

**Annual EENeT Conference 2019
in ATHENS / GREECE**

**Radicalization – Understanding a highly
dynamic and multi-causal phenomenon
16th October 2019 – 18th of October 2019**

**EWPS – 005
October 2019**

About the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues

The EENeT is an independent, non-partisan consortium of terrorism experts from European law enforcement agencies / relevant authorities and the field of science. It is dedicated to a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency analysis and research which is seen as a prerequisite to provide comprehensive insights into the complexity of the phenomenon "terrorism".

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The Annual EENeT Conference 2019

was funded by

**The national prevention program against Islamic Extremism
(NPP)**

of the German Ministry of Interior

Content

PREFACE – DR. UWE KEMMESIES	6
------------------------------------	----------

PANEL PRESENTATIONS OF EENET EXPERTS	8
---	----------

Topic 1: IT-Tools/Social Media

Daniel Köhler: Criminal Behavior of German Sovereign Citizens: An Open Source Exploration

Alina Arnhold: Counter-Narratives to Islamist and Right-wing Extremism: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Producing Counter-Videos

Cornelia Weins/Matthias Mletzko: Xenophobic hate crime violence in North Rhine-Westphalia 2012-2016: Background and Objectives

Topic 2: Prevention

Lindsay Clutterbuck: The IED attacks in Sri Lanka, Easter Sunday 2019: Lessons for European Counter Terrorism?

Marina Hilzinger: Gender specific prevention of radicalisation

Michael Kowalski: Ethics on the radar: Exploring the relevance of ethics support in counterterrorism

Miroslav Mares: International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in East-Central Europe: Selected Issues

Karoline Weber/Florian Gruber: The Extremism Prevention Atlas and “Handbuch Extremismusprävention “

Sofia Koller: Psychological Factors and Mental Health Issues in Tertiary Prevention

Topic 3: Radicalization/Extremism/Terrorism

Kevin McDonald: When far-right extremism mutates into violence

Barbora Vegrachtová: Educational and Research Activities of CTU in the Field of Radicalization

Barbara Lucini/Marco Maiolino: Social tension and Extremism: nexus and challenges

Nina Käsehage: Department for Religious Studies and Intercultural Theology

SUMMARY OF THE PODIUM DISCUSSION	38
---	-----------

WORLD CAFÉ SESSION	41
---------------------------	-----------

World Café 1: Future of the EENeT

World Café 2: How to embed research and expertise in the political domain? (Summary by Edwin Bakker)

World Café 3: How to implement evaluation with the support of research?

World Café 4: How can research be predictive?

PREFACE

Dear readers.

This brief report allows us to reflect on the previous

EENeT – Conference in Athens 2019

and to remember what occupied and moved us at that time.

As you are already informed, the conference 2020 will take place in Paris. It does not take wonder that we expectantly looking forward to many contributions and interesting discussions on prevention, radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.

The Athens-conference again was generously co-funded by “The national prevention program against Islamic Extremism (NPP)” of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community Germany. Given the special informal structure of the EENeT, we want to heartfully thank on the one hand for this needed financial support and on the other hand for the herewith expressed trust in the idea and the members of the EENeT.

Furthermore, we want to express our gratitude to all partners in the network. First of all the host of our conference The Center for Security Studies (KEMEA) in Greece. Thanks also to our long-lasting partners of the EENeT Steering Committee, H.P. Schreinemachers (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism - NCTV, Netherlands), Gert Vercauteren (Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis - OCAM, Belgium), Dr. Barbara Danczul (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and combating terrorism - BVT, Austria), Prof. Dr. Marco Lombardi (Catholic University/Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Italy), Jeanine De Roy van Zuijdewijn (Leiden University, Netherlands), Dr. Richard Warnes (Self-employed former RAND Europe, Great Britain) who gave support to conceptual, content and technical considerations from the very beginning and who accompanied the network activities.

And as always the greatest thanks are due to the members of the big EENeT-community who always voluntarily and gratuitously support our conferences and meetings by giving presentations, chairing workshops and round table discussions and so on. Only with the help of you all we could realize the vision, the concrete objectives of a trustful exchange between academia and security institutions and inspiring discussions on the diverse aspects of the phenomenon of radicalisation. This exchange of views is a prerequisite and serves as a fertile soil to stimulate, promote and develop methods and tools necessary to better understand the processes of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism on an individual and collective

level. These processes are of more or less relevance in a certain social and historical context. As things are standing now, radicalisation in general and terrorism in particular are still hot topics and complex social challenges. Thus, serving the basic idea of the EENeT – a broad international, interdisciplinary, and interinstitutional dialogue – seems everything else but being out-dated.

Dr. Uwe E. Kemmesies
Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany

PANEL PRESENTATIONS OF EENET EXPERTS

Our Panels were structured in three topics:

- 1) IT Tools / Social Media
- 2) Prevention
- 3) Radicalization / Extremism / Terrorism

TOPIC 1: IT TOOLS / SOCIAL MEDIA

Criminal Behavior of German Sovereign Citizens: An Open Source Exploration

Daniel Koehler

Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremismus in Baden-Württemberg (konex)

Abstract

The presentation provided the main findings of a recently published analysis of German language press coverage of so called "Reich citizens" and "self-administrators" (i.e. sovereign citizen extremists) using the Nexis press database. In total, 730 relevant events between 2003 and 2018 including 1,070 criminal offences and administrative offences committed by 487 persons were assessed. Through the press reports, it was possible to gain information on socio-biographic factors of the perpetrators (e.g. age, education, sex, marital status), as well as their potential radicalization pathways and motivators for the criminal conduct.

Introduction/Methods

The presented study is currently the most extensive analysis of socio-biographic backgrounds of German criminal sovereign citizen extremists (so called „Reichsbürger“ and „Selbstverwalter“). In overall size of this extremist movement is estimated at about 19,000 persons (in 2018). This movement is responsible for a significant amount of ordinary and extremist crimes and has been classified as form of political extremism by the German authorities since late 2016, when a sovereign citizen shot and killed a police officer in the Bavarian town of Georgensgmünd.

This study is based on a systematic assessment of German language press reports about individual and criminal movement members. In total, 730 relevant events between 2003 and 2018 including 1,070 criminal offences and administrative offences committed by 487 persons were assessed. The main research questions of the study were:

- What sociobiographical characteristics do "citizens of the Reich" and "self-governors" have?
- What actions do they take to attract attention in press coverage?
- Which victim groups can be identified?

Results

The study reports that from 487 identified adherents of the movement over 90 percent were 30 years and older and age ranged from 21 to 77. Among those, about 14 percent have been female. Furthermore, study subjects tend to be socially isolated. They often are affected by unemployment or retirement and show little embedding in organized antigovernment groups. Social isolation is even more intense within those movement members who become involved in violent acts. Apart from that, the study found no relevant differences in demographics and motivation between violent and non-violent German sovereign citizens.

Financial stress and biographical breaks, such as unemployment and divorce, are assumed main driving factors behind radicalization into sovereign citizen extremism. The study identified financial hardship, precarious professional situations as unemployment and bankruptcy, perceived injustices, health problems, and family difficulties as the main reported biographical breaks in the press about German sovereign citizens. Financial hardship and precarious professional situations were reported most frequently. However, due to the use of descriptive analyses only, these results should be interpreted as rough indications. Whether there is a causal link between these biographical breaks on the one hand and radicalization as well as the committed offences on the other, is not clear.

Furthermore, the study identified resistance against enforcement officers as the most common act of German sovereign citizens who received press coverage. Resistance against enforcement officers usually occurred in the course of the execution of arrest warrants or attachments (64.54%) or during traffic stops (22.70%). The authors find coercion and extortion, as well as (administrative) offences relating to vehicle connected contexts (for example driving without driver's license, driving without compulsory insurance, and fake license plates) as second and third most common acts in the sample. The reactive nature of these acts must be pointed out. (Administrative) Offences arise in response to confrontation with law enforcement and other agents of the state, for example in response to received official documents, within house searches, or traffic stops. Although defensive or reactionary in nature, these confrontations are indeed provoked by adherents' behavior and belief system.

Police officers are identified to be the most common victims of German sovereign citizens who received press coverage. In most cases, police officers get involved in resistance activities. Second largest group of victims consists of administrative staff. In most cases, they become victims to extreme acts of coercion and extortion in response to official documents. Besides civilians, bailiffs form the third largest group of victims. As police officers, they are mainly confronted with acts of resistance. Fourth largest group of victims consists of judicial

members who as well are targeted by sovereign citizen acts of coercion and extortion in most cases.

Counter-Narratives to Islamist and Right-wing Extremism: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of Producing Counter-Videos

Alina Arnhold

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Abstract

While the techniques of extremist online propaganda - ranging from obvious to more covert and subtle methods - are being thoroughly researched, it remains unclear how best to challenge them. The need to act against growing networks of radicalization which have become increasingly successful in their recruitment is undisputable. As extremist narratives are diverse in their styles and approaches to attract new followers, counter-narratives must account for this diversity and persuasive power. However, the development of counter-narratives has proven to be a complex undertaking. As our own project "Videostar" is currently producing counter-narratives, I would like to present to you some of the possibilities and pitfalls (or challenges!) we have encountered when developing counter-narratives. Having analysed extremist videos and texts with radicalisation narratives of both Islamist and right-wing extremist groups, as well as having interviewed numerous experts in the field, our project holds a rich database of scientific and practical insights into the mechanisms of online radicalization. Translating this knowledge into powerful counter-narratives is a step that still lacks both research and practice. Our project contributes to filling this gap by producing video-based counter-narratives based on a thorough analysis of the underlying mechanisms of online radicalization.

Proceeding

The project "Videostar"¹ strives to answer the following two questions: (1) Which messages are conveyed through extremist internet propaganda? (2) How should video-based counter-narratives be designed? These questions are examined for both Islamist & right-wing extremism/populism, mainly in Germany, with a focus on the early phases of radicalization.

In a first step, we conducted expert interviews with researchers and practitioners who work in the field of deradicalization. Additionally, we conducted textual and visual analyses of YouTube videos, online texts and online platforms such as Facebook. We selected videos and texts that (1) propagated unconstitutional content and/or (2) legitimized or called for violence and/or (3) were produced by people who are known for one of the first criteria from other contexts and (4) had a high number of views and likes. The selected videos and texts were directed towards persons in the early stages of radicalization; meaning that they had extreme/militant ideas or at least tendencies but were not made for completely radicalized extremists.

We analysed the transcripts with MAXQDA and used various codes and subcodes - generated from previous literature research - which then led us to identify the main narratives for right-wing and Islamist extremists (see 1.1-1.4 and 2.1-2.4 respectively).

Currently, we are in the phase of deconstructing the extremist messages and have started the production of Counter-Videos with selected experts.

1 „Video-based Strategies Against Radicalization“, based at the Police Academy of Lower Saxony. Research team: Daniela Klimke, Michael Fischer, Sybille Reinke de Buitrago & Alina Arnhold

Right-wing and Islamist extremist narratives

In our analysis, we found that right-wing extremist narratives usually cover one or several of the following topics:

(1.1) The conception of the evil Muslim/Migrant:

Young people in the early stages of radicalization receive a simple concept of the enemy, which explains all problems, daily local ones as well as the bigger ones on a global scale. The repeated emphasis and alleged proofs that all migrants are criminals promotes hate and violence towards this group. There is no differentiation made between migrants, refugees and Muslims (and actual criminals!).

(1.2) “We are no Nazis!”

The new right-wing extremists distance themselves from the typical Nazis, which makes it easier for new followers to find them attractive and sensible. German/right-wing atrocities against Jews are downplayed, which seems to please a group of Germans who find it annoying to be constantly reminded of their history. The propagated concept of “Ethnopluralism” states that every culture should stay in its own country – a way to justify why foreigners should leave Germany.

(1.3) The conception of being victims

Additionally to feeling as a victim of Islamist violence and terror, the right-wing extremists also see themselves as victims of the German politics/government/media. They claim that they are wrongly oppressed, which facilitates protest and hate towards the whole system of the state.

(1.4) Pop-culture, actionism & intellectualisation

New right-wing extremist groups have several new strategies to reach their target audience, i.e. frustrated youngsters. For example, they frequently use pop-cultural elements in their videos to increase attractiveness. Many of their actions are purely for the sake of actionism without any deeper meaning. They know that visuals (e.g. a bleeding nose) become viral through the internet even if there is no sensible context surrounding it. On the other hand, they try to intellectualize right-wing extremism, which shall be proof of their good education and allegedly deliberate positions stemming from a profound political knowledge.

The narratives that are most prominent in the Islamist discourse mainly concern one or several of the following topics:

(2.1) Media criticism

This relates to media reporting on Islam, Muslims or Islamist groups and it is expressed as accusing Western and/or German media of twisting or distorting the ‘truth’ claimed by the respective groups. Central aspects are the devaluation of Western media and their statements, but also the general function of media in a democratic system.

(2.2) The headscarf

Any calls to prohibit or limit the wearing of the headscarf (and at times the burka or niqab) are framed as a violation of the rights of Muslims. Although only women wear the headscarf, the message is more commonly directed to all Muslims, men and women. The Western World and Germany are accused of wanting to curb this Muslim right. The wearing of the headscarf is also seen as the only appropriate behaviour and symbol of the collective identity of all true Muslim women.

(2.3) Dichotomies and enemy images

There is an active and enforced creation of dichotomies between Germany / the Western World and Muslims. Not only Germany and the Western World are devalued but also moderate Islamic voices. Thus, the own interpretation of how Muslims should live is raised to the only right and true way to live.

(2.4) Collective identity and responsibility

According to the narratives, Muslims should remind each other of how to behave and to reject anything that is otherwise. This serves both as an offer of collective identity and as a call to take collective responsibility. Criticism and the questioning of the proclaimed interpretations of the true Muslim life are portrayed as traitorous to Islam and to Allah himself.

Challenges and options for video-based counter-narratives

What makes producing video-based counter-narratives so difficult? Firstly, in the early stages of radicalization (as well as in later stages) the target group despises the government and public authorities – but we cannot and do not want to obscure that the videos have been produced by the police. Secondly, our target group seeks easy and definite answers to their questions – however, in reality, most topics are complex and there rarely is one perfect solution to the current problems of our society. Thirdly, many extremist videos are popular simply because they show violence and violence attracts attention – clearly, we cannot and do not want to show violence, which means we need other ways to attract attention.

The difficult but crucial tasks to tackle these challenges range from the cautious selection of interviewees to the right amount of rational argumentation. The freedom of speech, which is often claimed by the extremists, must be carefully balanced with the clear rejection of extremist ideas. In our efforts to counter radicalism, we must reduce antagonism and instead strengthen cohesion. This includes bringing back and discussing the inherent complexity of issues in order to work against simplification. The existing conflicts on which extremist groups build their power and followership must be debated. The processes behind the various extremist misuses (of conflicts, terms, etc.) must be meaningfully deconstructed and alternative narratives need to be offered. An important goal and approach should be to strengthen media competency, and thereby resilience towards manipulation attempts in social media content. This furthermore requires the need to strengthen the ability to critically reflect upon news or facts (especially in the current post-factual time), encouraging a more evidence-informed decision-making.

Finally, counter-narratives should illustrate the manifold ways in which emotions are utilized; from generating fevered support to creating a comfortable sense of belonging and

community. Extremist actors strategically use emotional appeals in their messages and while it may seem a good idea to make use of emotional messages in counter-narratives, too, it is important not to underestimate the power of a strong argumentation and verifiable facts.

Xenophobic hate crime violence in North Rhine-Westphalia 2012-2016

Background and Objectives

Prof. Dr. Cornelia Weins

Ruhr University Bochum /Faculty of Social Sciences

Matthias Mletzko

Independent researcher

Xenophobic hate crime violence strongly increased in Germany in 2015/16. In 2016, officially recorded hate crime violence was at its highest level since the introduction of the current reporting system in 2001. The number of cases with terrorism relevance, both group- and lone-wolf-type, also increased - up to the present, underlined by the killing of CDU-politician Lübcke in June 2019 and the firearm- attack on the synagogue in Halle with two random killings. The strong increase in hate crime violence took place in the context of an increasing far-right, predominantly anti-Muslim and anti-refugee mobilisation by new political movements and parties (PEGIDA, AfD) since 2014, a series of jihadist attacks in Europe and Germany, and a historically high level of forced migration to Germany in 2015/16.

Our research is guided by the question whether violent hate crime offences, offenders, and victims have changed in the course of far-right mobilisation and the large migration to Germany in 2015/16. E.g. group threat theories suggest that these developments have triggered "ordinary citizens" to commit hate crimes (Köhler 2019, Zick/ Küpper/ Berghan 2019). Specifically, we address (1) *changes in bias motivations*, (2) *type and severity of offences*, (3) *offender characteristics*, and (4) *co-offending networks* by employing data from the first part of an ongoing research project on hate crime violence in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the most populous federal state of Germany, between 2012 and 2016.

Data and Methods

Results were obtained from police documents on all registered violent hate crimes in NRW in the observation period (in addition: incidents classified as right-wing against left-wing). Data access had been granted by the Ministry of the Interior NRW and data collection was supported by the Criminal Police Office NRW (LKA NRW). In Germany, Police are obliged to fill out a special form in all cases of politically motivated crimes (incl. hate crimes). Each document is checked by specially trained police officers in the LKA, who clarify open questions and then pass the document on to the BKA (see Bleich/Hart 2008). The documents also include a (mandatory) free text description of the incident. We employed these descriptions to collect additional and more detailed data than provided by official statistics (e.g. on bias motivations, types of offences, crime tools). All available documents on one incident (original report, notification of changes, final report) were considered. To sum up, our data covers violent crimes known to the police and, in addition, classified as hate crime (or as right-wing against left-wing) by the police.


Violent hate crimes are those offences classified as violent offences in the reporting system on politically motivated crimes, ranging from simple bodily injuries to homicide and including bomb/arson attacks. We define xenophobic hate crimes as criminal offences against a person and/or property, motivated by an offender's prejudice against a social

group on the basis of (1) ethnicity/nationality, (2) skin colour, or (3) religion. Mainly based on the incident description, which includes e.g. verbal harassments, the most specific information on bias motivation was coded, e.g. anti-refugee, anti-Semitic. Note that we have only observed attacks motivated against a *dark* skin colour. Multiple coding was applied when appropriate (less than 10% of all cases).

Key Findings

Figure 1 shows the distribution of violent xenophobic hate crime incidents over time. 92% of all xenophobic crimes (n=789) are classified as politically right-wing motivated by the police (6% politically motivated “foreigner” violence, 1% else). The number of arsons as well as other violent attacks were highest in January 2016, after the New Year's Eve mass sexual assaults of migrants on women in Cologne and in other cities.

Figure 1: Xenophobic hate crime violence: North Rhine-Westphalia 2012-2016



Bias Motivations: Regarding different motivations, the vast majority of xenophobic crimes is motivated by biases against ethnic/national groups (n=570), followed by racially motivated attacks (n=143) and attacks motivated by biases against different religious groups, mainly anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim crimes (n=121). Crimes motivated by prejudices against ethnic/national groups more than doubled between 2014 and 2016 (factor 2.4). The majority of this increase can be directly attributed to crimes motivated against refugees. In the observation period there is no trend in racially motivated violence (peak in 2013/14), nor in anti-Semitic violence (peak in 2014), while islamophobic violence did increase between 2014 and 2016. However, official data show increasing numbers of anti-Semitic violence in 2017/18 (cf. IM NRW 2019).

Offences: The majority of crimes is committed in public areas by offenders not known to the victims. 56% of offences are committed by one person, 35% by groups (9% no. of offenders unknown). Figure 2 shows that violent xenophobic crimes often involve humiliating acts like verbal harassments or spitting. The most obvious difference between 2015/16 and the years before is the prevalence of arsons/explosive attacks, mainly targeting refugee homes/shelters. In addition, stabbing attacks were more common in 2015/2016 than before. The use and type of crime tools (explosives, knives, batons etc.) also point to more serious violent offences in 2015/16.

Figure 2: Offenses and crime tools by time period



Offender characteristics: More than 90% of all suspects of violent xenophobic crimes are males/ born in Germany/ German nationals. The most striking difference to previous decades (cf. Willems/Steigleder 2003) is their age: they are much older (average age: 31 years, median age: 27 years) and therefore more similar to the population in terms of age. However, suspects are not older in 2015/16 than in 2012-2014. Police data do not include information on schooling levels. Ongoing analyses of criminal investigation files show high proportions of low schooling levels/dropouts/no vocational training and disproportionately high rates of unemployment among suspects (see also Backes et al. 2019). The proportion of suspects *without police records at all* is lower between 2014 and 2016 than before, while the proportion of suspects with police records on politically motivated crimes as well as on other crimes is slightly larger/larger between 2014 and 2016 than before.

Co-offending and co-offending networks: 42% of all suspects of xenophobic crimes and right-left crimes act alone (one or multiple times), 58% co-offend (as well). Statistical network analysis shows several co-offending networks, including one large right-wing network with a strong regional attachment to Dortmund, characterised by hate crimes as well as crimes against “left-wing” persons.

Conclusion and Outlook

Results of our analysis show an increase in xenophobic hate crime violence in NRW due to a sharp rise in ethnically motivated crimes. Attacks were more severe in 2015/16 compared to 2012-2014. Preliminary results of our project regarding offender characteristics do not point to more offences from »ordinary citizens« in 2015/2016. Most striking is one large right-wing network. In addition to police reports, our project employs a large sample of criminal investigation files (data collection not yet finished), which will provide additional information and more in-depth evaluations of offences, suspects, and victims.

Contact and more information

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<https://www.methoden.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/empirische-sozialforschung/forschung-und-projekte/violent-hate-crimes-in-north-rhine-westphalia-2012-2016.html>

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TOPIC 2: PREVENTION

The IED attacks in Sri Lanka, Easter Sunday 2019: Lessons for European Counter Terrorism?

Lindsay Clutterbuck, PhD

Independent Researcher and Consultant

Abstract

The complex terrorist attack mounted by the local violent jihadist group 'National Thowheed Jamath' (NTJ) that took place in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday, April 21st, 2019 left a heavy toll of fatalities and casualties. A post-event analysis of the Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) suicide attacks and other IED attacks on the day, including information uncovered during the counter terrorism operations carried out in their aftermath, shows that there are a number of identifiable elements that are of significance in the context of countering and responding to terrorist bomb attacks in Europe. These range across the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

Introduction

The objective of the EENeT presentation was to try to determine if the terrorist suicide attacks showed any elements that could be relevant in the context of countering terrorism in Europe. Open source public information was used throughout, obtained predominantly from the Sri Lankan English language press and other relevant media reporting. As far as possible, only factual or plausible information was utilised. A chronology of relevant events that stretched over at least the six months prior to the attack was assembled, dating from November 2018 to April 2019. Once this was done, it became possible to begin to assess where potential lessons relevant to countering terrorism in Europe could be found.

Summary of the Easter Sunday IED attacks

As security forces in Sri Lanka discovered a number of houses, compounds and other premises used by the terrorists (and after meeting violent resistance in some cases) they

recovered weapons, equipment and further investigative leads. It soon became clear that the attacks had been presaged by a number of incidents in Sri Lanka linked to a local extremist group known as 'National Thawith Jamaan' (NTJ) and led by Mohammed Zaharan HASHIM. In turn, HASHIM drew inspiration from the violent jihadist ideology espoused by the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (ISIS) and he may have had closer connections.

Five months before the attacks, in December 2018, a number of roadside Buddhist shrines and statues in Mawanella, central south Sri Lanka, were desecrated. Several arrests were made, with more suspects becoming 'wanted'. As a result of the investigation, an explosives cache was discovered in January 2019, hidden in northwest Sri Lanka at Wanathawilluwa. As a consequence of this discovery, in early March a local community leader in Mawanella who had been active in supporting the police investigation was shot in the head as he slept.

Less than a week later, on March 15th, a lone gunman carried out a terrorist attack on two Mosques in New Zealand. An unresolved question is whether this became a catalyst for the future attacks in Sri Lanka or did it give urgency to already existing terrorist planning and preparations? During early April, information was provided to the Sri Lankan authorities by India that terrorist attacks were possible, leading to an internal police warning of "suicide attacks [that] could target Catholic Churches and the Indian High Commission." It was not widely circulated or acted upon in the ten days remaining before the attacks.

Over a period of fifteen minutes on Easter Sunday, April 21st, 2019, six PBIED's were detonated in central Colombo and one in the northern suburb of Negombo. The targets were the worshippers and crowds at St. Anthony's Shrine and St. Sebastian's Church, plus four large hotels near the waterfront. Two PBIEDs exploded at the Shangri-La Hotel, carried into the restaurant by Ilham IBRAHIM (who had checked into the hotel the previous night,) and Mohammad Zaharan HASHIM, who had joined him that morning. At the nearby Taj Samudra Hotel, a PBIED device failed to detonate and the bomber then escaped on foot. Five minutes after the attacks in Colombo, one PBIED was detonated outside the Zion Evangelical Church in Batticaloa, a town in the east of Sri Lanka. The bomber had originally targeted the Catholic Cathedral but arrived too late as the congregation had already dispersed. He then made his way to the Zion Church where he completed his attack.

Seven PBIEDs had detonated by 9.05am in the morning. However, the NTJ attack was not yet over. Nearly five hours later a PBIED was detonated at a hotel in south Colombo, carried out by the bomber who had escaped from the Taj Samudra Hotel. Within half an hour, of this a PBIED was detonated in a wealthy eastern suburb of Colombo. The bomber was the wife of Ilham IBRAHIM (who had earlier detonated his PBIED at the Shangri-La Hotel) and her target was the squad of Special Task Force police (STF) who had arrived at address once it had been linked to the attacks. That evening, a failed secondary device in the form of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) was discovered and neutralised in a street close to St Anthony's Shrine, while a large pipe bomb which also had failed to detonate was found in a culvert under the road leading to the Airport terminal at Negombo.

An analysis of the attacks shows that in total eleven IEDs were used and nine of them were PBIEDs. Of these, six were used against single targets, two were used against the same target (Shangri-La Hotel) and one was used in the ambush of the police squad at the home of Ilham IBRAHIM. The remaining two were the VBIED and the pipe bomb IED. Of the main

targets, six were hotels and four were Christian Churches or Shrines. It should also be noted that two PBIEDs failed to detonate at their intended targets (the Catholic Cathedral in Batticaloa and the Taj Samudra Hotel in Colombo) but despite this, both suicide bombers were able to recalibrate their attacks, select a secondary target and then carry it through.

Are their Lessons for European Counter terrorism?

This preliminary examination of public sources points to a number of issues that should be examined further in appropriate forums, particularly those concerned with the Operational and Tactical levels.

At the Tactical level, Sri Lanka is another instance where a secondary IED attack was designed to target both a crowd fleeing away from the scene of an attack and first responders heading in the opposite direction. It may also be an instance where a deliberate 'trail' was laid by a terrorist to lure the police into a lethal ambush. If reports are correct, it appears that when Ilham IBRAHIM checked in to the Shangri-La Hotel on the evening before he detonated his PBIED, he gave a false name but used his correct address. The next day when police arrived at his home to carry out follow-up enquiries his wife, acting as a suicide bomber, detonated a PBIED. The blast also killed her own children and a number of Police officers. These circumstances begin to suggest deliberate planning rather than a spontaneous event.

At the Operational level, Sri Lanka serves to reinforce what should already be understood and planned for; a complex terrorist attack involving multiple simultaneous or consecutive events in multiple locations which can encompass a wide geographic area and may unfold over a prolonged period of time. The detonation of an explosive device or other event may mark the beginning of a complex attack rather than being a single event in itself and an effective counter terrorism response should reflect this.

Finally, at the Strategic level, in overall terms the events in Sri Lanka show that the current European-wide approach of striving to achieve better counter terrorism coordination, cooperation and collaboration both nationally and at the regional (EU) level, remains a vital one.

Gender specific prevention of radicalisation

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Abstract

After the first so-called foreign fighters left Germany to join ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, and especially after a series of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, many actions were taken in Germany to prevent radicalisation. Sometime later, public and professionals more and more took notice of radicalised girls and young women travelling to Syria and Iraq or supporting ISIS in Germany. The existence of these radicalised girls highly irritated the known picture about the male terrorist conducting deadly attacks and still people are struggling with possible explanations and the acceptance of the female facet of

radicalisation. A discussion about gender specific prevention projects that address the radicalisation motives of girls and women (contrary to those of boys and men) erupted.

The presentation asked a) if the assumption of a substantial difference between the motivations of girls and boys to radicalise is reliable and b) what the important questions are to ask before conceptualising expedient gender specific projects.

Introduction

After the first so-called foreign fighters left Germany to join ISIS and other groups in Syria and Iraq, and especially after a series of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, many actions were taken in Germany to 'fight' Islamist terrorism and prevent especially adolescents from radicalisation. Sometime later, the phenomenon of radicalised girls and young women travelling to Syria and Iraq or supporting ISIS in Germany spread in the media and therefore in the awareness of the public. The existence of these radicalised girls highly irritated the known picture about the male terrorist conducting fatal attacks and still people – even professionals – are struggling with possible explanations for and the acceptance of the female facet of radicalisation.

A discussion about gender specific prevention projects that address the radicalisation motives of girls and women erupted. This discourse suggested a substantial difference in the motives and motivations that lead girls/women and boys/men into radicalisation. Furthermore, it implied that either existing prevention projects mainly addressed boys and young men, or prevention projects for 'normal' teenager to not work for girls.

First intuitive answers to the riddle of female radicalisation were found soon. They mainly followed two lines of explanation:

1. Either girls were inveigled into Islamism by romantic promises about heroic fighters they can marry and a life without sorrows,
2. or their real motivation was not about joining a terrorist group but to escape from a supposed superficial, sexist and performance oriented Western society.

Both lines imply that girls are naïve, innocent followers or even victims, and they attribute a passive role to them. Furthermore, both lines imply that these explanations do not hold for boys and young men.

Results

Meanwhile, research und practioneers provide first reliable answers and results concerning the radicalisation of girls and young women, and there are many more to come. By now, one can sum up the key findings as follows:

- Girls' radicalisation motives are a complex construct consisting of emotional, religious and political elements.
- Former crises, especially identity crises, are involved in a striking large number of radicalisation processes.
- In comparison to other Islamist groups, ISIS opened up new spaces for women to get involved and thereby increased its attractiveness for women.

Especially with regard to the first and second aspects one has to concede that – while these findings are in accordance with motives and motivations in other disciplines and are even plausible to non-professionals – they are not fundamentally specific to girls or young women. Yet they do not claim gender specific prevention to be useless, but rather suggest asking different questions. Therefore, conceptualising useful gender specific prevention programmes starts with the clarification of the role gender is playing in the phenomenon.

What are the substantial differences between the sexes in the given context and can they be addressed? The presentation listed and discussed three notions, that can be relevant in the context of prevention of radicalisation:

1. Due to our socialisation, we adopt roles and especially gender roles that influence our perspective on or interest in relevant topics. These different perspectives can be a basis to get in touch with the target group of a gender specific prevention project.
2. Socialisation and (gender) roles also influence where we are located and can be found. Gender specific approaches, therefore, should take in mind what structures are required to reach the target group.
3. The broad field of resilience sees hints for girls and boys being more resilient, if they are not brought up as 'stereotypical boys or girls', as they get to know a broader range of coping strategies for crises in their lives. Breaking up differences, in this case gender stereotyping, could bear a chance to enhance resilience of boys and girls.

This list does not intent to be exhaustive, but it shows: While assumptions about differences can be misleading, asking the right questions can bring to light important approaches and issues gender specific prevention can be built upon or even existing non gender specific projects can be improved through.

Ethics on the radar: Exploring the relevance of ethics support in counterterrorism

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Research problem

Nowadays, countering terrorism involves many pressing ethical dilemmas for the professionals involved. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have had a tremendous impact on the practice of counterterrorism. The option of shooting down a presumed hijacked commercial airliner, with the deaths of many innocent passengers as a consequence, has been added to the toolbox of counterterrorism professionals. Naturally, most of the ethical dilemmas faced by counterterrorism professionals are not as extreme as this. However, this scenario is not a completely unrealistic and symbolic reflection of current practices of counterterrorism. The times we live in involve shifting security lines that mirror a continuous supply of threats ('liquid times'). In response to these threats, there is a permanent call for pre-emptive measures, a situation for which the term 'world risk society' has been coined. This situation provides a constant source of - often unprecedented - ethical dilemmas to be handled by counterterrorism professionals that can also challenge the democratic legal order.

Research question and relevance

In this research, ethics is viewed as an important additional source of guidance beyond the law. However, most of the ethical dilemmas facing counterterrorism professionals were, when this research started, hardly represented in the literature on counterterrorism and security studies, or in studies on applied ethics and ethics support. Further, regarding the practice of counterterrorism itself, there was a lack of documented experiences with the implementation of ethical support. This research sets out to fill this gap by formulating and then addressing its main research question: What is the current relevance of ethics to counterterrorism and what is the added value of ethics support within the practice of counterterrorism? This research builds on a broader PhD. thesis and contributes to the

scientific debate on the ethics of counterterrorism and the added value of applied ethics and ethics support in professional practice. In addition, the findings of this research can support counterterrorism professionals in dealing with ethical dilemmas.

Research method

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security of the Netherlands was willing to open the generally closed doors of counterterrorism to allow interviews with professionals on ethical dilemmas and the implementation and evaluation of moral case deliberations among counterterrorism professionals. In a moral case deliberation, professionals engage in a dialogue centered around a concrete ethical dilemma faced by one of the participants at the meeting facilitated by a trained moral case deliberation facilitator. Within such a closed setting, values are clarified and alternative options in handling the specific ethical dilemma are identified. In the medical sector, the application of the moral case deliberation tool has already been widely scientifically evaluated. The implementation of ethics support within the often secret and rather inaccessible practice of counterterrorism has, however, gone largely unreported.

Research findings

Based on an evaluation of the first pilot of moral case deliberation within the field of counterterrorism at the Office of the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, the research indicates high levels of appreciation for both the session held and the method of moral case deliberation itself. Over half of the participants report that engaging in the moral case deliberation exercise has changed the way in which they look at ethical issues. Other insights range from an appreciation that the ethical dimensions of their work are finally being recognized to the creation of more alternative ways for dealing with these ethical issues. Many elements of the earlier presented typology of ethical issues are reflected in the experiences that were raised in the moral case deliberations. The distinctions of the typology can help to understand how and why professionals deal with ethical dilemmas. These preliminary findings based on this explorative pilot seem to suggest that counterterrorism professionals see a considerable relevance and added value in participating in moral case deliberations. This can strengthen their dealings with ethical issues, especially in the practice of counterterrorism, where no institutional arrangements of ethics support exist when this research was conducted.

Future research

In answering the main research question, it can be concluded within the limitations of this explorative research that ethics has a substantial relevance in the current state of counterterrorism. There is an inherent ethical dimension to counterterrorism due to the intrinsic presence of ethical issues within the practice of counterterrorism, especially given the ongoing striving for and trend towards prevention and pre-emptive action. Using moral case deliberation as a form of ethics support has a considerable added value to the practice of counterterrorism at the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security according to the respondents of this study.

Future research

Further research on the ethics of counterterrorism could fill the gap on research on this issue, and could also clarify the potential added value within practices of counterterrorism at other security institutions. Future research could also extend ethics support in counterterrorism to politics and inform counterterrorism policies. This could enrich not only

the explorative contribution of this research to the field of counterterrorism and security studies, but also future evaluation studies on the contribution of ethics support.

International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in East-Central Europe: Selected Issues

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Abstract

This contribution deals with the development, current forms and future perspectives of counter-terrorist cooperation in East Central Europe. Legacies of the communist era and the post-communist transformation of the security sectors are assessed and recent trends of Europeanization and deeper international cooperation are analyzed. Specific general challenges (and obstacles) of cooperation are discussed (regional European vs. sub-regional Visegrad cooperation, different national perception of specific threats, various models of security architecture and power of specific actors, mostly the question of intelligence services with and without law enforcement powers, unclear borders between military and non-military security policy etc.).

Introduction/methods

The changing nature of terrorism in the world poses an enduring challenge to international counter-terrorism cooperation, which occurs at various levels. This paper is focused on the specific issues of international cooperation against terrorism in East-Central Europe (a sub-regional example). In this paper, I focus on the specific issues of international cooperation against terrorism in East-Central Europe – a sub-regional example. I shall attempt to explain whether, and if so to what extent, such cooperation is necessary in a situation where shared counter-terrorism platforms have been developed internationally, and when stable bilateral relations are maintained by states and by the various institutions engaged in counter-terrorism policy.

A conceptualisation of counter-terrorism cooperation in East-Central Europe needs to proceed on the basis of the levels on which international policy is pursued by states – the global level, the regional level (usually covering one continent) and the sub-regional level of cooperation. Of course, there are also other levels, for example, transcontinental and a level based on cultural ties.

Results

Counter-terrorism cooperation in East-Central Europe has a long history, but the contemporary traditions only date from the fall of communism. It needs noting that external actors have long been involved in international cooperation in the region, and that today the primarily East-Central European platforms for cooperation are linked with other states and international organisations.

In Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia, in April 1979 an international meeting was held of 'counter-intelligence service representatives from countries of the socialist community on international terrorism'. Delegates attended from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The meeting adopted a joint declaration expressing its determination to fight international terrorism. However, a permanent structure, similar to the contemporary Western European TREVI, was not created.

After the fall of communism, the ties were broken, and new ones were usually established in the context of Western European and US support for reforming police and intelligence services. With a major contribution from the Netherlands, the Middle European Conference (MEC) was created to aid the new services of post-communist countries in managing the challenges posed by the new security environment and the services' integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Contemporary counter-terrorism policy in the sub-region of East-Central Europe is determined by the events unfolding at the regional (continental) and trans-Atlantic levels. The Europeanisation of counter-terrorism policy is largely a matter for the European Union (including loosely associated structures such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism, PWGT). For Nato member countries, including the Visegrád Group, that organisation is important as well, not just in the context of major military counter-terrorism operations, but also for intelligence cooperation. Nonetheless, other international organisations also have a counter-terrorism agenda; globally, the United Nations; and in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Cooperation among the countries of East-Central Europe on fighting terrorism must be seen in the context outlined above. It is based on the declared shared determination to create security cooperation generally in the Visegrád Group. However, in many areas policy has remained largely limited to political proclamations. Cooperation on fighting extremism has nonetheless developed since 2001 through regular meetings of the 'V4+2' format, that is, the four Visegrád Group countries plus Austria and Germany. As some countries have shown less interest in participation and views have diverged as to whether some phenomena are extremist, this cooperation has been more limited in recent years. Strong bilateral counter-terrorist cooperation nevertheless continues to be developed by East-Central European countries, especially on particular cases and one-off operations.

East-Central Europe is an area where sub-regional counter-terrorism cooperation has developed to a limited extent. While strong counter-terrorism cooperation is developing at the European and trans-Atlantic levels, the maintenance and potential deepening of sub-regional cooperation might seem superfluous or even counter-productive – if, for instance, important knowledge were not shared with other allied countries outside of the region as part of this sub-regional cooperation. However, with a view to current trends in the development of counter-terrorism approaches, sub-regional platforms may provide an appropriate complement. Specific problems, characteristic of the region, can be analysed in greater detail at the sub-regional level, and then projected into closer sub-regional cooperation on a bilateral, trilateral or multilateral level. Important information and findings on links with other regions, should, of course, be shared with allies. As far as counter-terrorism cooperation in the Visegrád Group is concerned, this also has a symbolic dimension, helping to make the Visegrád grouping more generally viable.

This paper was written under the research project OPTIZ "Optimization of Intelligence Activities and Intelligence Institutions in the Changing Environment" (OPTIZ9070204510), funded by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic ("Development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic" defence research program). Translation Štěpán Káňa

The Extremism Prevention Atlas and “Handbuch Extremismusprävention”

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Research reason

The "The Extremism Prevention Atlas" that shows an overview about the prevention of extremism and politically motivated crime including terrorism in the year 2018 in Germany.

The prevention of extremism is not centrally coordinated in Germany by law, as Germany has a federal system. That is why public authorities on federal, state and local level and civil organizations are engaged in this matter in a different way.

The federal criminal police office has tried to analyze the different German projects since 2014 in order to compare them with the politically motivated crime to draw conclusions for the German police and the federal government.

Often projects cooperate with public authorities – like local police – and civil organizations. And that's why the police needs to know who can be a good partner to reach the preventive goals together.

Research design

In 2018 the federal criminal police office has started a data collection on public websites that continues frequently. In that year they collected data of 1.642 active projects, which work towards preventing radicalization, politically motivated crime and extremist thoughts or actions.

Thereby they learned that it is impossible to analyze all active projects – that might be definitely more than 10.000 on each day in Germany. Sometimes a project is a single event or only run by one private volunteer.

The analyses refer to the kind of organization, the target groups, the type of offer, the different phenomena, the trend topics like migration and media competence as well as evaluations. A comparison with the politically motivated crime is made regarding different phenomena (right-wing- /left-wing- / Islamist extremism etc.) and an East- / West-comparison (in view of different living conditions and crime rates).

Research results

The majority of the extremism prevention work in Germany is handled by civil organizations. However in a lot of projects the work is cooperatively handled together with public authorities. There is, for example, a German city working with a round table where on the one hand a teacher, the mayor, a police officer and on the other hand an Imam or sports trainer discuss how circumstances can be improved in order to stop someone's radicalization. These kinds of case conferences involving authorities as well as social facilities and prevention programs are one way to create a network of the different parties needed for successful prevention work.

20% of the projects work nationwide, where regional deficits in prevention can be equalized; 80% of the projects act specifically in one of the 16 states or in local communities, where regional specifics can be considered.

The projects focus not only on (potentially) affected persons but a lot of projects also concentrate on the indirect target group: social environment. For example families and

friends or experts like teachers, police officers, corrections officers or social worker were activated with specific guidance. On the one hand they can share their knowledge within their organization and on the other hand they can observe problematic thinking or behavior of juveniles better and start acting.

However it is not clear how exactly the different parties within social environment of a potentially radicalizing individual use their knowledge.

The prevention on right wing extremism (64% of all projects) appears to be a well-connected, nationwide section with the biggest experience.

The prevention of Islamist extremism (32%) is the fastest growing section, which you can usually find in the German „Hot Spot“-cities of Islamist radicalization. It is worth noting that these projects include the family more than any other sections do.

The number of projects for the prevention of left-wing extremism (7%) has risen over the last years, however in comparison with the crime in this section and considering the potential number of persons in this field, major efforts are necessary.

Additionally the majority of projects also address extremism in general (62%) – without focusing on a specific section (for example the support of Democracy and the German constitution). The big advantage of those projects is to avoid Labeling-effects.

Also some trends showed up: Topics like media competence and migration are integrated in many projects. (For example: Many projects exist that address all kinds of staff and practitioners, including police officers, who work with migrants. They try to prevent the recruitment of migrants by Islamists as well as protect them from becoming victims of right-wing-extremism. Migrants form a specifically vulnerable group and prevention initiatives try to address these issues more and more.)

Another trend are interactive online-projects which work with juveniles where they are: Often online and not around the fountain of a market place in their town.

The federal criminal police office tried to compare these results with the politically motivated crime in Germany. It is clear, that this comparison does not include the crime, that is unknown to the police, and radical or extremist preferences of people. Additionally, the number of projects is not an indicator for the quality and range of the projects – however:

- The highest number of projects prevent right-wing-extremism. This is corresponding to the very high right-wing crime rate of the last years.
- The projects to prevent Islamist extremism should also stay on the current level, because the potential risks for crime in this section is estimated very high.
- The few projects to prevent left-wing-extremism do not correspond to the specific high crime rate of left-wing-violence which in some years is nearly twice high as right-wing-violence.
- If you consider the distribution of population in East- and West-Germany you find four times more projects in East-Germany. However this corresponds with the occurrence of politically motivated crime in all phenomena.

Perspectives

A detailed description of the results of 2018 is part of a chapter of the handbook from my colleague, which will be published by the BKA at the end of 2019. There we will also add a comparison with approaches to prevention in France, Great Britain and Denmark.

Furthermore, it is planned to publish both: The contents of the handbook as well as the contents and contact data of the prevention projects and organizations on a website. The

service will provide a public searchable interactive map, a newsletter function and the opportunity to notify us of projects that have not yet been recorded.

For example a teacher can search on the website within a distance of 30km from his school for projects that prevent right-wing-extremism for juveniles in form of workshops. Another example: A mother who is unsure how to handle the fact, that her son watched Islamist websites, and looks for assistance by professionals.

Another goal of the website is, that different projects can get in contact with each other more easily in order to exchange information.

Psychological Factors and Mental Health Issues in Tertiary Prevention

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At the EENeT conference in Athens in October 2019, first results of the now published Issue Paper “Psychological Factors and Mental Health Issues in Tertiary Prevention” (by Sofia Koller with contributions by Anders Bo Christensen, Dr. Guillaume Corduan, Dr. Nils Duits, Dr. Aya Mortag Freund, Dr. Paul Gill, and Cathrine Moestue) were presented.

Abstract

Psychological factors and mental health issues are a complex and sensitive – yet important – issue in tertiary prevention of radicalization and Islamist extremism. This Issue Paper lays out some important aspects of these topics as addressed during the second workshop of the International Forum for Expert Exchange on Countering Islamist Extremism (InFoEx) in May 2019. Topics range from risk assessment tools to professional (medical) confidentiality. The paper thus aims to contribute to a better and more nuanced understanding by including highlights from expert discussions and additional perspectives of relevant researchers, as well as practical recommendations.

Introduction/Methods

This Issue Paper is based on group discussions and debates as documented during a workshop of the International Forum for Expert Exchange on Countering Islamist Extremism (InFoEx) in May 2019 in Berlin.¹ The workshop’s goal was to facilitate knowledge exchange in countering Islamist extremism.

Around 30 participants from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom came together in Berlin to discuss experiences, lessons learned, and inspiring practices regarding the role of psychological factors and mental health issues in the field of tertiary prevention. Both psychological factors and mental health issues need to be considered in this discussion. A counselor working at an advice center needs to be able to consider psychological factors, such as group dynamics and cognitive processes, when dealing with a radicalized individual. At the same time, he or she might be dealing with an individual that is considered radicalized but has a mental illness. The available data in this

¹ InFoEx is a joint project of the Migration, Integration, and Asylum Research Centre of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Over the course of 2019 – 2020, InFoEx is collecting inspiring practices from practitioners working in tertiary prevention in Germany and abroad, as well as insights from academics conducting research in this field.

research area is still quite limited. Thus, no causal connection has been established between mental illness and extremism so far. At the same time, experts largely agree that considering an individual's psychosocial background and personality forms the basis of exit work. Integrating a needs-based approach², the workshop focused on the following topics and chapters:

1. Lone Actors and Group Dynamics
2. Risk Assessment Tools
3. Multi-Actor and Multi-Agency Cooperation
4. Professional (Medical) Confidentiality
5. Psychological Perspectives on the Role of Gender
6. Personality Profiles
7. Resilience

Each chapter briefly summarizes highlights from the expert discussion during the workshop. Furthermore, selected articles, studies, and papers – written by some of the international participants themselves or recommended by them or other relevant stakeholders – have been included. This paper does not aim to provide an exhaustive literature review or scientific analysis but to shed light on inspiring practices and perspectives from international experts in the field of (tertiary) prevention. Finally, international speakers have contributed personal key recommendations for practitioners working in tertiary prevention.

Results: Key Recommendations

From these findings, the following recommendations result for those involved in the design, planning, funding, and implementing of tertiary prevention projects and programs:

- 1) Ensuring integration of mental health expertise in tertiary prevention:** There is no consensus on how exactly mental health impact an individual's decision to disengage from an extremist group. Yet there is a correlation and experts largely agree that tertiary prevention should include mental health expertise and provide psychological support when needed.
- 2) Developing a common understanding around mental health:** To ensure a common understanding of the topic, involved actors should generate definitions, standards, and assessment tools, as well as establish ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes.
- 3) Enhancing and improving multi-agency training:** There is an urgent need for joint trainings of different professions, such as social workers or security agencies. Project budgets should aim to include training units, for example regarding risk assessment, information-sharing, and medical confidentiality. Existing training programs should be regularly updated to include current developments in research and practice on radicalization and extremism, as well as relevant challenges, such as legal matters regarding prevention work.
- 4) Providing frameworks for effective cooperation and support counseling within and across professions:** Funding authorities should provide funding for projects that develop

²In preparation of the InFoEx workshop, research fellows embedded with local advice centers were asked to share – in agreement with practitioners – specific information needs and questions on the topic. This input was used to develop the workshop's format and content, as well as to select relevant (international) speakers.

opportunities for institutionalized exchange between professional peers as well as across professional borders. In this way, the access to professionals with relevant knowledge on radicalization and extremism can be improved, for example through (internal) intervention¹ and peer-to-peer counseling.

- 5) **Expanding (existing) public structures:** Existing support structures should be expanded to alleviate pressure on mental health specialists who are supporting tertiary prevention and ensure access to psychiatric care.
- 6) **Translating research findings into practice and informing research from practical experience:** Researchers should make sure to involve mental health professionals in the design of their research, as well as ensure that research results are discussed with practitioners and translated into practical recommendations. At the same time, workshops including case intervention, as well as talks on and presentations of practical experience, can be used to influence research questions and design.

TOPIC 3: RADICALIZATION / EXTREMISM / TERRORISM

When far-right extremism mutates into violence

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Abstract

Far-right extremism is often unified as an expressions of 'white power' or extreme nationalism, framed with an imaginary of neo-Nazi-inspired street violence of the 1980s. However, once we begin to explore this movement, we encounter very different currents. The *alt-right movement* is closely associated with gamer worlds, with a significant debt to forms of digital culture based on irony, *lulz*, memes and misogyny that emerged first in 4chan, and which became radicalised in 8chan, giving rise to celebrations of 'raids' and 'shitposts'. This demonstrates a complex relationship with nationalism, evident in the place of Kekistan. Other forms of violence associated with far-right extremism demonstrate an experiential structure similar to that of school shooters, associating a desire for *self-destruction and obliteration of a personal world*. Themes of the occult, ranging from Satanism to Nordic myths, pervade this new communication space, while the constant reference to 'redpills' and 'normies' highlights an experiential structure of the 'hidden' and the 'revealed'.

There are evident convergences between these expressions of far-right extremism and contemporary jihadist movements.

This paper examines three cases where alt-right extremism mutates into actual or planned extreme violence. The *April 2019 Christchurch massacre* was framed within an imaginary of 'shitposting'. A planned killing in the UK town of *Wokington using a pipe bomb and improvised napalm* in 2018 demonstrates the suicidal logic of the school shooter. Two men

convicted of terrorism offences in the UK in 2019 linked to the US group *Atomwaffen* demonstrate a fascination with the occult that is central to this current.

Understanding how these different extremist currents mutate into violence is of critical importance for both *policing* and *prevention*, and this analysis hopes to contribute to this task.

Summary, research method and conclusion

This paper presents current research on far-right extremism and begins to explore the processes involved when this mutates into violence. The research is based on an analysis of the social media communications of small neo-Nazi groups in the United Kingdom, as well as an analysis of posts and communications shared on 4Chan. The paper contrasts two kinds of far-right extremism, both associated with actual or attempted violence in Europe in the past year.

The first of these is the extremist violence linked with small, secret, neo-Nazi groups. In this case, the paper uses the social media feed linked to a UK group, System Resistance Network, to highlight themes leading to attempts to undertake killings in the United Kingdom.

The second case study focuses on more diffuse extreme right communications and networks emerging in social media, associated in particular with the 4Chan and 8Chan websites. The paper focuses on the fact that the alleged killer involved in the Halle attack in Germany in October 2019 refers to himself as 'Anon' in the live stream he broadcast of this attack, and his 'manifesto' is framed in language and metaphors reflecting the culture of 4Chan.

The paper examines posts and discussions of the Halle murders on 4Chan, and offers an analysis of the ways this attack is welcomed and celebrated. This is particularly the case with communications on the /r/ board, a board shaped by Incel (involuntary celibate) culture and communications. It is clear that the Incels who post to this board welcome the Halle killer as one of their own, and they frame this killing within a larger imaginary of violence that has been emerging on this and related websites over recent years, one that focuses on the 'uprising' of 'beta' males.

This 'uprising' finds its origins originally in the violent imaginary of school shooters, which over the past decade has given rise to a branch that focuses on women alleged to reject the advances of Incels.

This paper begins to explore the ways through which this Incel violence mutates into the far-right themes at the centre of the Halle attacks, in particular through the development of KEK memes and imaginaries that emerged on 4Chan in late 2017, where humour, irony and a culture of memes play a central role in diffusing a neo-Nazi culture well beyond closed secretive groups.

The paper concludes by arguing that this convergence of different imaginaries of violence, in particular that of school shooters, Incels and a new form of neo-Nazism constructed in terms of humour and irony is of fundamental importance in terms of understanding contemporary far-right radicalisation. These movements originally emerged in the United States, but the global impact of the cultures associated with them, in particular through websites and social

media, mean that we are now witnessing violence framed by these imaginaries in Europe. It is this convergence that was at the centre of the attempted mass killing in Halle in October 2019, and increasingly, this is the face of far-right extremism, and its mutation into violence.

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Educational and Research Activities of CTU in the Field of Radicalization

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Czech Technical University in Prague within the Faculty of Biomedical Engineering offer the students different study programmes on bachelor and master's level, which are focused on population protection and crisis management predominantly. These programmes are offered in regular and distance study level. Main ambition of these programmes is to bring together students with the vision to work in integral emergency system and law enforcement authorities. For this purpose, studying include lectures and practical exercise in the process of ensuring internal security, forensic sciences, terrorism, extremisms, crime protection a crisis situation. The graduated students are able then to join police forces, prison service, customs service, intelligence services etc.

Except the traditional study programmes, the faculty has been developing research activities. In this year the university was successful and received the subvention and financial support from the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic for project Detection of Radicalisation in the Context of Population and Soft Targets Protection against Violent Incidents. Main objectives of this project is to develop functional and complex methodology, how to educate the staff responsible for security detecting radicalisation process and the individuals who have been radicalised. Second line of the project is to develop efficient software helping threat assessment of the persons in deradicalisation process in regard to the risk level. Crucial platform for developing the methodology and tools to detect radicalised people and to deal with them is case studies analysis of the analogical cases happening in the Czech Republic. The analysis is focused on all forms of radicalisation because Czech Republic has only several experiences with jihadist radicalisation but this trend is slowly increasing. Below there are mentioned contemporary cases concerning radicalisation and terrorism on the territory of Czech Republic. First case of

jihadist radicalization in Czech Republic was young men Jan Silovský who radicalized himself on the basis of ISIS online propaganda. He decided to convert to islam and then he travelled to join ISIS in Syria in 2016. He was found guilty and The High Court in Prague sentenced Jan Silovský to six years in prison for the support of terrorism. In May 2019 starts the trial with Slovak Dominik Kobulnický. He was charged with the preparation of a terrorist attack. Kobulnický told the court that in the past he had been taught by former Prague Imam Samer Shehadeh. Last year, Shehadeh was charged with support to terrorism and in November he was escorted from Jordan to the Czech Republic. Apart from him, charges were brought against his brother and his brother's wife over membership of a terrorist organization. Czech pensioner Jaromir Balda was sentenced for 4 years imprisonment and psychiatric treatment for terror attacks on trains. A Czech pensioner felled trees to block railway lines and then pretended Islamists were responsible. Jaromir Balda, 71, left messages at the scene proclaiming "Allahu Akbar" or "God is great" in Arabic. Two passenger trains hit the trees, but nobody was injured. He was intensively influence by the anti-muslim and anti-migrants propaganda spreading on social media and by selected individuals.

Social tension and Extremism: nexus and challenges

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Abstract

Contemporary terrorism has been featured by an extraordinary frequency in low profile attacks. Those incidents contributed to the disruption of the ordinary character of the terrorist act or at least how the society used to perceive it.

Reality is changing, many significant phenomena are impacting globally, and the society finds itself at odds with effective ways of interpretation and intervention.

This situation advances instability into a social environment which is not ready, this promotes a general perception of insecurity which is not confined to the sole short run.

Insecurity pushes social tensions so heightening the risk of radicalisation, polarisation and violent extremism.

The challenge will be to design new cognitive frameworks which are able to better interpret the reality lowering social tension and insecurity, and capable of taking into consideration the complexity of the social context so requiring a wider cooperative effort.

The overall approach should tend to resilience – via - prevention, adapting social cognitive models to new scenarios, and to multi-agency cooperation as a channel to achieve it.

Introduction

The publication “Global Trends Paradox of Progress” of the US National Intelligence Council, through the discussion of demographic patterns, sustainable economic development, the relation between technological advancement and progress, the challenges of diversity, governance, the environment and of the changing nature of conflicts, clearly shows that

many complex phenomena are impacting globally “at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder”³.

In the meanwhile, the society over which these phenomena act seems to find itself at odds with effective ways of interpretation and intervention.

Within this framework, terrorism may be taken as an eloquent example: according to Europol, from 2014 to 2018 there were a total of 888 failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks in the EU, of low and high profile⁴. They were committed by groups as well as lone actors.

The hybrid character of the threat and the high frequency of attacks occurrence, which appears to be able to turn terrorism from an extraordinary to an ordinary phenomenon, has recently led experts to call for a condition of *new normal* and the need to promote social resilience to it because, for the time being, the society in Europe does not appear to be resilient to terrorism.

Complex phenomena impacting globally, a compressed time perception and the lack of relevant cognitive frameworks of interpretation and intervention within the social system create a state of crisis which promotes instability and a general perception of insecurity. The theory of cognitive dissonance⁵ elaborated by Leon Festinger in 1957 helps in understanding the process and the social reaction to it: “when real world events “disconfirm” deeply held beliefs this creates psychological discomfort in persons and they will respond by means of distortion and denial”⁶.

Translating theory into reality in order to provide for a clarifying example, in recent years the political discourse of some parties has exploited sensitive phenomena such as immigration through a narrative of fear, hate, prejudice and rejection.

According to Amnesty International, during the 2019 EU elections the 11.5% of the 100.000 evaluated social contents, from 461 candidates, resulted either offensive, discriminatory or hate speech⁷. On immigration, 42 contents out of 100 resulted of the above-mentioned type; 47,5 out of 100 for religious minorities⁸. The offensive or discriminatory contents of politicians generated an average of interactions much higher than that of the others: 2,467 likes, 595 shares and 473 comments, which fall in the case of nonproblematic negative posts to 443, 152 and 90 and are further low for those with neutral or positive meaning⁹.

Political formations which have often adopted the above-mentioned narrative seem to enjoy significant consensus among the European electorate, as a matter of fact the political group Identity and Democracy has won 73 seats at the EU Parliament¹⁰.

According to this changing scenario and its side effects for the societies, it is worthwhile to reflect upon the institutional dimension and how the phenomena of radicalisation,

³ US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends Paradox of Progress, January 2017
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf>

⁴ European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat>

⁵ L.Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford University Press, 1957

⁶ A.Kessler, *Cognitive dissonance, the Global Financial Crisis and the discipline of economics*, Real-world economics review, Issue no. 54, 2010 <http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue54/Kessler54.pdf>

⁷ Amnesty International, <https://www.amnesty.it/cosa-facciamo/elezioni-europee/>

⁸ Ibidem

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ EU Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ireland/en/your_meps/european-elections/election_results.html

polarisation and violent extremism impact on the counter – measures and above all prevention strategies and activities.

All the professionals involved at different levels under this framework need a sort of “*professional awareness*” about how these societal processes such as radicalization and polarisation develop and take place.

This perspective lead to our main research question: how to make evident the potential nexus between social tensions and terrorism?

The research activities carried out in this research project are aimed at the possibility to find objective findings related to the main research question.

Methods

The current research project was developed according to a mixed methodological approach, in order to take into account the varieties of features dealing with the changing scenario, previously described.

Two main methods were considered:

- a desk research finalized to the collection of the current analysis from a socio – cultural and socio – political perspectives of the changing scenario. The main aim of this research activity is to understand the more common elements useful for a comparative analysis of different social tensions and their reasons
- an open source analysis was focused on the different cases of social tensions rise in the last three years within the European countries.

These two research activities and their analysis developed under a holistic approach, where none sociological element was taken for granted, paved the new reflections on the role of social tensions and their nexus with the new faces of extremist processes.

Results

After the collection and analysis phases, it is possible to say that the perception of insecurity pushes social tension, intended in accordance to Neil Joseph Smelser “as a specific condition of social consciousness and social emotions (...) characterized by the buildup of mental fatigue and irritability, frustration and deprivation, aggression, and depression of a significant part of society”¹¹, which may lead to conflict if the social system and its settings are not *flexible*¹².

As an instance, social tension heightens the risk of radicalization, polarization and violent extremism, and violent extremist groups already foment and exploit social tension to their advantage. This, virally spreading a narrative which inflames insecurity, prejudice, rejection and conflict, and which is tailored for a target audience that lacks the relevant cognitive instruments to counter it (ex. Generation Z) and faces significant individual, social, political and economic challenges¹³. When discussing the flexibility of the social system Lewis Coser points out the central role played by the correct functioning of the public social institutions. Other factors could reveal crucial as well and as stated by Neil Basu, Assistant Commissioner

¹¹ N.Smelser, *Sociology*, Prentice Hall, 1994

¹² L.Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, New York: Free Press, 1956

¹³ R.C. Baffa, N. Vest, W.Y. Chan, A. Fanlo, *Defining and Understanding the Next Generation of Salafi-Jihadis*, Perspective, Expert insights on a timely policy issue, RAND, August 2019

of the UK Metropolitan Police “Policies that go towards more social inclusion, more social mobility and more education are much more likely to drive down violence ... than all the policing and state security apparatus put together. It is much more likely to have a positive effect on society”¹⁴.

These lines support the shared vision among European Law Enforcement Agencies to promote three different approaches to deal with social tensions, fostering multi-agency approach for multidimensional threats; community policing; community intelligence.

These approaches are essential to prevent and manage the signals and effects of violent extremism, focusing on the consideration of a resilient perspective.

According to this framework, resilience is not only the capacity to bounce back once a crisis materialises or an efficient response to a crisis, but a set of prevention strategies.

All prevention activities need to be shared with the population and communicate adequately, thinking about the features of the citizens, their needs and above all their perceptions.

Putting resilience in context¹⁵ is the best option to promote prevention and inclusive policies before societal tensions appear, making evident the features of resilience itself:

- context- sensitive
- flexible
- adaptive

Resilience is also directly connected with the importance of social milieu for all the different extremist processes such as radicalisation and violent extremism. It makes evident the adaptive feature of the new threats themselves, taking advantages from the vulnerabilities of the context.

Finally, two main results of this research action need to be recognized:

1. the methodological approach named *S.E.A. - Societal Environmental Approach*: the societal context is not only considered the frame where threats become real, but it is an active actor playing a central role in the possibility to prevent, deal or even contrast extremism attitudes.
2. the rising of *Situated Violent Extremism Approach*: the new threats need to be identified with different sociological categories, especially going beyond the interpretation based on fixed ideological borders, looking at the different types of low-profile attacks in the last years and their transformative features.

In conclusion, considering a socio- ecological perspective, it is worthwhile to include within a new theoretical and methodological framework of analysis the role played by societal resilience confronting societal settings through three main drivers already contained in the international counter – radicalisation and extremism policies: multiagency approach; community policing; community intelligence.

¹⁴ The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/06/counter-terrorism-chief-calls-for-greater-social-inclusion>

¹⁵ Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979), *The Ecology of Human Development*, Harvard University Press, USA

Behind the veil – Exclusive insights into female engagement within Jihadi networks

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Abstract

This lecture is about my current research in the field of female Islamic radicalization. Through selected examples of some of the young females who are members of Jihadi groups and part of the whole research-sample of 70 female interviewees, a specific vulnerability that is all of the female's biographies inherent should be underlined: the sexual abuse they had to suffer within their childhood and youth. Based on methods of the Psychology of Religion, this mutual characteristic is examined in order to understand its impact for the young females in terms of their engagement in Jihadi groups. Furthermore, the understanding of this causal link shall support the development of an awareness for the biographies of the female Jihadists and their fascination for violence as a way of self-portrayal, identification and mental processing of individual experiences.

Introduction / Methods

What motivates girls and young women to join the Jihadist wing of an Islamic movement? Based on qualitative data (70 interviews) with female adherents of Jihadist groups within Germany, Switzerland, England, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Austria and the Netherlands, my book 'Women in Jihad – Salafism as a Transnational Network' tries to find an answer with regard to this question.

Beside various individual reasons and a transnational interaction between the respondents within networks such as the 'Sharia4'-groups, one common ground was their experience of sexual, psychological and physical abuse during their childhood and youth. This aspect was presented in Athens, because it seemed to me that this manifestation is highly unexplored in the field of female Jihadists. Of course doesn't victimization automatically lead to an engagement within violent groups, but it is an indicator for the specific vulnerability of the female adherents that could have been channeled by Jihadist groups and actors on their behalf.

This observation could enable researchers, social workers and policy makers to modify their prevention- and de-radicalization-approaches with regard to female members or sympathizers of Jihadist movements.

The biographical interviews have been analyzed with respect to various gender-issues, e.g. the participation in violent acts, as well as methods with regard to the Psychology of religion such as the role of charismatic leaders, in order to observe the similarities and differences of male and female engagement within a religious movement.

(Selected) Results

Beside a gender-centric view on the phenomenon, exists a need for a research approach related to the Psychology of religion in the field of female religious radicalization.

Prevention approaches that contain the empowerment of females who became victims of sexual, physical or psychological violence in their childhood and youth, seem to be helpful in order to avoid the canalization of frustration, anger and the search for a 'sense of life' in radical Islamic movements.

PODIUM DISCUSSION

In this year's Podium Discussion, we talked about "Radicalization in context: Best practices and lessons learned". There were diverse veteran and newer members of the EENeT attending, who represented multiple countries as well as multiple pillars of information (Police, Intelligence, Academics, civil society and policy maker) and could bring their individual great experience in the field of research to the discussion. The EENeT-audience was also included in some parts of the discussion. Important for the whole process was also the point of view of our Greek local experts, who could provide insights on the current situation in Athens & Greece.

Radicalization Landscape in Greece

Different forms of extremism and violent radicalization get fueled by certain political, social and psychological conflicts. Right-wing and left-wing extremism as well as Islamist extremism can currently be observed in Greece. However, the main focus lies on extreme left radicalization. After the financial crisis, the potential for social conflict and thus the potential for violence have increased enormously. A polarization developed within Greek society. Violent anarchists have declared some areas to be grey zones in which the Greek police has not full control and do not have sufficient information about the inhabitants and their actions. Some anarchists have also travelled to the Kurdish autonomous areas in Syria to fight against the jihadists with them. At the present moment there are fewer incidents with left-wing extremists but the scene is active and the Greek police is on high alert if riots are expected.

There is currently less danger of Islamist offenders in Greek society. Greece is not an attractive target or destination for Islamist terrorism. One reason could be seen in Greece's good partnership with the Middle East. There is a long tradition of maintaining good relations between Greece and the Arab states. Moreover, Greece has not sent troops to the conflicts in Middle East and is not one of the central members of the EU, which are more often in the focus of terrorist attacks.

Concerns, however, have arisen regarding the continuous strong migration to Europe since 2015. Greece acts as a transit country and currently about 50,000 migrants and refugees are stuck in camps on five different Greek islands, living on the brink of society and being socially and economically totally excluded. Young people and children who live in these camps for months or even years have experienced negative sentiments and thus may suffer from the psychological consequences. Here radicalization could hit fertile ground. Greece, together with a joint EU-involvement, is required to improve preventive work at this point.

Greece is also developing its own tool for predicting radicalization processes in direct exchange with the Northern European states.

Terms of Radicalization

In our discussion we have mentioned that the term of "Radicalization" is problematic to grasp and serves a certain stigmata. It may describe more thoroughly results from social conflicts and symptoms of underlying mental or educational issues. Furthermore it is a term

often used for the Islamist phenomenon area, whereas it should still be able to generalize on the whole phenomenon. But is it not much more important to look at the transition from Islamization to truly violent behavior?

In competing for research grants we also notice that in order to get funding for projects, researchers are needed to use the term “radicalization” somewhere in their proposals, whether it fits or not. Without it, it is noticeably less likely to receive financial support.. At the same time, the concept of radicalization is too broad and can be used far too simply and recklessly without being aware of its exact meaning. Being radical is nothing criminal as long as you do not legitimate or even prefer to use violence. On the other hand, the term “Radicalization” has been overused by the police and politicians and is moving away from its original intended meaning. Terms such as “Hatecrime” or “Extremism” are seen much clearer defined by the active research community.

If we go back to the French Revolution, where the term has its origin, it has to be observed that radicalization is the fight against a state of violence or tyranny. On the one hand, it shows that "radicalization" is actually a psychological process. In the current context, this also implies learning of violence and how to express it. Therefore a different terminology must be used to describe these processes more clearly: What is the specific process of young people leading them to be violent against the society? What happens to the person? On the other hand, it must be found an expression that describes such a multi-levelled process. There are many forms of violent radicalization and many research fields are struggling for keywords for it.

Causes of Radicalization

The discussion proceeded to some critical thoughts about the variety of causes for radicalization: How is a person radicalized? What could be called the root cause of radicalization? On a general level, we see that unregulated social conflicts might be the reason why so many (especially young) people are radicalized. This leads them to suggest whether we still have the right answers to current problems in society (which is still a good thing and a necessary part of a vital society).

Are not radical opinions therefore a necessary component of society? A society will – as part of an integral process – develop extreme opinions and polarize on it. If we reimagine radicalization as an evolution of polarization, we will conclude that there are quite a few overlaps. The major issue arises when violence is perceived as a legitimate way of enforcing a certain idea.

In the end, radicalization is such a dynamic and rapidly changing phenomenon that it is quite difficult to follow the countless changes that occur. We have tried for decades in the past to solve this process, but we may simply not have the cognitive capacity to grasp such rapid developments. Globalization plays an important role here, too - as there are a number of efforts to reduce the effects of polarization through globalization. But globalization should not be used to make everything equal, but to emphasize inequality and yet engage in cooperative dialogue.

We have studied in depth the mechanisms by which a person adapts radicalized opinions and attitudes. But we may need to look more closely at the transition to violent behavior.

Typology of extremist Foreign Fighters

What does it take to get close to extremism? When we look at social psychology, we can extract a model of factors that can describe the phenomenon: Polarizing, absolute, threat-oriented, dehumanizing hatred and apocalyptic elements. When these factors are expressed, we may speak of extremism. But there are numerous individual reasons why someone might be willing to follow an extremist ideology and fight in other countries. Islamist foreign fighters are usually on the watch lists and in respecting databases of many European countries. For example: 90 foreign fighters went from Italy alone, 40 died in the process. But foreign fighters didn't only fight for Daesh; they were also involved on the Kurdish side: Many of them are treated as heroes in their respective countries because they fight the "great evil" of Daesh. 25 fighters travelled from Belgium, for example, to fight on the Kurdish side. Interestingly, these "non-jihadist fighters" are still radicalized people who gain combat experience and have access to equipment, but are often underestimated in their level of threat to internal security when they return - there is still the implicit belief that "jihadists" are more dangerous. However, they still fought for another country / cause and are by definition "foreign fighters". Another example of non-jihadist foreign fighters is people from the far-right who leave to fight for Ukraine or Russia in their respective conflicts.

What do these people learn in these conflicts? What do they bring back and what are their ideological beliefs? In fact, we have very limited data on left-wing and right-wing returnees. Nor is there any evidence of attacks by returnees. However, it is assumed that there is a high risk and that they are very threatening.

In our discussion, we also briefly addressed the question of whether foreign fighters can be exploited by foreign intelligence services. The topic of private mercenaries working specifically for the Russian Federation was also discussed, as was possible exploitation of foreign fighters by other states. However it should be borne in mind that every state-actor would be very reluctant to use foreign fighters for their own purposes - so operations would be completed under strictly confidential conditions. From a legal point of view, there is no difference in the fight for another country – but should there be another form of regulation? Or is there no such need for a general law to prohibit such behavior, because only people who inhibit extreme radicalized motivations would be expected to, fight for another country or search for other warzones. So the problem might still lie within the person.

We also often find very similar narratives when we delve into the typology of radicalization & extremism: There is an abstract danger together with the communicated need to defend the own in-group (e.g. the incident of Halle & Christchurch). We must therefore look more closely at the motivations of various extremist groups. Who are they fighting for? What is the political or religious agenda in the crosshair

WORLD CAFÉ SESSION

World Café 1: Future of the EENeT

Extension of the EENeT

- Make EENeT better known outside the network and raise awareness in order to attract more potential members
- The inclusion of further member states (France, Scandinavia, etc.) is important
- Develop more contact to experts in Africa
- More presentations of the EENeT and show presence on more different meetings
 - closer cooperation with other networks (policy makers, etc.)
 - open up to multilateralism institutions (Europol, European military group, regional specialists, contacts to ex-military)
- Urgent need for funding

Member Action

- Current issue: EENeT- member drop out due to not reporting back to the GDPR-regulations
- Examination of active qualitative participation
 - Selective recruitment
 - define more discerning criteria to become a member
- More diversity (gender, age, profession, etc.)
 - Woman, young and middle-aged, practitioners, etc.
- Improve dissemination practices for publications and actions by EENeT members
- Collecting interesting results from projects
 - Make them known
 - To ensure trust and transparency
- Member survey to work constructively and cooperatively on the network
- Improve online and social media presence of the EENeT

Suggestions for upcoming EENeT-conferences

- Room for experimental approaches
- Invite external speaker
- Looking at the topics from new perspective
- Need for more diverse approaches/presentations/topics
- Printed evaluation at the end of each conference (Does EENeT serve its members?)

World Café 2: How to embed research and expertise in the political domain? (Summary by Edwin Bakker)

Terrorism and extremism are complex phenomena and countering them is a complex task, both for practitioners and for politicians. Dealing with these challenges require many different actors at many different levels. The best way forward, at least on paper, is using best practices and output of research into (countering) extremism and terrorism. In the last two decades the body of knowledge in this field has grown, providing do's and don'ts and tips and tricks that could lead to better policies.

Both practitioners and researchers feel that their expertise and research often times does not reach the political domain nor find its way into new policies or political positions. The question the participants of the EENeT World Café focused on was 'how to embed research and expertise in the political domain?'

In order to increase the chance that research and expertise is embedded in the political domain, participants of the World Café stressed the need to understand the world of politicians: their needs, their reality, their worries. Politicians have to take into account not only the effectiveness of policies but also popular support, international (legal) standards and international agreements.

A second issue stressed by the participants was the importance of 'civil servant courage'. In a different session during the EENeT conference, policy makers reflecting on the CT policies in the last ten years were highly critical about the effectiveness of these policies. It is important that high ranking policy makers let their position know even if it is an inconvenient truth: preferably indoors, but if needed they should have to courage to express their thoughts also in the public domain. Some recent examples showed this might in fact give politicians the room to rethink and adjust their policies by referring to the civil servant experts.

The participants also discussed the tactics of how to get issues and policy ideas on the agenda that are based on expertise and research. The public debate is an obvious way to influence politicians, but there are other ways as well. Think of doing research for or cooperating with foundations, think tanks or youth organisations of political parties. Another tactic is cooperating with retired top officials who have the standing and the freedom to issue critical reports and open letters. Think of the recent open letter from national security professionals to western governments: 'Unless we act now the Islamic State will rise again', published by the Soufan Center on the issue of returning foreign fighters and women and children.

A fourth issue that was put forward by several participants to the discussion was the use of windows of opportunity in combination with international cooperation. Many of the issues related to extremism and terrorism are transnational issues and the political debates in European countries are rather similar, think of the current issue of returning foreign fighters.

Comparative research and international meetings of experts, policy makers and researchers can help to provide not only policy suggestions based on multiple experiences, but also more room for politicians to rethink and adjust their policies as they can refer to situations and experiences in other countries.

The participants of the World Café agreed that the opportunities to embed expertise and research in the political domain differs per country. In general, it is not easy, but despite the many differences within Europe we can learn from each other's best practices in this particular field. Conferences such as the EE-Net meeting in Athens, are very helpful to exchange ideas in order to help practitioners, policy makers and researchers to make sure their insights find their way to the political domain.

World Café 3: How to implement evaluation with the support of research?

How to evaluate

- Clear definition of evaluation is needed: What does evaluation mean?
 - Define a clear goal
 - Which data will be used
 - What to measure/Proper monitoring
 - Which methods can be used?

(Grounded theory, expert interviews, monitoring on phenomenon, Comprehensive methodology)

 - Adhere to quality standards
 - Use of randomization
 - Monitoring components must be able to adapt the projects to the results of the evaluation.
- Standardization of evaluation (and its advantage)
 - to generate comparable data
 - Important for the work of practitioners
- Time frame of evaluation
 - More time is needed to accomplish a proper evaluation
 - Policy is changing
- Evaluation needs to be independent (especially of funding organizations)
 - Secure funding for evaluation – from the beginning
 - Needs to be open/accessible: Transparency
 - Evaluation on different levels/perspectives
- Evaluated parties need to be included from the start (participatory approach)
- Limits of evaluation should be communicated openly
 - Problem with measures (politically effective)
 - Changing variables

Support/Implication for practical work

- There is a gap between data and everyday work of police /politics
 - Pseudo correlation
 - Theoretical guided
 - Dynamics of the phenomenon

- Be aware of the changing context
- Should be connected to real demands in order to make the evaluation usable
- Recommendation for the EU to improve evaluation practice
- Policy makers should be more clear on what they try to achieve
- Not only successful projects should be published (report on failed projects)
- Also publish “bad practice”/“failures” (to improve the overall work)
- Projects which are not driven by research, might not be “prepared” for evaluation
 - Increase awareness of value of evaluation and how/where it can be carried out
 - Raising awareness of the interaction with different parties
 - How to present the findings/results to the public
 - How to communicate the results and “keep an eye ” on the narrative of your research

World Café 4: How can research be predictive?

Research and Access to databases

- Paradox of asking the academia for access to database
 - Data should be shared with “the outside”
 - Use of qualitative data and access to official valid data (good models)
 - Access to the field
 - Complete database
 - Transparency
- Collection of data for implementation of risk and trend analysis
- Data needs to be objective
- Evaluation of methods

Prediction and Challenges for the future

- Global trends -> Future of predictions?
- Different disciplines make it hard to be predictive
- To effort/to ensure sustainability
- Complex and interdisciplinary team to observe the phenomenon
 - Learn from other disciplines and their approaches
 - To teach people about limitations plus disadvantages as well
- Future scenarios are changing rapidly
 - Sudden events can trigger political changes (makes prediction harder)
- Complex and interdisciplinary team is needed to observe the phenomenon from different perspectives
- To find funding possibilities for sustainable projects
 - Flexible budgets for the commitment of a task force dedicated to current topics/issues
 - Strengthening resources
- Need of different predictive models/using of complex models
- Have a look into early-warning systems/indicators
 - But be careful: Cannot rely 100% on an early warning systems/predictions
 - Identify risk factors with help of the judiciary
 - Identify indicators from actor’s point of view
- To be really predictive is maybe too ambitious /might not be possible
- Understanding the past in a decisive way
 - Compare and learn from case studies

➤ Interdisciplinary approach

- Careful: Labeling of persons grounded on predictions can be dangerous
- Demanding intergovernmental effort to realize being predictive