganda in Hungary and hindered juveniles from Western Europe and the Oversee to continue their travel to ISIS.

Regrettably, some occurrences lead to the conclusion that the heritage of the totalitarian dictatorship having the tendency to arbitrariness and usage of police for political goals beyond the frames of legality is partly still an active impact factor. In the spring of 2004 the police arrested the dentist Dr. Saleh Tayseer, Jordan imam of the Muslim Church who was accused to plan an outrage against Moshe Kacav, Israeli government head during his visit to Hungary. The National Security Service has been keeping him under observation for a longer time before his incarceration but the visit by the Israeli prime minister offered a good occasion to present him a Hungarian Islamist terrorist. Dr. Tayseer spent more than two months in pretrial detention but the Chief Prosecutor Office couldn't find any evidence against him. This action and the ruthless media campaign against Tayseer prompted the representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to complaint to the minister of Foreign Affairs because of the anti-Islamic incitement in Hungary.

Concerning foreign fighters, in the media reports and public opinion different data exist but no one of these is absolutely trustable. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no information about Hungarian citizens being soldiers in Syria or Iraq. According an interview with Zoltán Bolek, chairman of the Hungarian Islam Community, he doesn't have any information about Hungarian Muslims fighting in Syria. The website www.rosszabbik.com reported referring Syrian resources that the far right Hungarian Guard dissolved by the court is involved in the Syria War on Bashar al-Assad's side and lost 11 fighters by June 2013 (see tables below). Márton Gyöngyösi, foreign affairs expert of the Jobbik Party that was founder of the Hungarian Guard commented this that even if it is true at all the Guard's members participate as private persons and not on behalf of the Party in the war. He said the Jobbik Party was in principle supporter of Assad but had no connection to his government. Nevertheless it is known that his Party tried to build contacts to Iran's government. The online tabloid www.blikk.hu reported referring an anonym informant from Damascus that 93

Hungarian fighters are active in Islam militias (6 in Jabhat al-Nusra) battling against Assad but only 12 of them are of Arab origin. The other 81 are antifascists who went to Syria to fight against the Hungarian fighters of the extreme rightwing Hungarian Guard supporting Assad and killed 11 of them in the battle around the Airport of Damascus. By contrast to these in the study by Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Flashpoint Global Partners no one Hungarian foreign fighter is mentioned (Zelin & Kohlmann & al-Khouri, 2013).

Free Syrian International Brigades
List from Fryzia http://disqus.com/Fryzia/
With deep respect to the Volunteers !

List of foreign deaths in fight for Free Syria from the start of the war to date. Fighters only. No journalists or civilians.		Report Date 21/06/2013
		Days: 4
TOTAL DEATHS REPORTED	6,375	68

Country	Total by Nationality	Most Recent Data End Date 20/06/2013
Afghani	315	3
Algerian	56	1
Argentinian/Syrian	28	1
Armenia	7	
Australian/Syrians	31	1
Austrian/Syrian	19	
Azerbaijan	23	
Bahrain	12	
Belgian/Syrian	48	1
Bosnian	26	2
Brazilian/Syrian	36	3
British	20	
British/Syrian	72	1
Bulgaria	8	1
Burkina Faso	4	
Canadian/Syrian	26	1
Chad	9	
Chechen	463	6
Chile	14	
Costa Rica	1	
Croatia	12	
Czech/Syrian	18	1
Danish/Syrian	19	
Dutch/Syrian	43	1
Egyptians	509	4
Eritrean	43	
Estonian	5	
Finnish/Syrian	12	
French	20	
French/Syrian	94	1
Georgia	8	
German/Syrian	72	2
Guyana	2	
Hungarian/Syrian	11	1
Indonesian	82	3
Iranian Mujahadeen el Khalq	642	
Iraqi	240	7
Irish/Syrian	10	
Italian/Syrian	6	1
Jordanians	139	3
Kazakhstani	35	
Kirghistan	24	
Kosovar	30	

Country	Total by Nationality	Most Recent Data End Date 20/06/2013
Kuwait	106	
Latvia	6	
Lebanese Sunni	449	5
Libyans	268	2
Lithuania	1	
Macedonia	7	
Malaysian	61	3
Malinese	14	
Maltese/Lebanese	13	
Mauritanian	9	
Mexican/Syrian	60	
Moroccan	24	1
New Zealand/Syrian	7	
Niger	13	
Norwegian/Syrian	24	
Omani	13	
Pakistani	310	3
Polish/Syrian	13	
Portuguese/Syrian	10	
Qatari	19	
Russian/Syrian	189	
Saudi	737	2
Sierra Leone/Lebanese	5	
Slovak/Syrian	13	
Slovenian/Syrian	14	
Somali AlShabaab	122	
South African/Syrian	19	
South Sudan	6	
Spanish/Syrian	16	
Suriname	6	
Swedish/Syrian	49	1
Swiss/Syrian	18	
Tadzhikstan	15	
Trinidad & Tobago	4	
Tunisians	64	
Turkmenistan	41	
Turks -(part Kurds part PKK)	183	4
UAE	14	
Ukraine	7	
USA/Syrian	35	
Uzbek	40	
Yemeni	57	2

From: http://freedomfalconofsyria.blogspot.ca/2013/05/fryzia-syria-status-report.html

Assad's Allies Killed Foreign fighters and mercenaries killed fighting for the Assad regime Evaluated by Fryzia (http://disqus.com/Fryzia/) to **08/06/2013**			Current Report: Data ending **07/06/2013** 4	
Country	**Cumulative Total**	X-Check	**Total**	**Notes**
	52,265	52,265	**690**	
	Total by Country			
Algerians (aircrew)	67		2	Aircrew
Belarus (snipers & currently all aircrew)	819		6	Aircrew
Belgian (Stormfront Neo-Nazi)	2			
British Neo Nazi	1			
Chinese	40			
Columbian FARC	12			
Dutch (Stormfront)	1			
Former GDR (DDR) (carrying GDR-ID card)	15			
Frente Polisario	3			
German (NSU)	3			
Hezbollah	11,434		571	Mostly in Al Qasir area. Most younger than 18
Hungarian (Neo-Nazi Magyar Gárda Mozgalom)	11			
Iran	35,207		102	Damascus/Al Qasir
Iraq(Mahdi/gov't)	2,289			
Lebanese Amal	79			
North Koreans	369		4	IED Attack near Al Bayda
Russian (incl. Syr-Russ/Russ-Syr), Military & "Agricultural advisors"	1,868		5	All Agri Advisors
Sudanese	34			
Swedish (Far Right NeoNazi Stormfront)	3			
Ukrainians	1			
Venezuelans	7			

Report from: http://freedomfalconofsyria.blogspot.ca/2013/05/fryzia-syria-status-report.html

Based on unofficial information from intelligence agencies (probably leaked from TEK) it can be concluded that in reality about 10-15 Hungarian citizens could be as fighters in Syria but more precise data are not available. A number of them are surely no jihadists but professional mercenaries having been earlier members of the French Foreign Legion or participants of the Yugoslav civil war.

It can be predicted that the present situation in Hungary as well as in other countries of Eastern-Middle Europe is a temporary state that can and will change in the twinkle. Eastern-Middle Europe's terrorism threat is growing because these countries being NATO members can't avoid to get involved in any way into the present war(s) in the Middle-East since they are partly themselves on ISIS' target list of war. So Hungary that was 150 years long ruled at least partly by Islam governors (Pasha of Buda) appointed by the Sultan.

ThirdPosition @Third_Position · Jun 16
#ISIS Roadmap: The goal of a unified #Islamic #Caliphate. pic.twitter.com/21rEJM6xpV

After Western Europe's present overcrowding with immigrants also Eastern Europe as a whole and Hungary as part of it can't avoid to become more or less target countries of the (legal and illegal) immigration waves moving out the Muslim countries of South-East Asia, the Middle East and the North-Africa and the Sub-Sahara regions as well as of the Balkans. These migration routes are well known and the "migration-business" runs by well trained – partly Muslim – organized criminal networks settled inside of Hungary but also outside in the surrounding countries (Póczik, 2008:393-406). Due to it the unfiltered and relatively young Muslim population and the number of (particularly female) converts will grow apace and in the coming decades a double rooted or rootless Muslim generation will grow up similar to the problematic young generation settled today in Western Europe's metropolises. Because of the general identity crisis in Hungary too the time is not far when many converted Muslims will follow the example of Muriel Degauque, Samantha Lewthwaite or the ethnic Hungarian Croatian citizen Irén Horák, alias Amina, former wife of Anvar al-Avlaki, killed leader of al-Kaida in Yemen who declared after the death of her husband to be a convinced jihadist.

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Preventing terrorism through enlightenment?
The Danish approach to CVE[10]

Dr. Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen
Danish Institute for International Studies

Background

After several terrorism-related arrests in Denmark in 2005-7 the government's decided to draft a national actionplan to prevent extremism and radicalisation. At this point in time some municipalities had already begun directing attention to this (Aarhus, Odense and Copenhagen – the three largest municipalities).

This was part of a broader European/Western trend which followed attacks in Europe conducted by residents and identified a need for an alternative to hardcore War on terror and counterterrorism which could not easily be accepted against residents in a liberal democracy (a softer, more humane take on prevention).

The actionplan from 2009 was very broad and tied 'prevention of extremist views and radicalisation' to

- counterterrorism;
- efforts against gangs and youth crime;
- international cooperation to promote peace, development and democracy;
- efforts against discrimination and intolerance;
- access to education, jobs and equal opportunity;
- integration and intercultural dialogue

There was an emphasis on dialogue and enlightenment, rolemodels and campains – to correct misunderstandings about the Danish society, Danish policies and democracy – and on Muslims and integration.

In 2014 a new actionplan was drafted and this plan is in many ways more narrowly focussed on early and targetted prevention and exit and less focussed on phenomena that may or may not play into radicalisation-processes or be somehow related. This does not necessarily mean that concrete initiatives will no longer focus on some of these.

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[10] CVE – Countering Violent Extremism

Understanding - Carrot and a little stick for the ones who refuse the carrots

Crucial to the Danish approach is the understanding of terrorism as a crime and a risk to vulnerable youth rather than as a fundamental threat to the order of things.

From the beginning efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and extremism/radicalisation were imagined within already existing structures and logics surrounding other types of crime – although ideology and sometimes religion was added.

Incorporated into existing structures (SSP, PSP, Imam-board, etc.)

As this indicates CVE was therefore also incorporated into and a continuation of existing conceptualisations of pevention of crime and use of penalty (as resocialisation)

Fundamental understanding of the target group as misguided or unaware of own possibilities and potential.
Basic understanding that the Danish society is so perfect that it does not make sense to oppose it and therefore opposition must be the result of misunderstandings.
As a consequence the approach relies heavily on mentors, coaches and therapy to open the individual's eyes and enable and build capacity and on inclusion – if they understand the Danish society and are welcomed into it they will become content.
For the ones who, after all this, still choose to be radical there is punishment.

The danish approcah can therefore be understood within the same framework as other effort to prevent risk behaviour, crime and recidivism – an approach which focusses on the most cost-effective ways and sometimes offends victims as well as parts of the population because offenders receive help. But the basic logic is that the aim is to minimize the risk of crime, which is costfull to society and to do whatever works.

Prevention (of crime but also e.g. health problems) in Denmark is often framed within the "Prevention Pyramid" – identifying different stages where intervention can take place. In relation to CVE this means:

The Prevention Pyramid

General level

Aimed at the broader population, particularly youth (primary and secondary school)

Focus on capacity building to improve circumstances on a societal as well as an individual level

- Inclusion
- Enlightenment about own opportunities and the Danish society
- Facilitation of dialogue about controversial themes (e.g. Dialogue Ambassadors)
- Awareness about dangers (could potentially compromise the general rule about not addressing problems on this level due to the risk of social exaggeration)
- Education about manipulation

Specific level

Aimed at vulnerable individuals travelling in problematized social environments

Focus on capacity building and prevention of problems from arising or worsening

- Mentoring
- Coaching of parents
- Dialogue with communities to prevent eg. foreign fighters

Targeted level

Aimed at individuals who have engaged in criminal acts or are deemed in imminent risk of doing so

Focus on capacity building and prevention of specific criminal acts – offending or reoffending

- Exit programmes
- Mentoring
- Capacity building (life skills, education, etc.)

Overview

The main coordinating forces are the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs and the Danish Security and Intellingence (PET)

In addition to coordinating they also have concrete initiatives:

- **Danish Security and Intelligence Service:**

Training key persons in municipalities and police

Training/advising professionals

Training the Police

Exit-programme

Taking over from municipalities and police etc. in prevention and deradicalisationcases that are serious

Dialogue-forum (key persons who know what is happening on the street – and can affect it)

- **The Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs / The National Board of Social Services:**

Training key persons in municipalities and police

Advicing and supporting concrete initiatives in municipalitites as well as civil society (eg. Parents of foreign fighters

Developping methods and producing educational material (movies, booklets, pamphlets)

In addition to these two the main actors include:

- **Danish Prison and Probation Service:**

Exit – Back on track in cooperation with the Minsitry and the Service

Prevention in prisons in cooperation with the Danish Security and Intelligence Service – incl. training employees

- **SSP and PSP cooperation**(School, Social Services and Police + Psychiatry, Social Services and Police):

Awareness about spotting

Mentoring and coaching

- **Police districts**

In all 12 police districts in Denmark a structure revolving around socalled "Info houses" has been establihed to coordinate preventive efforts and cooperation between all relevant actors. There are, however, substantial differences with regards to how this works in practise.

- **Municipalities**

The most visible efforts can be found in two municipalities:

Aarhus municipality + local police:

Infohouse inspired by Amsterdam-project – registering concerns and advicing on how to handle them

Public debate arrangements

Foreign Fighters prevention in dialogue with eg. Mosque through which many passed

Foreign Fighters return – offering mentoring, therapy, assistance with practical challenges

Copenhagen municipality (VINK): Until recently primarily early prevention through inclusion – primarily educating others to engage with youth, counter prejudice and facilitate dialogue. Aims to strengthen dialogue and inclusion of youth attracted to extreme communities or ideas. Offers advice to those worried (professional and private), presentations and themedays for proffessionals and facilitation of networks and dialogue. Board of 'resource persons'. Can offer mentors for individuals.

Recently reinforced. 2015-18 doubled the resources. Now also includes initiatives to prevent travels to eg. Syria (eg mentoring) and rehabilitate returnees.

Most other municipalities also have initiatives but not quite as organised or visible. Most municipalities are also using the same approach as Aarhus – e.g. offering a mentor to returnees, who facilitates what they need (psychologist, housing, job, education).

In addition to this there is (attempts at) inclusion of various <u>social services</u> (e.g. social housing, job centres, etc.) and <u>education</u> (primary and secondary school, higher education)

- **Civil society and NGO's / Private companies**

NGOs working with empowerment of various groups (e.g women)

NGO's working with next of kins to Foreign Fighters

NGO's working with exit or prevention

NGO's offering courses, seminars, etc. to eg. teachers

Challenges ahead

There is little doubt that the international criticism of the Aarhus approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq is feeding into a national political debate (in an election year) about whether or not the Government is generally taking threats to security seriously since it plans to make the Aarhus approach a vital part of the national approach.

In my view, the Aarhus approach to receiving returnees and to preventing travels appears to be in line with the underlying logics.

Another challenge is that other parts of the Danish approach (including Aarhus) is increasingly being criticized for creating self-fulfilling prophecies by stigmatizing parts of the population through the focus on early prevention and thereby contributing to polarization and subsequent radicalisation.

A third challenge lies in the focus on mobilization of civil society which the new action plan dictates. This mobilization may in time compromise the professionalization which has thus far characterized the Danish approach and thereby increase the risk of involving and legitimizing private actors with unknown agendas leading to problems that other countries such the UK have previously encountered.

Bringing applied ethics into counterterrorism: strengthening professionalism and legitimacy

Drs. Michael Kowalski
Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University/Campus The Hague & National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, Netherlands

http://campusdenhaag.leidenuniv.nl/ctc/medewerkers/michael-kowalski.html

Countering terrorism implies various dilemmas for the many different professions involved, from intelligence officers to social workers. Research shows, however, that there are only few or even no institutional arrangements to handle those dilemmas within the chain of counterterrorism organizations. At the same time there seem to be widespread misunderstandings among the public about the way counterterrorism is performed in democratic societies, especially in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations. The missing attention devoted to dilemmas and popular misunderstandings can ultimately nurture the decline of legitimacy of counterterrorism policies. This legitimacy is at the core of counterterrorism given the important role intelligence services play. In addition, legitimacy of counterterrorism policies is also needed to meet emerging or adapting threats now and in the future.

At the EENeT-conference ongoing research has been presented that intended to bring applied ethics into the field of counterterrorism. One of the key questions was: What can be the added value of applied ethics in counterterrorism by using the instrument of Moral Case Deliberation? This research offers a practical contribution to counterterrorism professionals dealing with ethical dilemmas. The methods researched and conclusions provided can help strengthening the ethical expertise of counterterrorism professionals of diverse backgrounds. Indirectly, research into the added value of applied ethics can also support the legitimacy of counterterrorism policies.

As the research is still ongoing it is still possible to run practical sessions of Moral Case Deliberations within counterterrorism institutions outside the Netherlands in a closed and trusted setting upon request.

Victims of terrorism as actors in the prevention of radicalisation: The Spanish case.

Dr. Agata Serranò
University of Jaén, Spain

During the workshop at the EENeT conference 2014 in Ávila, the *invisibility* and the lack of recognition that victims of terrorism have endured for decades in Spanish society in general, and in the Basque Country in particular, were discussed, while highlighting the relevance of the peaceful demonstrations against terrorism that have taken place in Spain since the 1980s. Promoted by civil movements, associations and foundations of victims of terrorism in Spain during the last decades of the 20th century, these acts have shown how victims of terrorism are *visible* and *relevant* actors in the *social* fight against terrorism.

Secondly, the workshop underlined that civil society, together with victims, can be a "rational weapon against terrorism" because it has never resorted to violence to oppose this crime but to the *reasoning* of the Rule of Law: the defence of fundamental freedoms via democratic participation and respect for the Law.

Thirdly, the positive effects that these demonstrations have had on the gradual recognition of the significance of victims of terrorism and on respect for *dignity, truth, memory* and *justice* were considered. Furthermore, how such values have come to be inspirational principles for recent innovative and remarkable Spanish laws in favour of victims of terrorism were examined.

Lastly, the reason why victims of terrorism should be considered important players in the prevention of violent radicalisation were explored, while at the same time stressing their testimonies which constitute an effective educational and teaching tool that can be used to prevent radicalisation among younger generations.

For more information on the subject of "Victims of Terrorism",
please, have a closer look to

the European Project "Europe against terrorism: the glance of the victim".
http://www.fmiguelangelblanco.es/index.php/actividades/accion-internacional/european-project

Read also
http://www.fmiguelangelblanco.es/images/secciones/actividades/ep/Dossier_es.pdf

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