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**Focussing Radicalisation
June 2014 – May 2016**

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About the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues

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It is dedicated to a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency analysis and research which is seen as a prerequisite to provide comprehensive insights into the complexity of the phenomenon "terrorism".

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and
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EENeT RAD 2014-2016

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Focussing Radicalisation June 2014 - May 2016

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Preface

Dear readers.

With this paper we will close our project

EENeT RAD 2014-2016

Focussing Radicalisation June 2014 - May 2016,

generously co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union.

But to close the project does for sure not mean to end our discussion on still pressing issues of “radicalisation leading to terrorism, violent extremism” within our network of European experts on terrorism issues, the EENeT.

We want to thank the European Commission for the financial support.

Furthermore, we want to express our gratitude to all partners in the project. First of all the hosts of our conferences and meetings

- November 2014 the National Police of Spain,
- November 2015 the Swedish Defence University,
- March 2015 and March 2016 the European Police College CEPOL in Budapest.

Thanks also to our long-lasting partners of the EENeT Steering Committee

- Peter Gridling, Federal Agency for State Protection and Counter Terrorism (BVT), Austria,
- Gert Vercauteren, Coordination Organ for the Analysis of the Threat (OCAM/OCAD), Belgium
- Prof. Dr. Marco Lombardi, Catholic University (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore), Italy,
- Drs. Michael Kowalski, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), Netherlands,
- Nigel Inkster, United Kingdom, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),

who gave support to conceptual and technical considerations from the very beginning and who accompanied the project activities.

Last but not least many thanks to the big community of EENeT members who always voluntarily and gratuitously supported our conferences and meetings by giving presentations, chairing workshops and round table discussions and so on.

Only with the help of you all we could achieve to realize trustful exchange and discussion on issues of radicalisation – an exchange of experiences and know-how that helps to stimulate, promote and develop methods and tools necessary to better understand and fight in terms of prevention and repression the diverse phenomena of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.

But, as we all know, the current development of terrorism and violent extremism is still alarming. Various political and social developments caused new extremist reactions and vice versa.

The financial funding of the European Commission was an outstanding support to strengthen and consolidate our network. Thus, the EENeT will continue to pursue its main objective to provide a forum-based, constantly developing think-tank in order to exchange experiences revolving around a highly dynamic social phenomenon.

**Dr. Uwe E. Kemmesies, Project Leader
Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany**

Analysis about the Foreign Terrorist Fighters having left Germany between January 2012 and June 2015 towards Syria and Iraq

(Common Analysis of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and Centre of Information and Excellence of Hesse (HKE)

Dr. Kemmesies, Uwe E.
Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany

Conclusions / Key findings of the Analysis

The civil-war-like conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the establishment of various terror organizations in the region, such as the Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al Nusra, have led since mid-2012 to a massive increase in the number of Islamist-motivated persons travelling to Syria and Iraq. In Germany as well, above all Salafist institutions and actors are using the conflict to spread their extremist ideology and recruit new followers. Since the cut-off date for the last report in 2014, which nearly overlapped with the declaration of the Caliphate on 29 June 2014, the question has arisen as to whether this declaration has increased the pull of the IS. In addition, a significant number of persons has since returned to Germany, creating new challenges for the security authorities. How should we address this phenomenon appropriately, both in terms of prevention and of punishment, in order to prevent more people from leaving and to manage the security risks associated with those who have returned? The present report focuses on these questions. It was prepared at the request of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers as an update of the 2014 report and approved by the intelligence and law enforcement authorities represented in the deradicalisation working group of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ).

The findings documented here are based on the analysis of the radicalisation backgrounds and careers of the 677 persons nationwide that the German domestic security agencies know left Germany for Syria or Iraq by the end of June 2015 for Islamist motives or actively tried to do so.

The police and intelligence agencies of all the federal states and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) collected the data for this analysis in anonymous form using a coordinated data collection instrument. Although the quality and quantity of information varies widely from case to case, overall it has significantly improved in comparison to the first study in 2014. However, despite the improved information, wide variations in the amount of information meant that no elaborated multivariate analysis was advisable. For this

reason, descriptive statistical and simple inferential statistical methods were used to analyse possible differences between groups. In the context of the main purpose of this study, i.e. optimizing preventive approaches, the following findings on key issues should be noted:

- Overall, fewer people left for Syria and Iraq and more returned. Some findings indicate that the high-water mark of jihadist travel to Syria/Iraq has passed.
- The IS declaration of a caliphate and its ongoing efforts to form a state seemed to attract a different group of followers: Their average age fell to 23.7 years, and we saw many more minors (12%) and women (38%) leaving the country after the caliphate was declared. The data do not confirm the hypothesis that the IS is more attractive to those with lower educational attainment.
- A different process of radicalisation can be seen among those who left after the caliphate was declared: The length of time from the start of the radicalisation process to the first departure was shorter by seven months and is now 20 months. A much larger share of persons became radicalised within one year (60% as compared to 42%). Various detailed observations support the impression that the shorter process of radicalisation is more likely to take place in secret and to be a self-referential process, i.e. focused on the person being radicalised.
- For those who travelled to Syria or Iraq last year, the factors relevant for radicalisation also changed noticeably: The greater significance of the Internet (55% compared to 38% for those who left before the caliphate was declared) in the radicalisation process corresponds to the reduced significance of the social environment (59% compared to 71%). But real-world contacts overall were still a slightly more important influence than the Internet.
- Also noticeable is an apparent shift in the closeness to/distance from Salafist groupings: Among those who travelled after the caliphate was declared, the share of persons the security authorities consider Salafists fell slightly, to 91% from 98%, although this figure remains high. The number of active Salafists was much smaller (57% as compared to 76%). It is not possible to assess whether this apparently reduced activity expressed a newly cautious approach to recruitment.
- Among those who travelled after the caliphate was declared, the share of persons previously known to the police was noticeably smaller (50% as compared to 71%). This is obviously not a reliable predictor of threat, as can be seen from the fact that the percentage of persons known to have fought in Syria did not differ significantly between those

who travelled before and those who travelled after the caliphate was declared (34% as compared to 38%).

The key finding of last year's analyses, namely that travellers to Syria had differing radicalisation backgrounds, continues to hold true. This finding is not surprising in view of the apparently wide variety of openings for radicalisation in different segments of the population (whether related to age, sex, education or nationality) and areas of the country (whether rural, urban or metropolitan). So we must continue to diversify our prevention efforts. No universal strategy comes to mind, and our efforts should take specific regional, socio-demographic and milieu-related aspects into account. Whether the changes documented here, which are relevant in designing preventive approaches, will continue and whether the trend towards less travel to Syria, noticed since the caliphate was declared in June 2014, continues will have to remain under observation.

Complete Analysis only in German language

http://www.bka.de/nn_231072/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Publikationsreihen/SonstigeVeroeffentlichungen/2015AnalyseRadikalisierungsgruendeSyrienIrakAusreisende.html

Separatist and anti-separatist violence with right wing extremist background in Europe

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Abstract: This paper analyses separatist and anti-separatist violence with right-wing extremist background in contemporary Europe. The author deals with the historical legacies of this phenomenon. Current forms in Western Europe, Southern and East Central Europe as well as in Eastern Europe are analysed. Perspectives of the development of this form of violence are assessed. The author comes to the conclusion that right-wing extremist separatist violence is more intensive in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and that new forms of this violence can be expected in the future.

Introduction

Separatist and anti-separatist violence in Europe remains a significant security problem in the 21st century (separatism is used in this paper as an umbrella term for secessionist, irredentist and similar activities, anti-separatism means countering such activities). It is closely interconnected with various forms of political, ethnic and religious violence. The ideological background of separatist and anti-separatist violence can be very different. In Europe we can identify left-wing separatist groups (for example, the ETA in Basque country, several republican groups in Northern Ireland etc.), religious separatist groups (for example, the Caucasus emirate) and right-wing extremist groups (Bötticher, Mares 2012). The aim of this paper is to analyse and to categorize entities with extreme right background.

Historical development of right-wing extremist separatist and anti-separatist violence

Historically, the development of violent separatist movements was determined by the spread of nationalism in the 19th and 20th century, however, some nationalist or irredentist movements were influenced by leftist revolutionary ideas. A typical case of a mixture of nationalist and anarchist ideas was the assassin Gavrilo Princip, (member of the group Young Bosnia - Mlada Bosna) who killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, in 1914. The act initiated the First World War (Dinic 2014).

On the other hand, the rise of Fascism and Nazism inspired many violent groups with separatist (especially irredentist) goals. Various violent Nazi groupings operated in European countries with German minority population. They struggled for the destruction of borders after establishing the Versailles system. They won significant influence in Czechoslovakia. The paramilitary group National Sport (Volkssport) established according to the model of the Storm-Department (Sturmabteilung) of the NSDAP was active in 1929-1932 (Burian 2012: 139-170). The paramilitary arm of the Sudeten-German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei – SdP) called Voluntary Protect Service (Freiwilliger Schutzdienst – FS) was established in 1938. Their cadres escaped to Germany in September 1938, where the Sudeten-German Free Corps (Sudetendeutsches Freikorps) was founded. It started guerrilla and terrorist operations against Czechoslovak army during so called Munich crisis. Also the German social democratic and leftist units called Republican Defence (Republikanische Wehr) were used against the Sudeten German Nazi units (Burian 2012: 328-376).

After the Second World War neo-Nazi ideas were typical of South Tirolian terrorism. Austrian terrorists with neo-Nazi pan-German background attacked Italian targets, mostly in the 1960s. On the other hand, the Italian neo-Fascists opposed to this pan-German struggle (Dokumentationszentrum des österreichischen Widerstandes 1978: 349-353). Various extreme right loyalist anti-separatist groups were active in Ulster. They were involved in the war against irredentist republican groupings and they cooperated with the English and international extreme right. It was the case of the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association and its militant wing Ulster Freedom Fighters. They maintained links to the English and US Neo-Nazi-Scene (Fromm, Kernbach 1994: 173-175).

Contemporary separatist violence with right-wing extremist background in Western Europe

Current Western European violent separatism is relatively “under-developed” in comparison with the leftist groupings (the leftist separatist groupings operate in Corsica, in Basque country, in Galicia in Spain or in Northern Ireland on the republican side) (Frenett, Smith 2012) and with Islamist separatism (growing tendencies to establish local caliphates or at least “sharia controlled zones” in Western countries) (Vidino 2013: 9-10).

Right-wing extremist background can be still observed in Ulster among loyalist groupings and in the Flemish part of Belgium. However, a part of violent Ulster loyalist and total majority of the Flemish right-wing extremists turn their attention to new minorities on “their” territories (mostly Muslims, in

Ulster also Roma and other immigrants) (Mc Auley 2013: 94-96). In Ulster the loyalist Combat 18 (neo-Nazi group with British roots) threatened Roma immigrants in 2009 (Bean 2011: 49).

In Belgium Flemish violent youngsters are active in several neo-Nazi groups, predominantly the Blood & Honour Flanders and its splits (De Waele 2013: 25). One of these splits, the group Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty (Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw - BBET) tried to start civil war in Belgium in 2006. They had a plan to kill Filip Dewinter - chair of the far right party Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) under the false flag of Islamist terrorism and then activist Dyab Abou Jahjah from the Arabian European League (Arabisch Europese Liga). However, a police operation broke these plans. In 2014, several members of this group were sentenced (Belga 2014).

Contemporary separatist violence with right-wing extremist background in South-Eastern and East-Central Europe

In South-Eastern Europe the struggle for Greater States in the 1990's and 2000's was connected with neo-Fascist militant groupings, including the war conflicts in former Yugoslavia. The impact of these separatist and anti-separatist groupings is still visible in South Eastern Europe (in Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Romania etc.). Historical legacies have still strong impact on nationalist policy (Stojarová 2014).

In Bosnia, the Bosnian national socialist group called the Bosnian Movement of National Pride (Bosanski pokret nacionalnog ponosa) uses militant rhetoric and it claims the region of Sandjak, which is currently a part of Serbia with strong Bosnian population (Bosanski pokret nacionalnog ponosa 2016).

Various paramilitary groups were established with the goal to fight for lost territories from the Yugoslav wars. In Serbia the paramilitary Guard of the St. Tsar Lazar (Garda Svetego Cara Lazara) was founded in 2007 and it was active several years (Mareš 2009). According to current conceptualization of the extreme right also some Albanian militant groupings (the Albanian National Army - *Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare*, for example) can be defined as extreme right organizations, despite the fact that, at the beginning of their existence in the 1980s/1990s, some of them were inspired by leftist ideas (including "Enverism", named by the Albanian dictator Enver Hodza) and today they are more and more under the influence of Islamism. However, Albanian nationalism remains a strong element of ideology of some groups which struggle for greater Albania (Stojarová 2006).

In East Central Europe the scope of the militant extreme right separatism is relatively limited. Some separatists were active in groupings such as the

Moravian Autonomous Nationalists (Moravští autonomní nacionalisté) at the turn of the first and second decades of the 21st century, however, their main activity was visible mostly in social networks (Mareš 2013: 61-62).

Contemporary separatist violence with right-wing extremist background in Eastern Europe

The extreme right was and is active in various separatist and irredentist areas, currently mostly in Eastern Europe. The Russian extreme right in several post-Soviet countries (mostly in the Baltic states) claim irredentist goals, including branches of Russian paramilitary groupings (for example the Russian National Unity – Rossiyskoe Nacionalnoye Jedinstvo - RNE)(Kupka, Laryš, Smolík 2009: 207).

Extreme right units and individuals are fighting together with separatists in the so called Novorossia or in the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic after the start of the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russian extreme right volunteers as well as extremist foreign fighters from various countries were or are fighting on the separatist side. The Ghost Brigade (Brigade Prizrak) is a typical example of multinational and multi-ideological unit. The Diversionary-Attack *Reconnaissance Group* Rusich (Diversionno-sturmovaya razvedytnaya gruppa Rusich) and the Varjag unit is made up of far right fighters. The RNE is active here too. However, also far left units and individuals operate in Donbass (Mareš – Visigr 2015).

The Ukrainian militant extreme right struggles to re-unify the country with the use of violence. The Azov Battalion is currently part of the Ukrainian official structures. Many far right activists (including foreign fighters) are involved in this unit; others are active in the Right Sector (Pravy sector – PS). It has its own paramilitary structures (Roubalová 2015). Part of Ukrainian extreme right militants from the PS supports separatism in the western part of this country – in Galicia (Halič)(Rozhin 2015).

Perspectives of separatist violence with right-wing extremist background in Europe

The legacy of armed conflicts and dissatisfaction with current borders remains still an important driver of militant far right separatist activities in Eastern Europe. In the context of the 100th anniversary of the establishing of the Versailles system some extreme right forces can be involved in militant symbolic activities (the Treaty of Trianon from 1920 is still unacceptable for the Hungarian extreme right, for example) (Ambrosio 2001: 127).

The future perspectives of militant separatist and anti-separatist right wing extremism in the whole Europe can be connected with traditional claims on the one hand and with the struggle against the establishing of local and regional caliphates or “sharia-zones” in Europe or with the tendencies to “Americanization” in the sense of support for “White Separatism” in European countries on the other hand. “White-only” territories divided from multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies under the control of the extreme right might be claimed.

Conclusion

Important historical legacy of separatist violence with right-wing extremist background can be identified in Europe. In several historical eras this form of violence poses a serious a threat to regional security. Right-wing extremist separatist violence is contemporarily significantly more intensive in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The Ukrainian crisis has impact on stability in Eastern Europe. New forms of this phenomenon can be expected in the future, mostly in connection with Islamist separatist tendencies.

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Radicalisation – Analysis work at the Bulgarian Centre for the Study of Democracy

Rositsa Dzhekova and Mila Mancheva
Centre for the Study of Democracy

During the EENeT subgroup meeting in March 2016 at CEPOL in Budapest, Rositsa Dzhekova and Mila Mancheva, Analysts of the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) in Sofia/Bulgaria, took the opportunity to introduce to the audience some aspects of their work at the CSD on radicalisation issues. Comparable to the EENeT, the CSD (www.csd.bg) intends to bring together expertise and knowledge of scholars and policy makers.

Recently analysts of the centre brought out two interesting papers on radicalisation, which can be downloaded directly from the website of the CSD:

2015 - Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends (link: <http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17621>)
2016 - Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature (link: <http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560>)

Reactions of extreme right violence and extreme left violence to the European immigration crisis and their implications

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Abstract: This paper deals with the reactions of violent scenes from the right-wing and left-wing part of the political spectrum to the immigration crisis in Europe. The most important forms of right-wing extremist and left-wing extremist violence interconnected with this crisis are analysed. The possible future development in this field is predicted, including the “worst case scenarios”. The author comes to the conclusion that current immigration crisis significantly has re-directed the strategic and tactical use of violence by right-wing and left-wing extremists in Europe.

Introduction

Right-wing extremist and left-wing extremist violence are stable threats to European security. They are interconnected with the general political and societal development of this continent. The so called immigration or refugee crisis, which in the current form started in 2015, is a recent challenge to the militant extremist scenes. The aim of this paper is to describe and categorize the most important forms of extreme left and extreme right violence with direct links to this crisis.

General context of REX and LEX violence related to the refugee crisis

Right-wing extremist and left-wing extremist violent scenes react to the refugee crisis, however, they continue in their previous tactics and strategies. The refugee crisis was able to initiate serious right-wing extremist violence in various European regions. This violence dominates - in comparison with other forms (a. o. we can observe a decline of anti-Roma violent activities) (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2016). Traditional subcultural violence – skinheads, punks etc. (Smolík, Vejvodová 2014) is substituted by more sophisticated militant forms. Violence related to the refugee crisis is instrumentalised by quasi non-violent political parties and by foreign powers (mostly by Russia) for subversive purposes against European democracies and the European integration process (Czech Intelligence Community 2016).

Most important forms of right-wing extremist violence related to the refugee crisis

As the most important form related to the refugee crisis should be mentioned the wave of arson attacks at refugee homes, mostly in Germany (Diel 2016), however, also in Sweden (Eriksson 2015) and other countries. In comparison with a similar wave of attacks in the 1990s an important element of the current crisis is a relatively high number of perpetrators without previous affiliation to the organized right-wing extremist scene. During the refugee crisis migrants, Muslims and pro-refugees facilities and activists were and are targets of right-wing extremist violence and sabotages (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2016, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2016).

Also attacks against politicians, mostly in Germany, have a growing tendency (Diel 2016). A well-known case is the knife attack against the mayor candidate Henriette Reker in Cologne on 17 October 2015. Perpetrator Frank S. has right-wing extremist biography (Landtag Nordrhein Westfalen 2015). Violent demonstrations occurred in several European countries, a. o. rallies organized by the Hooligans against Salafists (Hooligans gegen Salafisten - HoGeSa) in Germany, anti-immigrant demonstrations in France or the demonstration "Stop Islamisation of Europe" in Bratislava on 20 June 2015 (Mesežnikov 2015).

The rise of anti-immigrant vigilantism is typical of Europe. A well-known case are the Soldiers of Odin in the Nordic countries (Laizans, Dagenborg 2016). In several Central and Eastern European countries extreme right paramilitary units are operating with the goal to protect borders and public safety. As examples we can mention the Slovak recruits (Slovenský branci), the Hungarian National Front (Magyar Nemzeti Front) or the Czechoslovak reserve soldiers for peace (Českoslovenští vojáci v záloze pro mír) (De Liedekerke 2016). They use public fear of immigration for their political propaganda. Massive spread of violent threats in cyber-space is typical of the era of the migration crisis (Faiola 2016).

A specific reaction to the migration crisis, respectively to the rise of the so called Islamic state, is the activity of far right activists related to Kurdish units in Iraq or Syria or the Syrian regime. Far right fighters from European countries are fighting in Kurdish units (despite the predominantly leftist character of Kurdish resistance) in Iraq or in Syria and maybe also in Assad's regime units in Syria. They also carry out propagandist, material and financial support for the armed struggle of Kurds or for the Assad's regime. However, the scope of these activities is limited (Czech Intelligence Community 2016).

Most important forms of extreme left violence related to the refugee crisis

Left-wing extremist violence reacts to the rise of right-wing extremist violence as well as to the growth of anti-immigrant parties and movements in Europe. Representatives of these movements are attacked or threatened by left-wing extremists, for example some politicians of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) by the leftist autonomous scene (attacked are their cars, buildings etc.). Violent anti-demonstrations against right-wing extremism and the police are a traditional instrument of the extreme left used also during the refugee crisis, as in Leipzig in December 2015 (Eichstädt, Lachmann 2015). Militant and terrorist left-wing groups adopted pro-refugees statements in their propaganda (FAI/IRF 2015).

On the other hand, also some leftist activists in East Central Europe with Panslavic orientation declare anti-immigrant attitudes. In East Central Europe a line between right-wing and pro-Kremlin left wing paramilitary and vigilantist violence against immigrants is not clear in some cases – the above mentioned Czechoslovak reserve soldiers for peace can also be called „left-wing“ patriotic“ paramilitaries (Mareš et al. 2016).

Several members of European extreme left groupings are fighting in Kurdish units in Iraq and in Syria. Kurdish political organisations and refugees from Kurdish regions are supported by domestic left-wing militants in several European countries, among others by Anti-Fascist Action (Czech Intelligence Community 2016).

Prediction of possible development

The intensity and scope of right-wing extremist violence can grow in the near future (a higher number of killed victims than up to now is not excluded). The worst case scenario includes also mass clashes between extremists from various scenes (the use of weapons is possible). Right-wing extremist as well as left wing extremist lone actor and small cell terrorism can be the result of the step by step radicalisation of a large part of European population. Left-wing sabotages and attacks against new European anti-immigrant facilities and institutions (European Border and Coast Guard) can be expected. The return of foreign fighters from Kurdish and Syrian pro-governmental units can strengthen the violent potential of some right-wing and left-wing extremist groupings (including their anti-Turkish and anti-Salafist activities in European countries).

Conclusion

We can conclude that the refugee crisis has a significant impact on contemporary right-wing and left wing extremist violence and both forms of violence are closely interconnected with the general security development. The scopes and intensity of right-wing extremist violence seems to be significantly higher than left-wing extremist violence. Arson attacks against refugees and the rise of paramilitary activities in the context of the migration crisis can be identified as the most serious threats up to now. Mass clashes between various extremist scenes and growing lone-wolf and small cell terrorist tendencies within the right-wing extremist and left-wing extremist scene in relation to immigration crisis are challenges for the future development.

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Fighting Terrorism Upstream: the Neglected Role of Prevention

Notes on a Planned Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness

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*Prevention as a science and a skill is still in its infancy;
with additional research, analysis, and practice, maturity will come.*¹
Michael K. Meehan (2006)

Introduction

Trillions of dollars have been spent since 9/11 by governments on *countering* terrorism by force. Nevertheless, the problem has gotten worse rather than better, with new terrorist atrocities taking place in nearly one hundred countries and with insurgencies erupting in fragile states where terrorist and hybrid (terrorist-guerrilla) groups have increasingly been able to bring territories under their control (e.g. Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan). Last year alone, according to figures recently released by START, more than 16,800 terrorist attacks took place, causing more than 43,500 deaths and more than 40,900 wounded, while more than 11,800 people were taken hostage.² These are the *downstream* result of terrorist scheming and plotting – all failures of terrorism prevention. To gain a better understanding of how to control the spread of terrorism, it is high time to approach the phenomenon of terrorism also *upstream* at the source, that is, on the prevention side rather than at the end of the attack line close to the response side.

Rik Peeters, has noted that “the way you look at the world determines what you see and the action you are likely to take”.³ If you witness a terrorist attack your first instinctual reaction is often - if you survive - one of taking revenge,

¹ Michael K. Meehan. The Tools of Prevention: Building Prevention and Deterrence into Exercise Programs. Washington: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2006 Master Thesis, p.v.

² START (University of Maryland) Newsletter Highlights. Worldwide terrorism in 2014; URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_OverviewofTerrorism2014_Aug2015.pdf?utm_source=START+Announce&utm_campaign=270cadb341-START_Newsletter_Aug2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a60ca8c769-270cadb341-45663445; accessed 31 August 2015. Note: the fatalities figure included killed terrorists such as suicide bombers. 24 % of the fatalities were terrorists.

³ Rik Peeters. The Preventive Gaze. How Prevention Transforms Our Understanding of the State. The Hague: eleven international publishing, 2013, p..7. Peeters notes that “prevention implies “...a belief in a certain ability to anticipate the future and in a certain ability to choose among alternative courses of action in order to avert this future. It depends on the construction of a causal scheme between future events and actions taken to avoid them. Consequently, prevention implies the potential of backward reasoning to avert a certain imaginable future. Prevention takes a not (yet) existing reality as the basis for intervention in the present”.- Idem, p. 27.

hitting back or otherwise neutralizing the perpetrators and those behind them and bring them to justice. That is supposed to have a *deterrent* effect on terrorists and their backers. Alternatively, if you have good intelligence you might be able to anticipate and, by early intervention, *pre-empt* - usually by military or police operations - a terrorist attack just in time before it happens. Yet both deterrence and pre-emption are *downstream* responses to terrorist incidents. It would be much better if we could stop or at least slow down terrorism upstream at an earlier moment. While the words "Terrorism Prevention" can be found in many reports and national programs, it is more often than not lip service to the idea that 'prevention is better than cure' while not much is being done on 'upstream prevention.

Definition of Terrorism Prevention

How should terrorism prevention be defined? Peter Romaniouk and Naureen Chowdhury Fink see it as a derivative of the concept of radicalisation and define it as

Ppt. 1: Definition of Terrorism Prevention by Peter Romaniuk & Naureen Chowdhury Fink (2012)

"...measures designed to counter the ideas, narrative, or "message" advanced by extremists and complement operational preventive efforts." Terrorism prevention aims to "prevent non-radicalised populations from becoming radicalised. The objective is to create individual and communal resilience against cognitive and/or violent radicalisation through a variety of non-coercive means."⁴

To me this is too narrow a definition and it is too closely linked to the vague and complex concept of radicalisation.⁵ It also implies that only radicals can commit acts of terrorism while we have ample evidence of reactionary

⁴ Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdhury Fink. From Input to Impact. Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs. New York: Center for Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, 2012, p.5.

⁵ There are many definitions of radicalisation. Daniela PISOIU noted that "...radicalization has been conceptualized as a process of individual evolution towards certain ideas, in some cases accompanied by a corresponding behaviour and of violence". – Daniela PISOIU. Islamist Radicalisation in Europe. An occupational change process. London: Routledge, 2012, p.11. - Ted R. Gurr, uses the concept of radicalization to refer to "...a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activities. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modelling or 'imitative' behaviour occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt". - Ted R. Gurr. Political Rebellion. Causes, outcomes and alternatives. New York: Routledge, 2015, p.171.- For an overview of many other definitions, see Alex P. Schmid. Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation Literature Review and Discussion. The Hague: ICCT, 2013.

(counter-) terrorism and false flag operations⁶ In addition, the link between radicalism and even between radicalisation and terrorism is not so direct and radicalism should also not be confused with extremism.

I prefer a broader perspective that defines terrorism prevention as involving the anticipation, identification and assessment of the risk of terrorist group formation, terrorist campaign initiation and/or specific attack preparations and the taking of pro-active measures to remove the threat and, failing that, at least reduce its impact.

Ppt. 2: Working Definition of Terrorism Prevention⁷

Prevention of terrorism involves the anticipation, recognition and assessment of the risk of terrorist group formation, terrorist campaign initiation and/or specific attack preparations and the taking of pro-active measures to remove the threat and, failing that, at least reduce its impact.

Even that definition might not be broad enough. Prevention is a concept that is used in many fields, e.g. in health care where it is more developed than in the fields of criminology, conflict- or terrorism studies. In the medical field some researchers make a distinction between five phases, levels or layers of prevention:

Ppt. 3: Levels/Layers of Prevention (not specific to terrorism)

1. *Primordial*: actions inhibiting the emergence of risk factors;
2. *Primary*: modification of factors correlated with undesirable behaviour; manipulating environments;
3. *Secondary*: efforts taken to ward off risk situations that, if unattended, could lead to more serious problems;
4. *Tertiary*: intervention after problem is well established to minimise long-term consequences as well as to implement new procedures to prevent recurrence of incidents;

⁶ Ted R. Gurr. Political Rebellion. Causes, outcomes and alternatives. New York: Routledge, 2015,p.173.

⁷ Based on National Crime Prevention Institute (USA). Understanding Crime Prevention. Woburn, WA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001, p. 3:" The formal definition of crime prevention as adopted in several countries is: the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it". Also based on: Tore Bjorgo who uses the term prevention to refer to "...reducing future acts of terrorism or other crimes, or reducing the harmful consequences of such acts, by proactive measures. – T. Bjorgo. Strategies for Preventing Terrorism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p.5. — See also Alex P. Schmid (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Prevention. London & New York: Routledge, 2011/13, p.676. Risk refers here to the degree of danger associated with a given operation, course of action, or failure to act in a crisis situation. For mathematical modelling purposes, risk is often expressed as the probability of an unwanted occurrence multiplied by the severity of its consequences. Risk assessments require the analysis of both remote and recent conditions.- Lemmas for "risk" and "risk assessment" (Ibid., p. 683).

5. *Quaternary: actions taken to overcome the consequences of excessive intervention.*⁸

Such a layered approach to prevention we find, for instance, in the field of epidemiology. While it cannot be directly applied to terrorism prevention, it might at least stimulate our thinking in new directions.

In this model, Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Choudhury Fink's conceptualization of prevention would be situated under 'primordial prevention' in the 3rd power point that is, related to "actions inhibiting risk factor[s] to emerge".

A dozen years ago, I suggested four factors that could inhibit terrorism from emerging. In 2003 when I was still Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and when the concept of radicalisation had not yet entered the discussion (that came only with the blowback after the US intervention in Iraq), I proposed that there should be four pillars (factors) on which successful preventive national anti-terrorist measures should build:

Ppt. 4: Four Pillars for Successful Preventive National Anti-Terrorism Measures⁹

- good governance;
- democracy;
- rule of law; and
- social justice.

Why these four? The reasons are simple:

- When governance is bad, resistance against corrupt rule gains followers and support.
- When unpopular rulers cannot be voted away by democratic procedures, advocates of political violence find a wider audience.
- When rulers stand above the law and use the law as a political instrument against their opponents, the law loses its legitimacy and credibility.

⁸ T. O' Connor, T. (2012). "Introduction to Terrorism Prevention," MegaLinks in Criminal Justice, retrieved from <http://www.drtoconnor.com/3440/3440lect01.htm>; accessed 10 March 2013.

⁹ Alex P. Schmid. Prevention of Terrorism. Towards a multi-pronged approach. In: Tore Bjorgo (Ed.). Root Causes of Terrorism. Myths, reality and ways forward. London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 226-227

- When long-standing injustices in society are not resolved but allowed to continue for years, without any light in sight at the end of the tunnel, we should not be amazed that desperate people, and some others championing their cause, are willing to die and to kill for what they perceive to be a just cause.¹⁰

These four pillars could be considered as “primordial” and their strengthening as “primordial” prevention of terrorism, inhibiting domestic (or national) terrorism from emerging. However, they offer not much protection against cross-border terrorism. To prevent transnational terrorism, states have to assist each other in strengthening, by means of international cooperation and technical assistance, the national capacities and capabilities of other states.

Going back to the concepts of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention and thinking in terms of fighting terrorism upstream, a broader view of terrorism prevention than the one offered by Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdhury Fink would focus on the anticipation, identification and assessment of the risk of a terrorism and the pro-active initiation of actions to remove the causes stimulating the formation of terrorist groups and organisations.

Ppt. 5. Potential Application of Three Phase Terrorism Prevention Model

‘Prevention’ of Terrorism involves the taking of pro-active measures aimed at

- I. [Primary prevention]:* reducing the risk of the formation of a terrorist group or organization,
- II. [Secondary prevention]:* reducing the risk of it being able to prepare a terrorist campaign and
- III. [Tertiary prevention]:* reducing the risk of execution of individual terrorist operations.

If that group formation cannot be forestalled, the focus should be on preventing the staging of terrorist campaigns and if that fails, prevention should at least be able to obstruct the occurrence of individual terrorist incidents and, if that fails, at least reduce the impact of an attack through contingency planning and preparedness with the help of a response-and-recovery apparatus that is meant to minimise harm.¹¹

¹⁰ Ibid. Wording slightly modified.

¹¹ This definition is influenced by the crime prevention literature. A more general definition describes prevention as “The taking of long-term proactive measures to remove the causes of an undesirable development or to obstruct the occurrence of an unwanted situation; social and technical engineering to reduce individual or collective harm or damage by inhibiting, dissuading or deterring potential offenders, also by creating environments where criminal activity is made more difficult (situational crime prevention)” -

Since not all incidents can be prevented (especially those from lone actor who show few clear signs of preparation to their surrounding (a case in point would be the case of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian who killed 77 people on 22 July 2011 in Oslo and Utoya), we also have to use precaution and initiate re-active measures to reduce and mitigate the impact by a high level of training and preparation for early response. The application of prevention strategies on the primary level could, for instance, be a task for communities and community-oriented policing. If a community's police has the trust of the population, the formation of a terrorist groups of some size cannot go undetected for long as citizens trusting the police are likely to act voluntarily as their eyes and ears. Further down the potential attack tree, secondary prevention should be the task for the intelligence services while tertiary prevention would be the responsibility of police and other security forces.

This Three Phase Terrorism Prevention Model flowing from our working definition has not focused on the Primordial Level on which risks factors are inhibited from emerging nor does it address quaternary prevention, which focuses on "actions taken to overcome the consequences of excessive intervention". Unwanted boomerang and blowback effects of counter-terrorism are a well-known phenomenon¹² that deserves more attention but this phase in the chain from primordial to primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary prevention is perhaps hardest to model and anticipate because unwanted effects are so hard to predict.

Idea of a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness

For a number of years (1999-2005) I was Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Those were very busy years and I did neither have the time, money nor mandate to write a book on terrorism prevention. However, the desire to do so has always been in the back of my mind. Having completed a Handbook of Terrorism Research¹³ – which took me almost five years to write – I feel that it is time to produce a comprehensive *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness*. To signal the practical focus of the proposed work - and since full prevention is unlikely to be ever achieved - "Preparedness" is an additional focus of the handbook. The latter refers to placing human

A.P. Schmid's Glossary, in: Alex P. Schmid (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London: Routledge, 2011, p. 676.

¹² See, for instance: Chalmers Johnson. Blowback. The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2000.

¹³ Alex P. Schmid (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London & New York: Routledge, 2011/2013 (718 pp.).

resources and services in place capable of coping with the effects of a terrorist emergency.

There is, in my view, a need for such a Handbook. While there are many of good books on crime prevention¹⁴ as well as conflict prevention¹⁵ there is, strangely enough, no really good and comprehensive and up-to-date handbook on the prevention of terrorism.¹⁶ Even handbooks on terrorism have only few references to prevention. The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook has, on its 1.196 pages, just three brief references to prevention in its index, together devoting less than a single page to the topic of prevention in the text's body.¹⁷ Harvey Kushner's *Encyclopaedia of Terrorism* (523 pp.) has no index entry for "prevention".¹⁸ Cindy Combs and Martin Slann's *Encyclopaedia of Terrorism* (pp. 339 pp.) has just one entry of less than half a page (p.163) in its text body, and even that is only focusing on the UK's 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act.¹⁹ Brigitte Nacos volume *Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (334 pp.) has only one index entry on prevention, briefly mentioning in passing the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 in its text body.²⁰ Yonah Alexander, in an edited volume 'Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Ten Countries' (436 pp.), has no entry for "prevention" of terrorism in its index.²¹ Even Boaz Ganor's volume *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle. A Guide for Decision Makers* (334 pp.) has no item on prevention in its index.²² However, to be fair, my own 718 pages long *Handbook of Terrorism Research*, also has only one entry on prevention, again referring to British legislation going under the name of Prevention of Terrorism Act.²³

¹⁴ E.g. C.R. Jeffrey. *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971; Irvin Waller and D. Sansfacon. *Investing Wisely in Crime Prevention*. Washington, DC.: US Department of Justice, 2012; National Crime Prevention Institute. *Understanding Crime Prevention*. Louisville, Kentucky,: NCPRI, 2001;A. Crawford (Ed.) *Crime prevention policies in comparative perspective*. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2009.

¹⁵ E.g. Michael S. Lund. *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C. United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996; David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (Eds.). *Conflict Prevention*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005; John L. Davies and Ted R. Gurr (Eds.). *Preventive Measures. Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

¹⁶ The last "handbook" on the subject was published 13 years ago and is mainly focusing on preventing CBRN weapon proliferation. See: Floden, Erik, Kate Käufer, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. *Terrorism Prevention Handbook: A Guide to U.S. Government Terrorism Prevention Resources and Programs* (2002). 114 pp.

¹⁷ David G. Kamien. *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006.

¹⁸ Harvey W. Kushner. *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003.

¹⁹ Cindy C. Combs and Martin Slann. *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*. New York: Checkmark Books, ,p.163.

²⁰ Brigitte L. Nacos. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. (3rd ed.). Boston: Longman, 2010, p.207.

²¹ Yonah Alexander (Ed.). *Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Ten Countries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.

²² Boaz Ganor. *The Counter-Terrorism puzzle. A Guide for Decision Makers*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 2005.

²³ Alex P. Schmid (Ed.). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London & New York: Routledge, 2011, p.107.

Existing Literature on Terrorism Prevention

Beyond the works just cited, a survey of the literature on the prevention of terrorism, done in 2011 by Eric Price (Editorial Assistant of *Perspectives on Terrorism*), produced only a modest list of books and articles, despite the fact that it was done by a professional information specialist (see Appendix for an updated and shortened version of his bibliography). This bibliography lists the most important titles. From this list I would like to highlight what I see as the most important two works on the issue of terrorism prevention.

The first such attempt comes from Ronald Clark and Graeme Newman who tried to take principles from situational crime prevention into terrorism prevention. Key to their approach is to reduce opportunities and rewards for crime by applying five principles:

Ppt. 6: Five Principles of Situational Crime Prevention (Clark & Newman)

1. *Increase the effort: target hardening (including concealing targets); control tools/weapons;*
2. *Increase the risks, e.g. by reducing anonymity, strengthen formal surveillance;*
3. *Reduce provocations: reduce frustrations and stress & discourage imitation;*
4. *Reduce the rewards: remove targets, disrupt markets, deny benefits;*
5. *Remove excuses: set rules, alert conscience, assist compliance.*²⁴

Clark and Newman argued that more attention should go at reducing the opportunities for terrorist attacks. This can be done by protecting the most vulnerable targets, controlling the tools and weapons needed by the terrorists and removing the conditions in our environment that make terrorist attacks easy to perform. Red teaming - trying to do what terrorists are likely to do as an exercise – exposes weaknesses in our defences and allows security agencies to develop better protection where it is most needed, limit accessibility to likely targets and anticipate the forces needed to counter a potential attack. There is a situational approach to terrorism that looks closely at terrorists' modus operandi, expertise and available tools and weapons.

Contrary to Romaniuk and Choudhury, the Clarke & Newman approach does not rely on changing the hearts and minds of terrorists but focuses on

²⁴ Ronald C. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman. *Outsmarting the Terrorists*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 190 -191. This book is, however, rather narrow in scope and already dated. Some other worthwhile works are: Dean T. Olson. *Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism Prevention* (2012); Nilay Cabuk Kaya and Aykan Erdemir. *Social Dynamics of Global Terrorism and Prevention Policies* (2008); Andrej Zwitter. *Human Security, Law and Prevention of Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 2010; Paul Thomas. *Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism. Failing to Prevent*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. - For more, see attached bibliography.

exploring how rational terrorists seek to accomplish their tasks. Once that is understood, their opponents have to (i) increase the effort involved, (ii) increase their risks of failure, (iii) reduce the rewards of terrorism, and (iv) remove temptations, provocations and excuses.²⁵

Based on these – and other – principles, Tore Bjorgo, professor at the Norwegian Police University in Oslo, has published a brief study of terrorism prevention two years ago that is also based on proven crime prevention mechanisms and measures²⁶.

Prof., Bjorgo uses the concept of “prevention” in this context as referring to “...reducing future act of terrorism or other crimes, or reducing the harmful consequences of such acts, by proactive measures”.²⁷

Here are Tore Bjorgo’s nine principles:

Ppt. 7: Nine Elements of Preventing the Crime of Terrorism (T. Bjorgo)²⁸

- Establishing and maintaining normative barriers against the acceptance of violence and terrorism;
- Deterrence through the threat of punishment or reprisals against potential perpetrators;
- Disruption of planned terrorist attacks by stopping them before they are carried out;
- Incapacitation (or neutralization) by denying the perpetrators the ability (capacity) to carry out new attacks;
- Protecting vulnerable targets by making terrorist attacks more difficult and more risky;
- Reducing the harmful consequences of acts of terrorism;
- Reducing the rewards from acts of terrorism;
- Reducing the root causes and motivations that lead people to get involved in terrorism in order to reduce recruitment;
- Disengagement from terrorism – as individuals or groups, including offering the chance of rehabilitation.

Bjorgo’s volume *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism* (for which I wrote the Foreword)²⁹ is an excellent starting point to bring our thinking on the subject further. He introduces nine preventive mechanisms, outlines the measures

²⁵ Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman. *Outsmarting the Terrorists*. Westport, Conn. Praeger International Security, 2006, pp. 11-14.

²⁶ Tore Bjorgo. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*. New York: Palgrave Puvot, 2013. For a Norwegian version of the text, see: Tore Bjørgero (ed. 2011). *Forebygging av terrorisme og annen kriminalitet*. Oslo: PHS Forskning 2001:1, p. 24. http://idtjeneste.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_17097.

²⁷ Tore Bjorgo. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*. New York: Palgrave, 2013, p.5.

²⁸ Idem, pp. 11-12 & p. 27.

that need to be taken to implement them and explains who has to take them against whom and what the pros and cons of each of the proposed measures are.³⁰

Bjorgo's study covers only part of the whole prevention spectrum that ranges, as mentioned before, from primordial to primary, secondary, tertiary as well as quaternary prevention. While Bjorgo's book is an excellent introduction, I feel that there is a need for a broader treatment of the subject of terrorism prevention which could serve as a toolbox for those tasked with countering terrorism. I therefore decided to try my hand at it but am still looking for guidance and financing.

Outline of Plan for Handbook on Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness

The goals of the proposed *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness* would be to synthesize what is known in governmental and inter-governmental reports, public policy think tank reports, academic literature and grey literature and bring it all together in a single manual for practitioners and counter-terrorism policy-makers (and, secondarily, for academics as well). Each chapter of the proposed Handbook should be written by a recognized specialist while the introduction and the conclusion would be written by the editor who will also be responsible for the selection of chapter writers, harmonisation of texts between the chapters and maintain overall quality control.

Table of Contents for the proposed

***Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness* (draft):**

Ppt. 8 Part I of Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness

1. *Introduction: purpose and organisation of Handbook*
2. *Conceptual chapter: definitions, typologies, methodologies and theories of prevention in various fields*
3. *Lessons from crime prevention literature for the prevention of terrorism*
4. *Lessons from counter-insurgency literature for the prevention of terrorism*

²⁹ Idem, pp. 11-12

³⁰ Passage taken from Foreword by Alex P. Schmid to Bjorgo's volume (p. viii).

5. *Lessons from conflict prevention and conflict resolution literature for the prevention of terrorism*
6. *Lessons from existing government CT training curricula literature on terrorism prevention*
7. *Lessons: what can we learn from terrorists' internal and retrospective writings for possible use for terrorism prevention*

Ppt. 9: Part II of Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness

8. *Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in schools (madrassas, universities)*
9. *Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in prisons*
10. *Prevention of radicalisation to terrorism in refugee camps*
11. *Prevention of radicalisation in religious institutions (mosques), including the (ab-)use of religion for terrorist recruitment*
12. *Prevention of radicalisation in Western Muslim diasporas*
13. *Prevention of radicalisation in social media on the Internet (including incitement and glorification of terrorism)*

Ppt. 10: Part III of Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness

14. *Prevention of recruitment to terrorism*
15. *Prevention of the financing of terrorism*
16. *Prevention of (ab-) use of mass media by terrorists*
17. *Prevention of (ab-) use of the Internet for terrorist purposes*
18. *Prevention of cross-border movement of terrorists (border security)*
19. *Prevention of arms and explosives getting into the hands of terrorists;*
20. *Prevention of CBRN materials and substances getting into the hands of terrorists;*

Ppt. 11: Part IV of Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness

21. *Prevention of terrorist attacks on critical national infrastructures*
22. *Prevention of kidnappings and hostage-takings by terrorists;*

23. *Prevention of terrorist attacks on public transport systems (incl. hijackings);*
24. *Prevention of acts of terrorism during major public events*
25. *Prevention of cyber-attacks by terrorists;*
26. *Prevention of suicide terrorism;*
27. *Prevention of lone actor attacks;*
28. *Prevention of VIP assassinations and gun-based massacres;*
29. *Prevention of bombing attacks (incl. IED and VBIED)*

Ppt. 12: Part IV of Handbook of Terrorism Prevention & Preparedness

30. *Prevention of vigilantism in response to terrorist campaigns;*
31. *Prevention of Human Rights violations and International Humanitarian Law violations in response to terrorism;*
32. *Prevention of public panic in the wake of terrorist incidents (incl. strengthening social resilience)*
33. *Prevention of major economic repercussions following acts of terrorism (e.g. on tourism industry);*
34. *Prevention of victimisation (incl. post-event victim care);*
35. *Conclusion: State of the art of terrorism prevention and preparedness*

This list of chapters is provisional and does not yet reflect some of my earlier remarks about primordial, primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary prevention. At this stage, it serves mainly to illustrate the range of aspects that ought to be covered in a comprehensive volume on the prevention of terrorism. There is dispersed - often grey - literature on most of these sub-topics. The challenge is to bring the findings together and present these in concise, policy-relevant form in a single comprehensive volume. Contacts with possible chapter writers have already been made and several prominent experts have already promise their collaboration.

For some time I have tried to raise funds for such a handbook which would cost about EUR 225.000,- (based on 35 x EUR 5.000,- for the authors of each chapter to which the costs of editing (25k) and dissemination (25k) have to be added. While I have submitted one version of the present proposal informally to various potential funders both within the UN system and outside,

so far none has been prepared to fund it despite the fact that there is already a major publisher interested in publishing the Handbook. I have also received many encouragements from fellow researchers who are willing to contribute a chapter. One of them wrote to me that it was crazy that it was so difficult to find 225,000 euros for such a comprehensive handbook while many less policy-relevant efforts in the field of countering terrorism receive ample funding.

As former Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC (1999 – 2005), I feel well qualified to act as editor and coordinator for the making of such a one-stop reference work that can serve as a toolbox for the prevention of terrorism. I have already edited (as well as being the principal author) of the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (718 pp; 2011/13) which was well received. As former co-editor of *Terrorism and Political Violence* (the leading journal in the field of Terrorism Studies) and current Editor-in-Chief of *Perspectives on Terrorism* (the largest journal in the field), I also have the necessary contacts in the field of terrorism studies and counter-terrorism and I also possess the necessary editorial skills for realising a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness.

In 2015, the Club de Madrid invited experts on terrorism and CT practitioners to a conference and, in one of its conclusions, bemoaned a lack of emphasis on prevention....”. It is this void I would like to fill – funding permitting.

Ppt: Club de Madrid: Final Statement re Prevention³¹

Government approaches that are short term, overly repressive, and ignore the complex causes of violent extremism rarely succeed, and may – in fact – be counterproductive. ***There continues to be a lack of emphasis on prevention and non-coercive means of tackling violent extremism***, and the potentially enormous contribution by women, educators, thought leaders, community groups, and the business community.

Each government should have a long-term prevention strategy, and commit serious political and financial resources to its implementation. They must also collaborate internationally, sharing new approaches, strategies, innovative practices, and lessons learned.

Thank you for your attention.

³¹ Club de Madrid. Final Statement; CSR/Club de Madrid Global Consensus Endorsed by 40 former Presidents and Prime Ministers.
URL: <http://icsr.info/2015/10/toward-global-consensus-stop-violent-extremism/> . Emphasis added APS.

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³² Partly based on, and updated from, a compilation originally prepared by Eric Price (*Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. V, Issue 1 (2011)).

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Experimenting Deradicalisation in France

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France has traditionally adopted a coercive approach in its fight against terrorism. But the changes in the international jihadism have led to a shift in this policy since the beginning of 2014. A series of actions is newly deployed on the ground of prevention. This Communication takes the measure of this shift by examining its various aspects: the legal, the administrative, but also the social fields where innovative partnerships between government and civil society are emerging.

In this presentation, we try to highlight that the French strategic change in favour of a preventive and “deradicalisation” approach in spring 2014 can be understood as a result of the conjunction of increasing European pressure and the need for adaptation of the kingly institutions to the contemporary changes of terrorism. The supposedly “soft” preventive measures remain unknown for most of the French political culture.

If the failure of intelligence services to adapt to new patterns of terrorism such as Toulouse and Montauban shootings was obvious in 2012, it was still the case one year later with French Jihadists leaving for Syria. The former French Prime Minister decided that further thought needed to be given to the problem, and encouraged a reflection on the prevention of radicalisation phenomena.

Consequently, he has entrusted Yann Jounot, Director of State Security and Protection within the Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN) with this task. The latter was keen on the Anglo-Saxon approach of how to manage radicalisation. His entitled report “Prevention of radicalisation” (30 October 2013), justifies a series of initiatives to improve detection and prevention.

He recommends, in particular, the engagement of the whole administration as well as municipalities and families through a toll-free number. This new trend of the public response meets to some extent the NGOs militancy, which plays a crucial role in the implementation of actions in the field of “deradicalisation”.

On the 23rd of April 2014, this approach was translated into an interministerial plan named “plan de prévention de la radicalisation et

d'assistance aux familles”, which emphasizes the necessity to act at the local level. The idea is to suggest an interlocutor for worried families.

This tool does not correspond to the transposition of the European plan but to ad hoc measures built in the urgency to face new needs. The two chapters of this plan contain on the first hand, a system of description of individuals in the process of radicalisation, and on the second hand “follow-up cells” working in the disengagement of these individuals and in the frame of their families.

The plan institutes a Security Staff at the local level, i.e. the ‘département’, and the prefect is responsible for this staff. It is dedicated to support (especially psychologically) and to provide facilities to the families and accompanying individuals identified as being in the process of radicalisation or returnees from Isis zones.

Thus, the plan holds that the Security staffs also lean on a set of existing local skills of psychologists (health expertise), educators (social services), professionals of the Department of Education, Employment agency and the local missions (reintegration), as well as of the associations fighting against the phenomena of sectarian influence and supporting families, and of religious persons in charge, etc.

Integrating rehabilitation into the criminal justice sector response

Eva Entenmann and Liesbeth van der Heide
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In their presentation, the speakers focused on the current debate of integrating rehabilitation into the overall approach to foreign fighters, by highlighting the challenges and opportunities within the criminal justice sector response to the phenomenon. Their Presentation built on an ICCT Policy Brief entitled “Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector”, as well as a closed expert meeting on the topic, which was held in Brussels in May 2015 and was sponsored by the European Commission.

For download of the Policy Brief “Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector”, written by J. Dorsey, E. Entenmann, L. van der Heide and D. Weggemans from ICCT, please refer to

<http://icct.nl/publication/rehabilitation-for-foreign-fighters-relevance-challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-criminal-justice-sector/>